

# THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

---



NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1937

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*Crazy Business*  
By PETER B. KYNE



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# The CHIEF OF CAVALRY

~ extends to the ~  
OFFICERS and ENLIST-  
ED MEN of the CAVALRY  
*the season's Greetings  
and his best wishes  
for the Ensuing Year*



CHRISTMAS ON THE OUTPOST



WILLIAM  
PETERSON  
1907



# GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN

By Lieutenant Colonel John G. Yenchar, Infantry Reserve

At the beginning of the Civil War the Southern Cavalry was superior because the Northern Cavalry was new to the field and the Southerners were undoubtedly better mounted and individually better horsemen. These circumstances, together with their knowledge of the country gave the Southern Cavalry great advantages in the scouts, skirmishes, raids and actions by small detachments that for nearly two years comprised the operations of the Cavalry. However, from the moment that General Sheridan challenged that supremacy until the surrender at Appomattox Court House, he held the initiative and gained the superiority in all actions where large bodies of troops were massed and engaged in personal conflict.

General Sheridan was born at sea of Irish parents on March 6, 1831. His birth was recorded at Albany, New York. At West Point he had difficulty in getting his commission for scholastic reasons but he developed his natural talents in a way that inspired others. Until May, 1861, he served in the 3d and 4th Infantry Regiments in the West. At that time he was appointed Captain in the 13th Infantry. In December, 1861, he was made quartermaster and commissary of the Union Army in southwestern Missouri. He

was General Halleck's quartermaster during the Corinth campaign in 1862. In that year he was appointed Colonel of the Second Michigan Cavalry and fought successfully in the operations in Northern Mississippi. Later he was appointed Brigadier General of Volunteers and placed in command of the 11th Division (Infantry) of the Army of the Ohio. Early in 1863 he became Major General of Volunteers and took part against Van Dorn and aided in the capture of Winchester, Tennessee, on June 27, 1863.

## COMMANDS INFANTRY

As an Infantry division commander, Sheridan had been engaged from dawn until night in the great battles of Perryville on October 8, 1862, Murfreesborough, January 3, 1863, and Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. In each of these contests he was generally unsupported by other troops and had to act on his own responsibility. At Mur-

freesborough and Chickamauga with his single division he protected and held the right flank of the Federal Army. His failure here might have been very serious if not fatally disastrous.


His division went into each of these battles with an average strength of four thousand men. At the close of the Battle of Chickamauga, General Sheridan had lost 3,483 men from his single division in killed, wounded, and missing in these three engagements. Among the casualties were five brigade commanders killed and one badly wounded. Of the 3,483 men, 350 fell at Perryville and about 1,560 each in the other two battles. Despite these severe losses Sheridan and his troops never lost heart nor lacked the power to defend themselves or attack the enemy. They were never routed, panic-stricken, nor driven in confusion from the field but if retreat were necessary or advance to be made, they retreated or advanced under orders with a definite purpose, and came out of the most severe engagements organized, formed and ready for any further service.

His experience with desperate and indecisive battles closed with Chickamauga, and from that time on Sheridan was destined to lead or

take part in operations that were designed for, and obtained victory.

## A DYNAMIC PERSONALITY

Early in life Sheridan was of slight physique. In 1864, when he came from the West to take command of the Cavalry in the Army of the Potomac, at the age of thirty-three, he was five feet five inches in height and weighed only one hundred and fifteen pounds. Though he was of low stature and appeared slight, he possessed great bodily strength and a remarkable ability to bear, without strain or fatigue, continued and severe physical labor and the constant cares and anxieties that resulted from his duties. An excellent horseman and always well mounted, his presence was commanding and inspiring when he was aroused by the excitement of combat in the field.



General Philip H. Sheridan

## REORGANIZES THE CAVALRY

On April 5, 1864, Sheridan assumed command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, with headquarters at Brandy Station, Virginia, 62 miles southwest of Washington. He would have much preferred an Infantry command in which he acquired his experience as a general officer. Not only was he a stranger to the officers with whom he was to serve but he had no knowledge of this part of the country.

The organization of the cavalry as a corps was comparatively recent. It had been accomplished under discouraging circumstances with great difficulty. At no time did the officers in command possess exclusive authority over their troops or any power of independent action. When the war began, Lieut. General Scott, then in command of the Union Armies, did not believe in the utility of mounted troops and opposed the enlistment or organization of cavalry regiments to the full extent of his power. Those that were first called into service were raised under the direction authority of the President, contrary to the advice and wishes of the officers who held high commands. Evidently the officers shared Sherman's opinion that "romantic cavalry is antique in a war such as this." Doubtless they were influenced by the opinion of European armies, that since the days of Napoleon the Cavalry had not been giving the results expected of it because of the lack of real cavalry generals who knew how to handle masses. (EDITOR'S NOTE: Improper missions given cavalry far exceed examples of bad leadership.)

## UNDISCIPLINED TROOPERS, SMALL UNITS, AND INEXPERIENCED OFFICERS

The largest unit commanded by cavalry officers of the old army was the squadron. No attention was given to the drill, discipline, or organization of these troopers. For their vital necessities they were dependent upon such efforts as could be made by their regimental officers. During the 1st year of the war no attempt was made even to organize the cavalry into a brigade. At that time the rule of service was to assign one or more regiments of cavalry to each division of infantry for such duties as each division commander might order. The regiments were then broken up in small detachments for use as orderlies and escorts for general officers, guards for division wagon trains, and pickets to protect the front of Infantry lines. Rarely were they united as an organized body for drill or for any service. In the summer of 1862 the necessities of severe service compelled the organization of some brigades of cavalry. Each brigade was attached to a different corps of the Army. The cavalry did some effective work in the field and protected the infantry when they were at rest, but its discipline and morale still suffered from the want of a responsible chief and of a compact organization.

## CAVALRY CORPS ORGANIZED

Early in 1863, General Hooker authorized the formation of a Cavalry Corps in the Army of the Potomac, so that at least the various regiments and brigades scattered

throughout the army were united in divisions and placed in a separate command. Immediately, this greatly improved these troopers and from that time to the close of the war cavalry constantly increased in effective strength and usefulness. At the battle of Chancellorsville—May 1-5, 1863, its strength was not available as during that engagement the whole corps, with the exception of one brigade, was scattered in a series of desultory raids and operations in the rear of the enemy, which produced no important results, though in some instances executed with dash and brilliancy. However, General Pleasanton, who later was selected as the cavalry corps commander, at a critical period of the Battle of Chancellorsville gallantly repulsed, with a brigade of cavalry and a few field pieces, an attack of the Confederate infantry that, if successful, would have routed the Union Army. Within a short time after this battle, Pleasanton was placed in command. His division and brigade officers were all young men who had grown up with and had been developed by hard service in cavalry since the outbreak of the war. Shortly afterward his corps three times met and defeated in the open field the whole of the Southern Cavalry and took an important part in many other engagements.

## CAVALRY DUTIES IN 1861-1863

Even Pleasanton's success and the proofs he had given of the value of Cavalry, when properly used and led, were not sufficient to overcome the force of tradition and customs. Among higher authorities the idea still prevailed that the cavalry was secondary to infantry and should be used for its protection, convenience, and relief. The commanding general of the cavalry was more of a staff officer transmitting orders of the commanding general of the Army than an actual commander of a body of combatant troops. Because of the serious differences of opinion on these questions between generals Meade and Pleasanton, the latter was relieved from duty. At the suggestion of General Halleck, Sheridan was selected to fill this vacancy.

## SHERIDAN'S VIEWS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF CAVALRY

General Sheridan felt that the functions of a large body of cavalry attached to an active army were not limited to the guarding of wagon trains, the furnishing of advance guards and flankers to columns of Infantry, and the protection by heavy lines of pickets of the repose and peace of infantry and artillery at rest. Above all, he strongly insisted that he could not perform his duties as a cavalry corps commander by attending at the Headquarters of the commanding general and transmitting to his different Cavalry detachments such orders as he might receive.

He believed that trains and the flanks and rear of an army could be best protected from attacks of the Southern cavalry by seeking out and fighting that force in the field. The Infantry should protect itself and leave the Cavalry free for independent operations, he said. A large force of cavalry, properly organized and led, acting as a unit, he believed, could be used successfully against both the cavalry and infantry of the enemy, while this same

force broken into detachments and operating at different points, without plan or combined action, would be practically useless.

Until the time of the battles of the Wilderness, General Meade opposed these views of Sheridan. From the time that Meade withdrew his opposition the Cavalry Corps became in fact an organized, compact, and actually existent force, with the right and responsibilities of other Army Corps, and was consequently able to perform better service and accomplish greater results than at any previous period of its history.

#### RESTS AND RE-EQUIPS HIS CORPS

At the opening of the campaign of 1864 the effective strength of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac was 10,000 officers and men, the majority of whom had seen from two to three years of active service. The enlisted men were well disciplined. As a result of the two weeks of relief from picket duty, upon which Sheridan insisted, they were all well armed, equipped and fairly mounted. With more abundant forage and rest much was done to restore the condition of the mounts. In three divisions, about equal in strength, his Corps was organized, with Generals Torbert, Gregg, and Wilson in command.

In this war the Cavalry had its first extensive and important use in the United States. Twelve troops of seventy men each made up a regiment. For the first time troops formed in double ranks. They formed a single line of skirmishers when dismounted. This formation was very effective against Infantry attacks. When they reconnoitered, raided, charged, and fought, cavalrymen were usually dismounted.

#### DESTROYS LEE'S EYES AND EARS

With this Corps during the summer of 1864 Sheridan took part in eighteen actions, including the Wilderness, May 5-7, Spottsylvania, May 8-21, and Cold Harbor, June 12. He protected the flanks of the Army and reconnoitered the Confederate position. He further increased his reputation for daring by raiding from May 9th to 25th. During this time he destroyed the Confederate railroad communications around Richmond, captured Beaver Dam, and defeated the Southern Cavalry under "Jeb" Stuart at Yellow Tavern. In this action Stuart, Lee's eyes and ears, was killed. On May 28th he fought the Battle of Hawes Shop and on June 11th, Trevillian's Station. Nearly every day in May and June Sheridan battled with the Southern troops or raided their communications.

#### DEFEATS JUBAL EARLY CONTINUOUSLY

On August 7, 1864, Sheridan became the commander of the Army of the Shenandoah and was given the mission to clear the Southerners out of the valley. A month later, September 10th, he was promoted to Brigadier General, Regular Army. With this command he defeated General Jubal Early, Stuart's successor, at Winchester on July 20, Opequon, September 19, and Fisher's Hill, September 22. On October 19th at Cedar Creek, Sheridan's Army

was surprised and routed by Early, who failed to pursue. Though Sheridan was twenty miles away when the Battle began, he made his famous ride from Winchester, rallied his demoralized troops and decisively defeated Early, capturing 5,000 men and several guns.

For this victory he was promoted to Major General, Regular Army, on November 8, 1864. From February 27, 1865 to March 24th, he raided from Winchester to Petersburg, cutting three railroads, two canals, telegraph wires, destroying supplies and leaving only one railroad line by which Lee's Army could be supplied. Like Sherman, he incurred the hatred of the Southerners for destroying their riches. During this raid he again defeated Early at Waynesboro on March 1st, at Dinwiddie Court House, March 31st, and at Five Forks on April 1st. By this last defeat he turned Lee's right flank and helped force him to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond and begin the retreat to Appomattox.

#### PURSUES LEE

In the pursuit of Lee, Sheridan harassed him constantly. With his three divisions of Cavalry, he took a road parallel with the Southern line of march and followed that for some hours, making continuous attacks upon Lee's flanks and dashes at his trains at every opportunity. As one division halted and formed for an attack, the others passed in its rear, and then pressing to the front, made a new attack. In this way the whole Confederate line, combatants and trains, was continuously forming to resist an unexpected enemy or seeking shelter from some new danger. At a point near Rice's Station he made a break in the Southern line and destroyed several hundred wagons and captured sixteen guns and a large number of prisoners. By this attack he interrupted the line of retreat and closed the road to Ewell's Corps that was trying to follow Longstreet's which had reached Rice's Station, and was then waiting for the troops in its rear to close up. At the same time a similar cavalry attack in the rear of Ewell's column had broken off Gordon's connection forcing him to change his direction of march to the right. This separation brought on the Battle of Sailor's Creek about 5 PM on April 6, 1865, breaking up Ewell's force, and compelling nearly his whole Corps to surrender on the field.

With his Second Corps Sheridan hotly pursued General Gordon's Corps for more than fourteen miles until after nightfall and inflicted heavy losses upon him. These disasters with the advantageous position held by Sheridan's Army, deprived the Southerners of their last hope of reaching the Danville turnpike and using that road as a means of uniting with Joe Johnston's Army in North Carolina. Now their only hope of escape lay in an effort to reach Lynchburg.

After dark Longstreet and Gordon united at Farmville and reorganized what still remained of Lee's Army. There they found rations sent in advance and obtained the first food that many of their soldiers had received in three days.

When Sheridan learned from his cavalry on April 7th that the whole Southern Army had crossed to the north



bank of the Appomattox, he immediately perceived that Lee had abandoned all hope of escaping by way of Danville and evidently intended to march on Lynchburg. He could again throw the cavalry across the new line of retreat and delay the Southern Army until it could be overtaken by the Federal Infantry. For this purpose he sent orders to General Crook to recross the river at Farmville and march to Prospect Station, six miles west of Farmville on the Lynchburg railroad, and moved the cavalry at Prince Edward Court House in the same direction. He directed General Custer to capture the four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's Army at Prospect Station. Not only did Custer accomplish this mission but he drove the Southerners back on the road by which they had advanced for their supplies, capturing twenty-five pieces of artillery and a large wagon train. By night the remainder of the Cavalry force came up and Sheridan strongly posted it in front of the Southern Army, holding the last road that offered the faintest hope of further retreat. After forcing the Southerners back to the vicinity of Appomattox Court House, he skirmished during the night to prevent rest or offensive demonstrations.

#### AGAIN OVERTAKES LEE

For the second time during the pursuit Sheridan had overtaken Lee's retreating Army and stood as a bar to further progress by placing his force directly in front. On the morning of the 8th the Twenty-fourth Corps, marching from Farmville, and the Fifth, from Prince Edward Court House, united at Prospect Station. Through that day and the following long night, they diligently followed the roads taken by the cavalry. At the break of day on April 9th, Sheridan heard that the Infantry columns were within supporting distance and would soon be on the ground to aid the cavalry.

#### LEE ATTACKS

Not aware of the position of these two Infantry Corps, Lee decided to cut his way through the cavalry force in his front. As Lee's line advanced, Sheridan withdrew his cavalry slowly, delaying the advance. He knew that the Infantry was on the ground behind him organizing its position. When this was finished, Sheridan moved his two divisions by the right flank. Thinking that they were driving Sheridan off the field of battle, Lee's lines cheered wildly and redoubled their fire as they felt that they were

clearing the road to Lynchburg. Suddenly disillusioned, they saw before them, much to their surprise, the heavy lines of two strong Infantry Corps in an organized position awaiting an attack. Not another sound was made nor another shot fired by the advancing line as it wavered, halted, and then, without an order, faced about and fell back on the disorderly mass of Southern troops that were huddled in confusion about Appomattox Court House.

#### LEE SURRENDERS

As the Federal Infantry continued to advance and the cavalry was preparing to attack Lee's right, the first signal of surrender was made and a white flag sent into the cavalry lines with a request to suspend hostilities, for General Lee was then making arrangements for surrendering his entire Army. Sheridan halted his troops in commanding positions to await the arrival of General Grant upon the field about 1 o'clock to accept the surrender officially. Thus the long pursuit which Sheridan had advised, planned, directed, and led ended in triumphant success.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Here is shown briefly and clearly the slow but effective growth and improvement of the Northern Cavalry in the Civil War.

Colonel Yenchar has emphasized the misuse of the arm during the early years of the war. Not until the battle of Chancellorsville was the Union Cavalry so organized as to make its presence an attribute in any campaign of the war. Its use there on a fruitless raid denied General Hooker its combat value in the actual battle. However, this was the first battle of the war in which the maneuvers of the Army of the Potomac were hidden from Lee. Heretofore, General Lee, through an active cavalry and other agencies, had been kept minutely informed of every Federal activity. Now, due to the rapidly improving Union cavalry and to a more efficient and effective outpost system in the Union Army, Lee was uncertain as to the movements and intentions of Hooker. The battle of Chancellorsville was in reality the last decisive victory the Confederate Army was to enjoy to the end of the war.

Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and even up to Appomattox, Lee was never again certain of his opponent's maneuvers. An improved Federal cavalry was the answer. As Frederick the Great said, "If one could only be acquainted beforehand with the enemy's design, it would always be possible to defeat him even with an inferior force." For a concrete example, go to the first two years of the American Civil War.)

#### IGNORANCE

*IGNORANCE based on lack of fact is excusable. Ignorance based on prejudice—never.*

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# *The Objective and the Cavalry Leader*

By MAJOR E. S. JOHNSTON, Infantry

A man without objective is so much wasted energy; so, if an objective is lacking, is a military force.

The objective determines the direction of effort, the amount of effort, the character of effort. Without these, how can there be a plan?

The cavalryman, if his mental mobility is to synchronize with his physical powers of movement, must be a lightning thinker. Owing to the speed of his operations, his objectives change from this pulse-beat to that. Often at a distance from the higher command, he must draw inspiration from himself. Again and again, time will not permit him to look up for orders. His tactical existence is a succession of emergencies. In emergency, if he looks up, he can look only to his Maker. And the Lord helps those who help themselves.

The proper use of high mobility\* depends, in the first instance, on the choice of successive positions, the positions to be occupied from moment to moment. The master of mobility must be master of the strategy and tactics of position. For the best use of weapons, relative position with reference to the enemy is often the paramount factor. And effective weapons, whether by actual use of the fear they inspire, are the rulers over battle, the crowned kings of campaign, and the sires of success in war.

The choice of position depends, first, on the purpose to be served. The choice is first influenced by the effect to be produced by one's presence, however momentary, in that locality. The choice of position also involves proper measures for protection. It calls for the correct use of means of security, and for the right utilization of the conditions presented by Nature and by the works of man. The choice of position requires accurate judgment of one's own capabilities of movement matched against the enemy's. It needs a true estimate of one's powers to override opposition if one cannot evade. It depends on ability to control, effectively, the maneuver involved in leaving the old locality and arriving, fit for the contemplated action, at the new position.

Because each position is, for the time being, the goal of

movement, each such locality is a physical objective. The whole story of war is told in the choice of such objectives. Some small detail of fact or fancy may determine the ultimate issue. Every factor in the situation may have to be seen, sounded, and sorted. The highly-mobile soldier must therefore be able to think and act between this breath and that. Indeed, the less exalted his rank, the more accent on speed in thought and act. The junior leader may have to act as soon as he can draw breath to shout.

If the professional soldier has a valid claim to tactical leadership, it is because he can think and act with the necessary accuracy and rapidity despite pressure of time and events. As for any other human characteristic, this quality depends on native ability and on practice. Since native ability may be equally great in the veriest amateur, the professional's claim rests essentially on practice. But practice implies some form of repeated experience,—a method, a system, a way of constantly improving ability. Since our wars are infrequent, this practice must come mainly from study and from field exercises and maneuvers. But experience has amply shown that peacetime exercises in the field, unless tested by the experience of war itself, breed fallacy after fallacy. It follows then that the guide for peacetime training must be the study of war—the study of wars currently in progress, and of the wars that have gone before. Our touchstone must be the recorded facts of war itself. Nothing is true merely because it is in our regulations. The books where we record our doctrine are good books, the doctrine is good doctrine, only if the basis is experience tested in war.

There is a school of thought, furtive but stubborn, which deprecates historical study because of the radical changes which time effects in tactical means. This objection is sound if historical study attempts universal application of such evanescent values. Again and again, as at Jena and Sadowa, disaster has punished such error. But the true value of historical study lies in examination of the fundamentals which underlie the outward aspect of events.

Among convinced historical students there is a cult which argues for the quick skimming of the cream of

\*See *Mobility and the Cavalry Leader*, THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, September-October, 1937.

experience, and another which urges exhaustive exploration of a few particular examples. The answer here, as in anything else, is that the correct method depends on the situation. There are mines of historical metal which only yield gold if we drive our shafts deep, but there are others which reward the placer-miner with priceless nuggets. The military prospector ought to do a good deal of mining of both kinds. He needs a variety of samples, in order to assess the values from a broad point of view, and he also needs to dig deep here and there if he is to find his fortune.

Modern invention has evolved a new technique for analysis of movement too fast for the unaided eye to follow. The action is recorded with the moving-picture camera, and the picture is then projected in slow motion. For the highly-mobile soldier, the same effect can be obtained from the camera of history. Since the higher the command echelon, the slower the motion, the fundamentals in the choice of objectives are readily found in problems of international scope. But the same basic considerations are no less discoverable in the case of squadrons as well as of armies, and in the actions of individuals as well as of squadrons. For a well-proportioned picture, we do well to explore first on the highest echelon, and then to look on the lowest for the same fundamentals.

No single problem of our profession has been more oversimplified, and so distorted, than that of selecting objectives. One way of discovering the factors which really determine correct objectives, is to eliminate those which do not. Therefore, while searching for truth it should be helpful to test current ideas on the subject, and discard those which are faulty.

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When the British and French found it necessary to restrain the Tsar's advance toward the Dardanelles in 1854, did they single out the seat of Russian power and take it as their objective? Did they advance directly upon the Russian main armies in order to destroy them in one great battle? They made no such error. They profited by Napoleon's example. They so arranged matters that the Russians must attack them. Did they seat themselves firmly in front of the Dardanelles, prepared to defend that area to the last? Not at all. They defended it from a flank. Further, they chose as the theater of war an area as far away as possible from the sources of hostile strength. They endeavored to minimize the size of the Russian forces which could be brought against them. They wished to fight in a locality so far from the center of Russian power that the maintenance of the long Russian communications would tax the Tsar's resources to the limit. Furthermore, the allies wished to fight in an area where their own seapower would enable them to maintain adequate forces with the minimum strain on their own economy.

For all of these reasons, the allies decided to operate in the Crimea. Here was Sevastopol, a city so important that, once it was in their hands, Russia must drop every other project in order to regain it. Here, also, all

the other conditions could be fulfilled. The choice of the physical objective was therefore in accord with the political aim of the war. It also was a sound choice in view of the relative strength of the forces to be engaged, as influenced by the conditions in the theater of operations. Moreover, if the effort failed, the Allies could readily withdraw, lick their wounds, and in due course try again. The campaign, founded as it was on a sound basic strategy, was a success.

Japan is an inherently weak nation situated on a mere fringe of poor and mountainous islands exposed by Nature to hostile incursions from the near-by mainland coast. Her history is a struggle to maintain security—that minimum level of security essential to her life as a nation; security without which the individual lives of her patriotic people would be merely tolerable, if that. With greatest difficulty, she once beat off a powerful invasion by a Korean monarch bent on conquest. Again she barely repulsed repeated efforts on the part of Kubla Khan. Forced at last to open her gates to the modern world and her eyes to the realities of international life as it has existed from of old, she found herself obliged by her situation to secure the age-old hostile base across the narrow waters, in Korea. This done, she was again constrained, this time by the threat of the Chinese fleet, to extend her continental bridgehead to include Port Arthur. Deprived of this conquest by a consort of Western Powers, she gained an alliance with Britain and in due course fought Russia to regain her losses.

In her war in 1904 with Russia, Japan's principal physical objective, initially, was not the Russian main armies, but the Tsar's Far Eastern Squadron. When the Russian fleet took refuge at Port Arthur, the latter became the objective, in order that the Japanese might get at the fleet.

The Mikado's generals would have preferred to feel out the defense slowly, determine its strength and weakness, accentuate the latter with siege artillery, and so reduce the fortress with minimum loss. But their siege-train had been sunk in transit, and they were working against time. The Russian Baltic fleet was en route to the East. So the Japanese perforce accepted the disadvantages of attacking the defense where it was strong. They changed the objective of large forces originally intended to assist in pushing back the Russian army to the north, and they committed these forces against Port Arthur. In spite of heavy loss they carried the fortress and disposed of the remainder of the Far Eastern Squadron before the Baltic Squadron appeared on the scene.

When the Baltic Squadron had been in turn defeated, Japan's sea communications were at last secure. Now—but only now—she was able to give her special attention to the Russian main armies in the Far East.

When, in like manner, our V Corps had driven Cervera's squadron out of Santiago harbor, and our fleet had destroyed Spanish seapower, the main Spanish forces in Cuba, though never yet in contact with ours, surrendered. Further fighting was useless. But Russia, opposing Japan, could still use her armies to limit hostile success even after her fleets were gone. Japan had never expected to do Russia vital damage. As in the Crimea, it was the inability

of Russia to transport her entire army to the theater and maintain it there which afforded Japan the hope of success. The war now dragged on. In the end, however, with good fortune, Japan gained her minimum requirements for the time being.

With the passage of years, however, Russia has become stronger than ever. Her bombers menace Japan's tinsel cities, and her submarines are a threat like those of the European continent against England. Japan has therefore closed her grip on Manchuria, and is endeavoring to extend her minimum bridgehead to include the Russian air and submarine bases in the Maritime Province of Siberia. Since a frontal attack would be costly and would expose her forces to flank attacks from the west, Japan prefers to envelop from the south and west. To do this, she must first extend her base on the continent in those directions. If she therefore is first going south, in order later to go north, this is not new in the history of war.

Sherman and Grant projected a similar maneuver whereby Meade, under Grant's eye, held Lee in the East, while Sherman moved south in order to swing north against Lee's rear. Initially, Sherman's main physical objective was Atlanta. Its seizure would upset the war economy of the South, and insure Mr. Lincoln's reelection. Every contact of Sherman's army with Johnston's was so much wasted effort unless essential to the seizure of Atlanta in time to influence the elections.

In due course Hood, succeeding to the Confederate command, obliged Sherman by attacking him. Repulsed, Hood gave up Atlanta, and strove to draw Sherman north. Sherman, refusing the lure, detached forces to deal with Hood, and turned his back on the main hostile forces in the western theater. He struck eastward to destroy hostile supplies, contact the fleet, and reestablish his own supply line by water from Washington to the eastern seaboard. His exact objective on the coast he left to events to determine. Moving his army as a far-flung net in the best Napoleonic manner, he ravaged the opposing morale even more than he ravaged the country. By the use of alternative objectives he repeatedly placed the opposition "on the horns of a dilemma," confusing his opponents to such an extent that his march encountered little resistance. How could Sherman's adversaries know where he would strike next, when frequently, up to the last moment, the Old Fox himself did not know?

The march to the sea completed, Sherman turned north. But as he and Grant had hoped, the disruption of Confederate supply and the blow to Confederate morale had had such effect that the last great battle of the conjoined Union forces against Lee did not occur. It was not essential to success.

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Obviously, then, the political object is the first determinant of the ultimate military objective. The political aim is therefore also the first factor in establishing intermediate military objectives. Basically, the political object therefore underlies the proper selection of the physical objectives appropriate to all these purposes. Except as essential to the political aim, destruction is an asinine

objective. A dead enemy cannot work for the conqueror or buy his goods. A maimed enemy, a ruined city, a wasted country-side represent so much loss to the victor. Needless destruction of enemy resources is therefore self-destruction. In the moral realm, it is not destruction of the hostile will which should be sought, but rather its reduction, to the point where the vanquished feels himself no longer serving his own interests by resisting the demands made by the victor.

Louis XV's minister Fleury weakly yielded to a courtier clique who insisted that France's true aim was to dismember Austria and rule over the remnants. The result was a series of exhausting wars, waged over half of Europe, which did much to undermine the French monarchical régime. An objective, however desirable, is appropriate only if relative means are adequate under existing conditions. Even had France possessed the necessary means, her objective would have been incorrect unless it could have been achieved without involving herself in the ruin of her foe. The consequences of failure, the consequences even of a success bought too dear, are therefore also among the determinants of the proper objective.

When Prussia and her allies defeated Austria at Sadowa in 1866, a group of general officers urged the King of Prussia to march on Austria's capital and stamp her flat. The operation was certain to succeed with little loss. But Bismarck wished to preserve Austria's self-respect and gain her friendship. He knew that she would in due course recover, and he was looking ahead to the future of the Prussian monarchy as the capstone of Imperial Germany. He wished to insure Austria's benevolent neutrality in the war which he was secretly planning against France. After an exhausting struggle with the King, who was bent on a Roman triumph in Vienna, Bismarck—a stronger man than Fleury—won his point. It is worth noting that what the great Chancellor feared most at this time were the consequences, not of failure, but of too great an immediate success.

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"As above, so below." The ancient adage has been borne out by modern science. The universe and the atom are bound by the same law. The fundamentals as to objectives on an international scale are no less fundamental as to the smallest forces.

Once upon a time, an officer, wounded by a hostile machine gun, directed two men near by, "Get that gun." One of the soldiers, a raw recruit, charged straight across the open toward the gun. The other soldier, a seasoned Regular in his first battle, ran straight to the rear. The recruit fell riddled fifty yards from his objective. The old soldier gained the cover of a hedge, and made his way at a lope to the left and left again until he found himself in position on the flank and rear of the machine gun. He had no grenades. So he streaked through the hedge and paused, rifle at ready, on the paradox of the gun emplacement.

At his feet he saw three men, faces turned away toward their front. Besides their machine gun, they had rifles, pistols, and trench knives. Our man had passed through



a gap in our line. The line was digging in. The advance had stopped, and enemies might be anywhere.

To the objective given him by the officer (disabling of the enemy machine gun), the soldier added another: his own return to safety. To get at the gun, he had to deal with three intermediate objectives, one after the other.

He had the means to do the job: his weapons, the inestimable advantage of position, a certain temporary security (which might be shattered at any moment), and the self-control of a mind keyed to desperation, with surprise on his side.

But it was a ticklish proposition because, while he courted death if he failed to effect sufficient destruction, he was equally in danger if he effected too much. He needed at least one prisoner to shield him on the way back to safety. Our friend had to deal expertly with the consequences not only of failure but of too great immediate success. It may be thought that such a Bismarckian analysis would hardly have occurred to the mind of a simple soldier. But in a situation like this, a man can live a month in a moment. And, simple soldiers are not so simple as simple folk would believe.

Our man gulped a lungful of air, fired, leaped—and did the job. He saved one prisoner to cover his retreat. While he lost the prisoner's life on the way back, he did not lose his own.

Once upon a time, again, a raiding party was moving by night through enemy wire to attack a trench. A corporal, carrying a Stokes shell with a special detonating device, had the mission of destroying the hostile company command post in a dugout behind the trench. During the advance, a hostile machine fired along the wire, causing a pause and confusion. The corporal turned toward the gun. The gun ceased firing. The corporal turned back toward his objective. The gun recommenced firing.

The corporal was well aware that dropping a big bomb on the enemy company commander was by way of gilding the lily, and he also realized that there would be no lily to gild if the raid was stopped in the wire. No time could be lost in maneuver to search out the machine gun's blind side and attack it from the rear. To point the moral, this was in fact the same machine-gun emplacement which figured in the preceding story. But circumstances alter cases. In the previous incident, the recruit who rushed straight for the gun expended his life uselessly. The corporal, in this case, also rushed the gun head-on. He also lost his life, but he destroyed gun and crew, and so spent his life usefully.

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The distinguishing feature in the operations of highly-mobile forces is the rapid tempo of events over wide areas. A rapid tempo of events depends, however, not on speed alone but on relative movement. Time is one thing as measured by clocks, another as measured by human senses. Relative speed may be equally great in the operations of small forces engaged afoot in restricted areas. To run their full course, the instances cited here required only a few minutes. In such situations, the time between the crack of two rifles may seem equivalent to many

hours. In fact, it may mean eternity. Even a single minor operation is packed with examples of such action. Widely different though they be in outward aspect from typical cavalry action, the fundamentals in both are identical. Whatever the size and character of the forces, the same basic considerations are presented as to the choice of objectives. The same perennial problems must be solved as to fire and shock, security, movement, and control, if the force is to attain the objective selected.

Each operation, large or small, has as its ultimate objective a condition—a situation, as our Navy describes it, which is to be maintained or to be created. Since physical action, in fact or by threat, is essential to this end, each operation will involve one or more physical objectives. Frequently these latter present themselves in great variety, even in a single situation. Moving or fixed, whether hostile troops, supplies, localities, or whatever they may be, these physical objectives are located somewhere in space. Just as the underlying aims are objectives in mind, so these physical objectives are objectives in space.

The first determinant of the mental objective is the effect we desire to produce. But the influence of the effect desired is not final. The correct objective is also influenced by relative capabilities, by existing conditions, and by accurate visualization of consequences. The proper objectives in space depend, in the first instance, on the mental objective, but the choice is also swayed by the means available to both sides, by the conditions in the area of operations, and by the estimate of the consequences.

Like everything else in war or peace, the correct objective, physical or mental, depends therefore on every factor inherent in the situation. Whether stated in a half-dozen words or expanded into thousands, the truth remains that everything "depends on the situation."

To attack hostile strength may be a grave mistake. To fail to do so may be an equal error. To adhere to the original objective may be disastrous. To fail to do so may prove equally fatal. To single out one objective and neglect all others may be the right thing to do, or decidedly the wrong one. "It depends on the situation."

If man now chases beasts who used to chase him, it is not because he has grown physically stronger. It is largely because he has developed eyes which can see several things at once. Through the eyes of his body he sees with the eyes of his mind, and his mind has developed the faculty of choosing accurately among the things presented to its vision.

The highest possible development of this faculty should be the objective of the soldier. Because of the demands of mental mobility, such development is the special interest of the cavalryman.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: In unequivocal terms has Major Johnston emphasized the importance of a true and proper objective and the strategical and tactical approach thereto. As there is a proper approach to any objective, so is there a correct selection of the means to attain that objective. To assign the mission of capturing an occupied village to field artillery alone is comparable to directing cavalry to assault a modern fortress. As pointed out by Major Johnston there are often alternative objectives, the control of which, will mean eventually the attainment of the principal objective. One of these alternate objectives frequently will constitute a true and imperative cavalry mission.)





# Crazy Business

By PETER B. KYNE



## PART II

Having had his regiment mustered into the Federal service, our colonel dismissed the outfit to its homes and cheap rooming houses in San Francisco, until he could find a place to park them under canvas. Our ultimate destination was Camp Kearny, near San Diego, but construction of that portion of the artillery brigade quarters had not even been started. So the colonel dashed around like a tin-canned dog and promptly landed on the infield of old deserted Tanforan Race Course. There were a few dozen crumbling old barns, an administration building and a rickety old grand stand; the old track was overgrown with grass and tarweed.

Immediately General Liggett sent down a detail of engineers who laid out the camp. Meanwhile I was pounding away like mad on the accursed novel I had contracted to write. Suddenly came a telegram from the colonel ordering me to active duty at nine o'clock AM, the following day.

I arrived at our recruiting headquarters to find a mob blocking traffic on Montgomery Street and was informed that this was Battery A, that it belonged to me and to get it out of there and down to Tanforan Park. Here, for the first time, I met my lieutenants. I had already looked in a book and was aware that I was entitled to four—two first and two seconds; hence I was a little disturbed to discover I had three, all firsts and all commissioned on the same day! It took me above five minutes to discover which two of the three considered themselves senior! I also discovered that of my Battery A about eighty-five men had formerly been members of a Catholic Cadet Corps in San Francisco known as the League of the Cross Cadets. It was a temperance organization and the lads were pledged to total abstinence until they reached their majority. Most of them still were under twenty-one but they appeared to consider that enlistment in the army nullified their vow of abstinence, as I very promptly discovered. To add to my distress I discovered that one of my first lieutenants had been captain of a troop of these cadets, and his old command called him by his given name and he so addressed them. I was quite certain he was going to do his best to exercise command of the battery and regard me as an unavoidable nuisance. My eldest first lieutenant was the son of millionaire parents, a cheerful lad who, after four years in Yale, had emerged a good foot-ball player. This lad was all for fun always and I wished I didn't have him because I knew I'd have to work him over severely and his father was a good friend of mine. Indeed, his

father gave me a thousand dollars for my battery fund, which made the situation even more binding. However, I accepted the jack with thanks and took occasion to remind the donor that I didn't think his offspring was so hot and that I'd probably have to give him a rough ride. Fortunately, father agreed with me most heartily! My third first lieutenant was a slim, pale, anemic boy about twenty-one, very nervous, very industrious and very anxious to be a nice little lieutenant. His father belonged to one of my clubs.

The colonel had had some banners painted—two man signs, announcing to the world that the mob streaming up Market Street with three uniformed officers was Battery A, 2nd California Field Artillery headed for camp and still wishful for more recruits. Once out of sight of G. H. Q. I had these signs ditched in a vacant lot. Presently we got aboard interurban trolley cars and in due course were delivered at our destination. The former captain of the cadet troop promptly took charge of the detrainning and forming up the outfit for the short march to the infield of the race course, so I called him over and confided to him that I was in command and would thereafter tell him what I wanted done. He looked hurt and said he only wanted to be helpful, to which I said: "I know it. But be helpful when I tell you to. You're in the army now. After we get the men under canvas and a meal started I'll give you some pointers on military etiquette." He was terribly hurt and my paternal smile didn't help a bit.

After I had prowled around and taken stock of the tactical situation I put one lieutenant in charge of a detail carrying tents to the street in which they were to be erected, and erecting them. I put another in charge of a pick and shovel detail to dig trenches for the water pipes, and another in charge of a detail to dig a latrine, police up the campsite and dig up bushes and tufts of grass. Meanwhile my civilian chauffeur had arrived with my car, locked trunk and bedroll, so I fled to the adjacent town of San Bruno and bought lumber to build a wall around the latrine and make seats. I decided that my Chic Sales should be a thirty-holer—fifteen on each side.

Suddenly I bumped into a man who, as a boy, used to deliver groceries at my home and who, for the past ten years, had been the proprietor of a grocery store. I knew him for a high-class lad and the sight of him was like unto a gentle rainfall in a Kansas drought. With great presence of mind I restrained myself from shaking hands with him and addressing him as Tommy. Instead I said: "Private

Cushing, you're the mess sergeant; if we can get some pots and pans somewhere and some grub we'll have supper for the outfit."

An old soldier, who actually smelled of the regular army, now detached his stout person from an army truck that had been halted close by, and gave me the old Figure Four. "Sir," he said, "Mess Sergeant Gazookis, Coast Artillery, reports to the captain. I am here with complete kitchen equipment for one battery, mess kits and field rations, by order of General Liggett. I observe the captain has selected a mess sergeant, so I will take him under my wing. Have no worry. A fine hot meal will be ready at six o'clock. Has the captain a battery fund?"

I had none but I assured this excellent fellow that my private purse contained some jack that hadn't been spent yet and wouldn't I be the low dog to refuse credit to my own organization! The sergeant, following some slight inner convulsion, agreed with me and laid in my hand a list of groceries, fruits, fresh vegetables, butter and fresh meat and with the calm insolence of his type toward pinfeather officers ordered me to fare forth in my automobile and do some shopping in an adjacent town. I obeyed because once I had been taught to jump six feet when men like that fellow spoke to me.

This regular army mess sergeant was such a swell fellow I induced him, for a monetary consideration, to inform General Liggett that we were a pretty helpless lot of babes in the woods and that the good general had better let him stay a week with us and break in each battery mess sergeant as the other batteries came to camp. The general agreed with him—so Sergeant Gazookis spent the entire week with my mess sergeant and forsook all others. That was money well spent, for he made of my ex-grocer the sort of mess sergeant one dreams about.

With the trenches for the water pipes dug, the engineers laid the pipe and set up stand-pipes and spigots in the battery street. It is my impression that the next day I had to buy lumber to build a bath-house and lay in a devil of a supply of tin wash basins—all from my privy purse. My lads erected the bath-house and I never got my money back, being much too busy thereafter even to think about it.

At six o'clock, believe it or not—I blew mess call. I was just enough of an old soldier to realize that I had to have some music, so just before reporting for active service that morning I had stepped into a store that specialized in condemned army and navy goods and for two dollars and a half had purchased a trumpet of the vintage I had blown for two months in the 14th infantry when our two musicians both inconsiderately got dysentery simultaneously. A few preliminary tootles convinced me I still had a lip, so I let her fly, greatly to the admiration of my soldiery and the vast amusement of Mess Sergeant Gazookis.

After supper, as twilight gathered, I mounted guard. There wasn't anything to guard except our morals, but then I'd often walked a post, seemingly without reason, so, inasmuch as I had suffered in my youth I figured I had better pass on the pain. I made my most obnoxious lieu-

tenant officer-of-the-day and loaned him the only weapon in camp—my own forty-five and web belt, with instructions not to remove it while he slept. He seemed surprised, as well he might be, but I offered no explanation as I retired to my bedroll thinking: "Well, kid, you're back in the army again, and it's going to be a lot of fun."

Presently a warm, friendly voice outside my tent said: "Are you asleep, skipper?"

"No—and damn it, don't you call me skipper."

"We'll probably be calling you worse than that before long, captain," came the pert answer, and a Hibernian countenance appeared in the moonlight as the tent flaps were thrust aside. "A bird brought this telegram to the gate where I'm on guard, so I thought I'd better hustle it up to you."

"Do you mean to tell me, that, despite my lecture to the guard, you have deserted your post to bring me this telegram?"

"Hell, yes. I just closed the gate. I'll be right back in a jiffy. Don't worry, captain. Nothing will happen."

I got my flashlight and read: a telegram from the editor of *Red Book Magazine*, to which publication I was under contract to deliver some time within the next months a 100,000 word serial novel guaranteed to whoop the circulation not less than thirty per cent. It ran:

Reported here you are in army stop oh, God, is this true and if so what about that novel you were going to write for me stop can you do it before you go to France and get killed stop I feel you have betrayed me stop answer.

I wired him next day that he was unnecessarily alarmed that while it was true I was in the army, my colonel had promised a furlough so I could finish the novel. Which was equally true and I really believed the colonel at the time, because he had such a pull with General Liggett. Alas, before, as a Mexican would say, I could turn around and say Jack Rabbeet, the general and Kenyon Joyce were high-tailing it to France and pretty soon the colonel soured on me or got military or something, for when I asked for my furlough he said I couldn't be spared just then.

This is the closest I ever came to committing a murder.

Well, I had the guard wake me early next morning so I could blow first call and rouse the lads out. Then I blew assembly and they fell in, but when I tackled reveille and blew up I was heartily laughed at by my friendly soldiers.

That day we drew uniforms. I put it up to the lieutenants to see to it that the uniforms fitted my men, while I supervised the fitting of their brogans by a private from supply company, perhaps a dozen of whom were already on the job. Presently this private gave me a violent shove in the ribs and said: "For God's sake, Pete, don't be so damned important. I don't need you around to boss this job. I've read in the book how to fit shoes to soldiers."

I had been insulted by Mr. "Blink" Morgan, a gentleman of considerable emprise in civil life, a dear friend and a member of all my clubs. "Very well, Private Morgan," I replied, "I excuse your contumacious conduct because of

your amazing military innocence, but don't get the notion in your head you can play dominoes with me in the army."

"What's contumacious mean?" Blink demanded. "It sounds like a two-bit word."

"It means you're terrible. I've never heard it employed outside the army and it's worth a dollar for the first offense. Indeed, I've frequently seen contumacious sold for two months' pay."

"Never speak to me again," Blink warned.

The colonel arrived about noon and found my men busily engaged digging more water pipe trench for the other batteries and setting up their tents. He was, at the time, assistant to the president of the street railway company in San Francisco and had a strike on his hands, so he told me to take command of the regiment until he could get around to relieving me. He said he figured he'd be two weeks cracking that strike. He was in the army as deep as I was but it never occurred to him to ask anybody if he could have two weeks off to settle a strike.

I remembered that in the army one has to have a lot of signs—Adjutant's Office, Commanding Officer, Latrine, Bath-house, name signs in front of company officers' tents, etc. So I dug up a swell sign painter in my outfit, bought him paint and brushes and told him to get busy. Then I went home and robbed my own fiction factory of two brand-new typewriters, a lot of manuscript paper, carbon paper, clips, ruler—in fact I cleaned out my own office—and brought these office supplies down to camp where I set up a regimental office, in the old race-track administration building. We had no adjutant as yet, but what of that? I could double in brass. I got out some orders just to be nonchalant and maintained an orderly whose sole duty was to remind me when it was time to blow a call, whereupon I would step out on the veranda and tootle. Strangely, in eighteen years I hadn't forgotten a call.

The other batteries now commenced to arrive at two day intervals and the commanding officer pro tem was a pretty busy kid. I issued an order to have the battery commanders read to their commands the regulations covering military crimes and misdemeanors; I issued a training schedule calling for eight hours a day of nothing more intricate than squads east and west; we had a doctor and held sick call and I sank eight bucks of my own dough in a muslin flag, pulley and halyards. I banished civilians from camp after six PM. No gals in the battery streets at any time. Indeed, racked my brains to remember all the don'ts we'd had in the 14th Infantry eighteen years before.

The day the last battery came to camp I decided to start a post exchange. We appeared to have some supernumerary lieutenants and upon looking the field over I discovered one who had the misfortune to be very wealthy, very good-natured and terribly anxious to do something nice for his country. So I called him in. I said: "Mr. Peep-sight, you will this day proceed to establish in this camp a post exchange."

"Certainly," said Peep-sight. "What is it? What's it like?"

I explained. "Grand," he exclaimed. "Give me the money and I'll establish it."

"No," I said firmly, "that's your job and do not bother me with the details. The best I'll do for you is build a post-exchange while you're up in San Francisco laying in a stock of things to sell. Go to the Post Exchange at the Presidio, interview the post-exchange officer there and get some pointers on your job, because you're the post exchange officer."

He disappeared in a general northerly direction in an eight thousand dollar limousine with his liveried chauffeur who reported to him faithfully every day in camp. In the cool of the evening he returned with his limousine crammed with goods, also the trunk rack and the top of the car. I think he was in about fifteen hundred dollars, but who cared? He got it back months later, sans interest. Everybody thought this fellow a sort of useless society flower, but I found him capable of doing well anything he was told to do, promptly and without excuse. He was smitten often with wonder but never admitted it. I still think he's a great fellow.

All this time we had no majors, the adjutant-general of the State of California, for reasons best known to himself, not having commissioned any. And all this time my Battery A did squads east and west and somehow the three first lieutenants didn't kill each other over the question as to who had the right to command. I soon discovered that the play-boy had, through sheer bulk, assumed it and was holding it, and the former captain of cadets had his nose slightly out of joint, while the boy lieutenant was saying nothing but doing exactly what he was told to do by the other two. He seemed slightly bewildered. My duties as regimental commander kept me so busy I didn't have time to look at my own outfit.

Presently the colonel arrived, bringing with him another captain, who, he informed me, would be his adjutant, so I wrote out an order appointing him adjutant and had him and the colonel sign it. (I also reminded the old man we should have a seal just like a corporation, so in a few days we had one.)

I now abandoned the regiment to its fate, fled to my orderly tent and had every man parade before me and answer a lot of questions never found in a service record. Could he sing, dance, cook, do a monologue, fight, wrestle, run, leap, play baseball, basket-ball or foot-ball, play a musical instrument, ride, drive or shoe a horse, tinker a motor, read the Morse code or do tricks with cards. By the speed with which they coordinated and the manner in which they answered my questions I got a line on their intelligence and made a cabalistic mark opposite each name. That represented my idea of an intelligence co-efficient. I interviewed them all with the exception of one Snooper, who was on guard, and came to the conclusion that I had a pretty bright outfit and one that would play any man any game. So I selected all my ratings, but was disturbed by the knowledge that in the lot I had failed to find any-



thing that remotely resembled my idea of a first sergeant.

The following morning a sizeable man walked up to my desk, came easily to attention with every muscle relaxed, looked me in the eye and—oh, Glory be to God—failed to salute me with a snap! Instead he gave me the old Figure Four, calmly, a bit lazily and said: "Sir, Private Snooper reports to the captain for his interview."

I got out his service record. No previous military service!

"What outfit," I queried, "did you go over the hill from, Bluebird?"

"The Fifth Cavalry, sir," he shot back at me.

"Why didn't you admit it when you enlisted?"

"I had trouble in the Fifth Cavalry."

"Yesterday I put out an order on the bulletin board commanding all former enlisted men in the army and navy to report to me. You did not obey that order. I realize why, so you're excused."

"I had a curious desire, sir," he defended, "to see if the captain was old soldier enough to smell me out."

"The captain," I replied, "has all the points of intelligence prominent on an army mule. Were you ever a non-commissioned officer in the 5th cavalry?"

"A sergeant in my third year, sir. I was acting first sergeant for four months while the old top took a lay-off before reenlisting. If he hadn't come back I'd have had the diamond."

Now the former cadet captain had appointed one of his clan to be acting first sergeant and this young man now sat on a nail keg before a packing case for a desk, wondering what a first sergeant should do. Said I to private Snooper. "You're the first sergeant. Take over. If I can induce regimental headquarters to believe it's necessary to have a first sergeant, I'll have you made at retreat."

He thanked me, moved over to the nail keg, took the late cadet gently by scruff and trousers seat and moved him outside, grinning as he did so. He swung my typewriter over and inserted two sheets of paper with carbon and wrote out a request to the commanding officer to have himself made a sergeant. Then he wrote out the formal order making him a sergeant, all ready for the colonel and the adjutant to sign. "They wouldn't know the form," he explained. Then he wrote out Battery Order No. 1—his own appointment as first sergeant, after which he got off the nail keg so I could sit in and sign. Then he said:

"Has the captain made a list of his potential non-coms?"

I handed it to him and he ran a jaundiced eye down the list. "Not a bad shot in the dark," he complimented me "but inasmuch as I have been a private in this outfit all of two weeks and have kept my eyes open I think I can improve on it," and he ran a pencil through several names and substituted others. "Will the captain announce these names, at retreat, as acting non-coms?" he queried.

"Hell, no," I replied. "All the other captains in this crazy outfit are doing that. They think they must try non-com material out before making a definite choice.

They wish to avoid making mistakes and hurting men's feelings by reducing them later. They do not realize that an acting non-com has no authority; that a private can sock him and get away with it. I will make all my ratings immediately and get the lads on the payroll. Discipline in this outfit has just commenced."

"With whom?" he asked mildly.

"With three first lieutenants."

He nodded sage approval. If an old ex-regular army first sergeant can not locate, with unerring instinct, a poor company officer who, I ask you, can? His next utterance proved he had taken over the battery and me with it. We were palsy-walsy. Ah, that pronoun of kings, what a valuable part of speech it is! "We," he said, "will have to get rid of the late cadet officer. He's very bad for discipline. He visits in their tents with the enlisted men and they call each other by their first names. He's a nice enough young man but it seems he feels very badly at not having been made captain of this battery. When the regiment was about to be mustered into the Federal service and a couple of hundred men were needed in a hurry, he delivered his gang in one clatter—about ninety of them. He believes his reward has not been sufficient and his gang agrees with him."

"They would," I agreed. "They're all Irish. So am I. I know how to handle their kind."

"In our day, sir," he said presently, "the first sergeants had charge of minor discipline. That happy day has fled."

"Not in this outfit," I reminded him. "When I get the notion in my head that you can't handle it I'll take the right away from you and do the job myself."

He looked around at me; the ghost of a sardonic grin fringed his stern mouth. "I'll make hell look like a summer holiday to those young Micks," he promised. "Between us, we'll make an outfit out of this mob." He shot an order at me. "Get rid of the boy friend."

You readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, who stepped out of West Point or from the ranks into a going organization will never be able to realize what I felt when the knowledge came to me that this powerful fellow had his arm around me. Somehow, I knew he liked me and would continue to like me until I proved unworthy. He was loyal by first intention.

That night he was first sergeant at retreat with his chevrons on. He read out the order and his malevolent glance went up and down the line. "I," he announced, "Am First Sergeant Snooper. Never sarge, never Snooper, never Snoop, never pal, never old man. No dropping in to the orderly tent to loaf and chin-chin. No monkey business, no excuses. You'll get a square deal and no explanations."

As I listened I said to myself: "All I have to do is let this chap run the outfit while I pound out that novel."

I was to discover it wasn't as easy as all that!

The following day I managed to get regimental headquarters, after a long argument, to make my non-coms. A battery order, of course, made the other grades, and we were off to a fair start. I bought a number of copies of a



manual dealing with the duties of non-coms and without an order from me Snooper started a non-com's school, in which he was head-master. One day he reported that we had a corporal who said he was a cousin of mine. I couldn't place him, never having seen him before, so we had him up to the orderly tent and he proved he was my third cousin. So I told him it was just too bad he hadn't kept the tale to himself, because now the outfit might think I was not above practicing nepotism. "So you're busted back to private," I told my relative and as he went out chopfallen, Snooper laid before me for my signature a request to the colonel to bust the unfortunate fellow. I used to shudder at the thought of what Snooper would have thought of me if I hadn't done that; he saw to it that the tale was told in the outfit and it built me up tremendously. Plainly I was one who played no favorites, although the Irish thought it was lousy of me to bust my own cousin.

Well, I now had time to give my attention to details and the next morning a detail bounced up and hit me in the eye. I had thirty-four men on sick report and upon questioning the battalion surgeon I discovered they had a low fever due to constipation. And this was a slap right on my nose because I O. K.'d the mess sergeant's menus, kept the starches down to a minimum and provided plenty of fresh vegetables and fruit. I poured out my soul to Snooper who growled. "I overlooked that one, too. Shameful of us both. The other five firing batteries, headquarters and supply haven't built any latrines. They don't see why they should when we have one, so we get all their trade and our own lads have to stand around waiting until mess call or drill call stills the wild cries of nature. They try again after morning drill, but our latrine is always crowded. So presently the cry of nature fades to a whisper and stops. Impaction. No other cause for it."

Covered with shame, feeling myself grossly inefficient and unobserving, I fled to the colonel to beg him to issue an order to make the other battery commanders build latrines of their own and restore to my gallant lads their one-time privacy. Alas, the chief medical officer was with him . . . a word here about this hombre because he comes very prominently into the picture.

He was the egg that had certified our heroes by proxy as physically fit to die for their country that day we had to get a couple of hundred men in a hurry in order to be mustered into the Federal Service as a National Guard unit. (I think a law went into effect that day; no more new National Guard regiments after midnight that night.) Well, although really too old and stout for service, doc had gotten himself a captaincy in the National Guard Medical Corps—a tribute to his age, this rank, doubtless. He had gotten himself two very ill-fitting ready-to-wear uniforms and a pair of pigskin puttees two sizes too large for his fat old legs, of course, having done a great favor for our colonel, naturally our colonel had to return the favor. So here he was, our chief medical officer, and a captain, whereas, he had not practised medicine for twenty years, I had been informed, but had been the proprietor of a drug store. And younger and better doctors

could only secure the grade of first lieutenant in the National Army!

At sight of old Doc sitting there, a most unmilitary figure, blouse open, unshaved, a pipe in his mouth, I recognized the culprit responsible for thirty-four impacted starboard guts. So I flew at him like a hawk on an old hen. I asked him what the hell kind of sanitary inspector he thought he was, anyhow, etc., etc. He began to sputter, to make excuses, but I cried him down.

Of course the colonel had been reading a book by this time and had discovered that whatever happened he, as commanding officer, was responsible for it. So I think he realized I was really abusing him over old Doc's shoulder; he had to defend himself and the only way he could do that was by defending his own medical selection, and promptly ordered me to mind my own business. I told him respectfully that minding my own business was something at which I was only ordinarily efficient, but at minding my men's business I really was a fanatic; that this was my men's business, that I was all that stood between them and impacted bowels and by the holy poker I would permit no man to bluff or terrify me into a betrayal of their calm trust in me.

Now, the colonel is Irish. Left-handed Irish, as my kind call him, but nevertheless, Irish. And for all general belligerent purposes the Ulster Irish will do until something better shows up. In fact, I'd rather leave that kind alone myself. I'd seen our old man in a street car strike riot once driving a trolley car through the heart of the riot while a dozen strikers took pot shots at him with pistols, which fusilade he had as calmly ignored as if they had been throwing ripe tomatoes at him. I never doubted his courage and anyway, I wasn't concerned with his guts, but those of Battery A. So when his usually benevolent eyes flashed and he said very quietly: "Get out of my office—quickly," I knew it was time to go. However, in the words of an ancient Irish Come-All-Ye,

We did retreat

But we were not beat

At the Battle av Bull Run.

As I went out I promised to file charges against Doc for gross neglect of duty and abnormal inefficiency. I told 'em both I knew my rights and that I'd soldiered where a lot of officers in this man's army couldn't be dog-robbers, that being one classical enlisted man's phrase that had clung to me from my real soldier days.

Half an hour later Snooper came in. "The way this regiment is digging latrines is certainly soothing to my old eyes," he announced. "Meanwhile, I've set a guard at our latrine—stout Micks with pick and ax handles. Any stranger that gets in there will have to give the counter-sign or have his head cracked."

Old Doc never saw the horrid increase in unsanitary conditions adjacent to the camp while those other latrines were being built and I laughed until I almost cried.

The colonel was cool to me at mess that night, but it is quite impossible for him to remain cool very long, so the next day he smiled at me and the next day I hit him for a

furlough—and didn't get it. So promptly the novel began to ride me even as *The Little Old Man Of The Sea* rode Sinbad The Sailor. In desperate moments I was almost tempted to turn the writing of it over to Snooper. I was quite certain he would have done an excellent job!

Now for the first and last time I found myself officer-of-the-day. I think that was penance for my attack on Old Doc. I knew the guard detail from my own battery could recite their General Orders backward, because that was the way they had made me learn them in my youth so why change? But in my prowling among the others I discovered they had never heard of that ancient military catechism. In fact, few of them knew why they were on post, because the colonel had forgotten to issue any special orders! I caught one pathetic wretch, a Hispano-Californian from Santa Barbara who explained his way out. "Hell, mi capitan, I don't never to hear of such a theeng. My capitan he don't tell me notheeng. An' you don't suppose I goin' talk to heem eef I can help eet. You know theese general order yourself?"

I said I did and recited them to prove it. "Well, now, mi capitan," he suggested, "eet is midnight an' the camp she is all dark, so nobody see me talk to you. An' nobody goin' to butt in, no? I weel be much obleege eef you teach to me these general order now, so next time when some ——— of a captain come around to ask the questions an' maybeso he not be good-nature like you, he don't say to me: 'Hey, look here, Juan Camarillo, what the hell ees the matter weeth you? You one dumb bell? What for you don't know the general order?'"

I found a bench alongside one of the decaying barns and we sat down together, Juan confiding to me that he could read and write Spanish but not English so, unless somebody took the trouble to teach him, he was headed for trouble. Before I left him he was letter perfect and so grateful he gave me a friendly pat on the shoulder. I told him to go to his battery commander, when he came off guard, and repeat his General Orders to make certain he had not forgotten them.

Juan did. He came busting into his battery commander's tent and insisted on reciting his lesson. And he was perfect. His captain, who was my fellow novelist, Stewart Edward White, said: "Who taught you and who ordered you to come and recite your lesson to me?" To which the proud fellow replied: "One hell of a nice capitan come to me las' night an' teach me on the post. He wass a hell of a good fellow. He don't scold notheeng. He just sit down an' say: 'Private Camarillo, I weel myself teach to you those general order.'"

From that night forward Juan was my friend and he must have gotten the notion I was his, for frequently, be-

tween paydays, he would honor me with a polite request for a trifling loan, which I never refused and which he always repaid. I observed a similar tendency on the part of F Battery to give me their financial business, because I had enlisted them.

No, I wasn't long making the discovery that I was not popular with my brother officers, but strong as horse radish with all the enlisted men. I think a great many of my brother officers jumped to the conclusion that I was a hand-shaker, a seeker after popularity, but this was not so. I could secure popularity without seeking it, and the recipe was a very simple one I had learned from a grand soldier who had been my company commander in the 14th Infantry. This man never considered his dignity was undermined if, when he passed a soldier and returned the latter's salute, he smiled like a warm, friendly human being or murmured: "Good morning, soldier." He conceived it to be his first duty to fight like a wild-cat for his men; their comfort was ever his first thought; a bed, food, drink and rest were not for him until his men had had a first serving. His was the fine art of leading, not driving and I tried to copy cat him.

To take the curse off the cured so-called disciplinary drill, Stewart White organized a regimental base-ball league, with a red pennant, and every afternoon we had five innings and the winning team took the pennant home and hoisted it over the first sergeant's tent. After three weeks of league activity I noticed the pennant had never floated over Snooper's tent, so one morning at reveille I said to the baseball team:

"This afternoon the base-ball team will bring home the pennant. I'm damned sick of seeing my battery suck the hind tit."

This homely idiom, a hold-over from my youth as a country boy, brought a chuckle. Later Snooper turned around on his nail keg and said to me: "I wish the captain would more frequently address his command in the living language, as he did this morning. Because the captain is an author they are inclined to be suspicious of him, to regard him as high-hat, possibly unsympathetic. You got close to them this morning. They have concluded the captain was farm-raised and not ashamed of it. I recommend frequently a few modest cuss words but never in anger, of course. Incidentally the pennant fell to us this afternoon."

Snooper reminded me of an anaconda preparing a goat for ingestion. He had his coils around me and every little while he gave a squeeze, just to let me know who was boss around there. As the old settler would have expressed it Snooper was extremely judgematical!

(To be continued)

THE PREEMINENT LEADER is the one who can pick successful subordinates.

# Only Security Can Guarantee Speed

By CAPTAIN JOSEPH I. GREENE,<sup>1</sup> Infantry

THE FACTOR in mechanical warfare that is least clear in our minds, and on which there is the greatest variety of muddled thought, is the element of speed in fast motor or tank columns. It is particularly necessary to consider modern security before we can draw well-founded conclusions on fast motor and mechanized movements. In this article, then, let us see what security has to do with it.

The greatest confusion regarding fast motor columns comes from the natural but mistaken conception of widespread parallel columns of great armies speeding toward each other, and toward battle, at 40 miles an hour. We know full well by this time—or at least we should know it—that such a conception is absurd, and that the flying columns of such forces would be bound to get into difficulties soon or late.

And yet this idea persists, and with some reason, since motor vehicles can travel at high speeds even in large numbers. Particularly does it persist in the newspapers, which seldom number among their writers men with a sound background of military thought.

In a recent lecture, for example, Mr. George Slocombe, well-known British correspondent and commentator on European affairs, made the statement that if Germany wars against France again, her armies will speed toward and across the border at 50 to 60 miles an hour, with vehicles moving six abreast on broad military highways. At that rate, if the layman follows Mr. Slocombe's picture to its seemingly inevitable conclusion, the German armies would reach Paris some two hours after leaving their own soil.

It is perfectly true, however, that the German army, or any other, may move toward and probably as far as its own border with remarkable speed. But once it reaches the border there can be no continuance of such speed unless, perchance, the invaded nation is totally unprepared. Here is where security enters the picture.

\* \* \*

Not long since, when a day's march for cavalry was 20 to 30 miles, and for infantry, 12 to 15 miles, the commander of a large force felt safe with a screen of mounted units a score or two of miles out front, and with advance and flank guards giving him a protective leeway of a few thousand yards. Moreover, the term "beyond striking distance of the enemy's main ground forces" meant in those days, simply that his security detachments could be smaller than when he was "within striking distance" of the

enemy. And so long as his cavalry kept close watch of the hostile forces, he felt secure.

Now, however, "striking distance" must be measured in terms of 30 miles an hour instead of  $2\frac{1}{2}$ . Where a commander once felt that an enemy 20 miles away was uncomfortably close, now, a hostile force that is 20 x 30/2.5, or 240 miles away is beginning to get near enough for business. Under these circumstances a commander has but one solution—to push out his ground security many times farther than before, and to use his distant air reconnaissance hundreds of miles farther than that. In fact, The Command and General Staff School now teaches that elements of distant ground security and reconnaissance may operate out to 250 miles, and distant air reconnaissance to 700 miles.<sup>1</sup>

Security, moreover, is only a half measure unless it extends in all directions. Where once a commander could reasonably estimate the chief direction of his danger, today he cannot tell from what point of the compass a blow may strike. Hence he dares not leave the slightest section of his perimeter unguarded. The same Leavenworth text quoted above defines security as "the all-around ground and air protection of a command by the adoption of effective measures to prevent surprise, observation, and interference by the enemy." (Figure 1.)




Figure 1

This all-around protection at a distance is not obtained, however, by placing advance, flank, and rear guards much farther out from the main force, than before, or by increasing their sizes. On the contrary, we find the following in paragraph 74 of the same text:

When our main body is beyond striking distance of the enemy's main ground forces, the necessity for advance, flank, and rear guards, and other security detachments of a size capable of effective combat, is minor as compared with a

**A hostile force 240 miles away  
is near enough for business**

<sup>1</sup>Page 25, *Reconnaissance, Security, Marches, Halts*, July 1, 1936, C. & G. S. S.



thorough distant air and ground reconnaissance which will provide adequate warning of approaching aviation, mechanized or motorized elements, and be able to delay or stop them.

And here it is that we find the essence of modern security—a distant sturdy circle of small ground combat units.

These ground units are necessary no matter how strong we may be in the air. The fact is simply that air reconnaissance at best is too uncertain. It cannot see through cloud, fog, and haze for one thing. And for another, we may not have the planes to spare to do a thorough job, especially at the beginning of a war.

The distant security units around the great perimeter of a modern force must be strong enough to prevent any undetected penetration, and powerful enough to delay and harass an approaching enemy. By resistance, road blocks, and demolitions they can reduce the speed of his approach from any direction to a crawling pace.

*This job is essentially one for mechanized cavalry.* (At the same time, there must be no confusion of mission between the tight ring of distant security forces, and mechanized reconnaissance units that may dart out to still greater distances in order to seek definite information by contact.) Lacking mechanized cavalry in sufficient numbers, motorized infantry, assisted by artillery and demolition engineers, can do the job of distant security. This fact is recognized by the discussion of "security without cavalry," in The Command and General Staff School text previously cited. Reconnaissance detachments of the types which have appeared in Leavenworth instruction for the past two years may also be used. However composed, such units must have high speed and considerable delaying power.

\* \* \*

Now, to return for a moment to the general concept of a mechanical army speeding toward the border bent on invading a contiguous state; it is self-evident that the border itself is equivalent to a strong perimeter of distant security. Behind that border, so long as hostile defending elements of any size have not crossed it in order to establish road blocks, movement toward invasion can be conducted at maximum speeds. The only limitations are the capacities of highways and the power of motors, save, of course, the possibility of interference from the air. And of this there will be little or none, if the invaders choose a day of visibility zero to launch their thrust.

If the enemy has any defenses at all along his borders, the invading columns must, for all their initial speed, reduce their pace to a walk when they encounter them, or even come to a halt and fight. It is an absurdity, for example, to conceive of great German columns continuing on into France at high speeds.

But suppose instead that a sudden invasion strikes an ill-defended frontier. In such case, it seems probable that small but tough advance combat units of the invaders' force would first push rapidly down every road, in order to advance the high-speed zone as far as possible for the larger columns following. But as the advance units go on this errand, they must keep fairly abreast and make sure

by rapid cross reconnaissance that the ground between roads contains no force of size. Eventually we can expect that all such advance security and reconnaissance units will find roads blocked and meet resistance strong enough to halt them. The defender, by then, will have established his own perimeter of distant security, behind which he, too, can speed forward with his forces as fast as he can muster them.

What comes after this, as far as speed of movement is concerned, depends entirely on the relative strength of invader and invaded. If the invaded nation is relatively weak, we may expect determined operations by the invader to overcome the delaying forces in accordance with a plan of action involving his whole main force. These operations, when successful, will extend his area of high-speed operation and reduce that of the defender in the same degree. But in the words of the Leavenworth text, quoted before, "generally speaking, a highly mobile force will not be able to move through an area which is not controlled by friendly forces, unless the situation and the available information definitely establish the fact that hostile interference within the area is impossible."

It may be that movement for one force may be far more restricted than for the other. For example, in the event of an invasion of our own coastal frontiers, we may think of our distant security perimeter as forming a semi-circle (Figure 2) around the invader. In this situation we would have much room, and he comparatively little. We can imagine, here, a continuous line of mechanized or motorized units giving way where the invader presses, but placing every stumbling block in his path. And somewhere behind this line of outposts, our own force would be getting ready to strike its blow. But where both main forces have some freedom of maneuver, their distant security perimeters will, of course, approach the circular in form.

In any case, the first clashes will be between advanced mechanized reconnaissance elements, forming a part of the security perimeter, or pushed out still farther in advance. Thus our own main force may be called at short notice to strengthen its security perimeter. Every hour




Figure 2



saved in making such a reinforcement may mean many square miles of maneuver area saved to our own force. Here is a time, if ever, for using the main highways to rush double staggered columns at maximum running speed to critical areas.

Let us assume now that our main force takes the offensive before the hostile commander makes a vigorous effort. If up to this time the enemy has not tried to penetrate our own distant ground security, or has not gained contact with it, our whole perimeter of security should move forward as the main force moves, perhaps leapfrogging by rapid jumps, instead of slowly advancing. Eventually some part of the security must close upon the enemy's. Indeed, these far outpost lines may touch along scores or even hundreds of miles before one main force or the other makes a sudden thrust.

When such a thrust is made, if the direction of advance is to be through a sector where the hostile security is already in contact with our own, there should be a preliminary pressure at several points in order to create deception. (Figure 3.) The security units at all these points, reinforced by detachments strong in motorized engineers, must shove forward rapidly, repairing roads, rebuilding bridges, and otherwise preparing for the main advance a few hours later. If the direction of advance is toward a part of the security perimeter where there has been no contact, feints in several directions are nevertheless desirable. Here the security preceding the main force must likewise be strong in road- and bridge-repairing units.

Thus, throughout the whole period of coming to grips, behind the shifting barrier of the security perimeter large mechanized and motorized units can move at high speed,




Figure 3

using the highways to their full capacities. Nothing can get through that stout ground barrier to interfere with rapid movement. Hostile action, behind the barrier, can only come from the air.

Hostile action from the air may consist in attempts to block or destroy defiles and stretches of important routes, or of actual attacks upon columns by bombardment or attack aviation. Whether an enemy could keep all roads in great areas continually closed by air bombardment is

open to doubt, although he may be able to interfere continuously with a few important defiles as long as the weather favors him.

Direct attacks on columns may occur as a routine harassment of traffic on main highways or they may take the form of planned attacks upon discovered motor movements, both of which have their limitations. We are safe in assuming that the trained antiaircraft fire of a modern army—particularly that of infantry—will afford considerable protection against either.

It is also a possibility that, in order to break through our line of distant security abruptly, the enemy might concentrate his air attack directly upon the elements composing it. Here again, success is doubtful. For the security units will be small, scattered, and well camouflaged. And those who fly attack planes that move between 200 and 300 miles an hour, and close to the ground, will have great difficulty in detecting and attacking such small deployed forces. Moreover, the effect of such attacks on the actual road blocks would be nil.

More effective perhaps, would be the use by the enemy of the vertical envelopment, although as yet we know little about it. Whether carried out by hostile units in transport planes that land to discharge their loads, or by bodies of parachute troops, this type of operation grows closer to reality every day. And how could a hostile commander employ aerial infantry better than by using it to clear a wide breach in our distant security thereby paving the way for the rapid and unresisted advance of his ground units? (Figure 4). If this new method of warfare proves practicable, an operation like that just suggested could only be countered by frequent patrolling to cover the entire area inside of the distant ground security. And once a vertical envelopment is discovered, the movement of fast columns behind the distant security perimeter to deal with them would be an absolute necessity.

To sum up, then, distant security guarantees in large measure rapidity of movement in areas behind it. In turn, speed, combined with secret movement during hours and days of low air visibility—the very circumstances that also best protect fast columns from the hostile forces of the air—preserve for us surprise. And surprise, as always,




Figure 4


gives the great advantage. But there can be no true speed in movements of large forces, hence no surprise, until we are thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of traffic on modern highways.

Once battle is joined by the main forces, the pace of the forefront will be greatly reduced. Yet if speed of movement is largely preserved until that time, it should give us such an advantage in the placement of forces that the conflict will never come to a World War standstill. But even if that does happen, speed of movement in rear areas will still be a vital thing. No matter what vehicular columns move, back there every resource of modern traffic

knowledge and practice will still be needed.

Speed, in fact, will be vital from the first act of war to the last pursuit. We must learn how to gain it and use it, now, in time of peace. In war we must preserve it. Security alone can guarantee it.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Captain Greene has indicated a new conception of security under modern conditions in this stimulating article. Additional views on this subject may be found in the succeeding article by General Hawkins. We feel fortunate, indeed, in being able to present under one cover such thought-provoking analyses of this important topic.)



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# The Composition of Army Covering Forces and the Employment of Mechanized Force in This Role

By Brigadier General H. S. Hawkins, Retired

We read recently a good many articles from abroad on the use of mechanized forces for strategic reconnaissance and other duties that fall to the covering forces of an army. It is generally admitted that cavalry is needed for close-in or tactical reconnaissance. But the enthusiasts for mechanization are playing with the idea that distant and strategic reconnaissance may be better performed by armored vehicles.

An army covering force has various duties, including strategic reconnaissance, that remove it temporarily from the support of the main body of the army.

An army commander, after the army has been concentrated, desires to move forward towards the enemy with a certain liberty of action. That is to say, he desires to be able to move his forces this way or that way so as to find himself in the best tactical position, according to the ground and other considerations, when he comes into actual contact with the enemy. And, in order to do this, without interference by advanced formations of the enemy, and to have room for unimpeded movements of the various elements of his army, he must send out some very mobile detachments to reconnoiter in the direction of the enemy and to cover his own movements. A large mobile covering force is thus necessary for that liberty of action before mentioned.

The duties of this covering force require that it should place itself ahead of the army by from ten to fifty miles in accordance with the nature of the terrain, the known movements of the enemy, and the commander's own intentions as to the nature of his operations. The covering force must reconnoiter to discover and watch the movements of the enemy, to screen the army from similar efforts on the part of the enemy, and to delay any serious movements of the enemy which may bring him into close contact with our army before the army commander has had time and space enough to effect the dispositions he desires. Sometimes the covering force must seize and hold an important strategic point, until reinforced, and thus deny it to the enemy.

Thus, the covering force of an army must frequently be out so far as to be beyond supporting distance for the time being. It is on its own, so to speak, and must be able, if attacked in front or on the flank or even in rear by superior forces, to make its escape from dangerous situations and to place itself again in front of the enemy so

as to give the army commander as much time for liberty of action as possible.

The nature of these duties requires, obviously, that the covering force be very mobile, not only on roads, which may or may not run in convenient directions, but also for cross-country movements. It must be able to negotiate any kind of country so as to be able to move speedily in any desired direction. It differs from an advance guard in that the latter is always supported closely by the main body. Each of the various columns of the army following the covering force at considerable distance will have its own advance guard for its own local security.

Much of the very distant reconnaissance is done now by the air force. In fact, the air force will have to perform important reconnaissance in front of the covering force, and also behind it in the space between it and the army. And the covering force should have attached to it certain elements of the air force for its own security and to assist it in reconnaissance. Much, and sometimes all, of the distant reconnaissance that formerly wore out the army cavalry will now be done from the air. This will save the cavalry for its more important rôles later on.

The question now is whether the mechanized forces can perform *independently* the rôle of the covering force.

On account of its great speed on roads, mechanized force can advance very quickly to great distances ahead of the army. But is it desirable that the covering force, or forces for strategic reconnaissance, should advance so far? The most important part of the pure reconnaissance for information is now done from the air. Can machines be used for reconnaissance with reasonable safety? Negative reconnaissance of villages and cities can no doubt be performed speedily by the use of motor vehicles. But we are not always certain that the reconnaissance is going to be negative. Rolling down a road towards a village when we don't know whether it is occupied by the enemy or not is a precarious business. If the place is occupied, the enemy will probably have concealed outposts armed with anti-tank guns along the principal avenues of approach. When approaching such a place, cavalry gets off the roads and advances cross-country towards different sides of the town. They do it stealthily and silently. Can mechanized force do that? Suppose the enemy lays a trap and blocks off the roads in rear of the mechanized force. Can



these vehicles then take to the woods or ravines to one side and get out of the trap?

To perform reconnaissance a man has to get off the roads and encircle the place to be reconnoitered. He cannot do it from the seat of an automobile or through the slits provided for vision from a tank or armored car. To be sure, if not under fire, he can stand up in the turret of an armored car and look around him, provided the terrain lends itself especially well to cross-country movement in vehicles and the elevations are made to order to permit him to see for long distances. Moreover, it is often necessary to fight in order to obtain strategic information, and mechanized troops need to be supported by other troops if seriously engaged.

For all these reasons, and the additional problems of supply, effective strategic reconnaissance by independent mechanized forces is extremely doubtful.

And now, about the other rôles of the covering force, the seizing of strategic positions and the delaying of advanced enemy elements so as to give the army commander the liberty of action so desired. An independent mechanized force is not able to hold strategic positions even for a short time. The vehicles are too easily hit by cannon and anti-tank guns. And if they attempt to deploy across the terrain so as to bring these weapons into action, it would be a very exceptional terrain on which they could maneuver and withdraw at the proper time to avoid being surrounded or blocked in rear and attacked in front by superior forces of the enemy. Furthermore, the control of a large mechanized force is going to be very difficult.

The army commander will probably find himself very much embarrassed by having to hurry forward some troops to rescue the mechanized covering force. Battle may be brought on before he is ready for it, or on ground that he would not have chosen.

Independent mechanized force is probably unfit for either strategic reconnaissance or other covering force missions. It remains to be determined whether or not it can be used in conjunction with cavalry in performing these tasks.

On the other hand, a few scout cars will often be useful as security patrols for marching cavalry. They do not have to separate themselves very far from the column and they may save a good many horses from the extra fatigue which accompanies security patrolling for a rapidly marching cavalry command.

It has been suggested that modern armies will move by motor vehicles at great speed, and that, to cover the movements of such an army, cavalry would be too slow. And therefore, it is said, a mechanized force of light tanks is necessary. Anything more absurd is difficult to imagine. It shows how superficial is the thinking of many men who have committed themselves to an idea before they have used their reason to a logical conclusion.

Armies may be concentrated rapidly by the help of motor vehicles. Railroads and sometimes steamships are also used for this purpose. But after the army is concentrated and commences to move toward the enemy, only

small columns of motor trucks can be used to transport troops for special purposes. The great use of motor vehicles will be for supply. We cannot block the roads with passenger cars, nor could we supply the gas and oil to move, not only supplies of all kinds, but also all the troops.

The idea, which has also been advanced recently, that the motor trucks would carry the troops forward and then go back and come forward again with the supplies, is too fantastic to merit much discussion. The roads would have to be made to order. The coordination would have to be perfect beyond human intelligence. The necessary supply of gas and oil would be appalling. And lastly, the enemy, particularly his air forces, would have to agree not to interfere.

Furthermore, when an army has reached a point within fifty miles of a probable enemy it must proceed with caution. Its columns must be developed or disposed so as to be able to effect tactical maneuver without undue delay. Convenient roads running in the right direction and parallel to each other at the proper tactical intervals are seldom available. The different columns must be protected by advance guards. The country in front must be patrolled. A large covering force must precede the main force by a good many miles. And this covering force must look after its own security and must move by bounds. The movement of the whole army slows down, and movement must stop frequently to await information. It takes time and space to deploy an army. Opposing armies do not rush toward each other in motor cars. Even if they could all ride in motor trucks they must detruck at safe distances from the enemy. Then there will be long marches. Infantry must be kept hard and well trained in the art of marching.

The concentration takes place as near the enemy as is considered safe. After that, cavalry can move as a covering force with all or more than the speed necessary. A large covering force like a division or even a brigade must of course have its horse artillery with it.

During the concentration the cavalry, as well as other troops, may be brought up in motors or in railroad trains. After the concentration the cavalry goes ahead to give the army its liberty of action, and no other force can perform this covering mission so well.

When the army covering force is given the task of seizing and holding an important strategic position, it may be desirable to reinforce it as quickly as possible. Therefore, after the cavalry has seized the position, infantry in trucks may be sent forward to help in holding it. It would be well, therefore, to have in each field army a regiment of motorized infantry. That is, infantry that moves habitually in motor trucks as part of its own organic equipment, as differentiated from infantry that is transported occasionally by trucks drawn from a motor pool.

If the operations are on such a large scale that there are several field armies moving abreast of each other, the whole front will be very wide. Each field army should have a cavalry division for its army cavalry, in addition to

the divisional cavalry of one squadron for each infantry division. But in addition to this, there must be a cavalry corps of not less than three cavalry divisions to be at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of all the armies that are coöperating in any theatre of operations.

Each field army will thus have its own covering force. The G.H.Q. Cavalry will not be given a covering force mission because the front is too wide. But it will be kept for those smashing blows that would have so helped the Germans in their advance into France in 1914, had they concentrated their cavalry for this purpose on their right flank.

It is possible that under some circumstances a field army could spare its cavalry division to reënforce the G.H.Q. Cavalry Corps when the latter is to be used for very important missions. The field army thus deprived of its cavalry division would still have its divisional cavalry for security purposes in front of each of its infantry divisions. A mechanized force might be useful in this case. It might not be necessary to send it very far in front of the field army. It could be closely supported. But if the field army needs to send its covering force very far in advance, it should not be deprived of its cavalry division.

Thus, mechanized force might be more useful for missions not far in advance of the field army than for the more distant tasks that must be entrusted to cavalry. This is a reversal of the general idea that, on account of its speed and capacity for traversing long distances on roads, mechanized force should be designed and used for the distant tasks of a covering force.

Whatever may be the future employment of mechanized force, it is quite safe to predict now that it will not be successful as an independent force at long distances from its supporting army.

The conduct of a cavalry command acting as a covering force for a large infantry force, a division, a corps or a field army, deserves special study, and is an art in itself. But suffice it to say here that such a covering force should never be scattered across a wide front in a long line of widely separated columns. On the contrary, whether it be a squadron serving as divisional cavalry for an infantry division, or a cavalry division covering a field army, it must be kept concentrated enough to be in hand. It covers the front by means of a number of small patrols which act as feelers for the cavalry force itself, not for the main force of the army behind it. These feelers keep the covering force commander informed, and he moves his force where this information and his mission seem to require. Whether the immediate mission of the covering force is to obtain information, or to screen the army, or to delay the advance of the enemy, or whatever it may be, the commander must keep his force concentrated and the terrain covered by very small patrols. If he sends back information to the army commander it must be information that he has obtained for himself by moving his whole force in the direction indicated by the information obtained by his patrols. These patrols do not send information to the army commander. The cavalry commander sends it;

and if he secures important intelligence from a patrol he goes with his whole force to confirm it before sending it back to the army commander.

If the primary mission is screening his army, and he learns from his small patrols that a force of hostile cavalry is moving in a certain zone, he then takes his whole force, or a sufficient part of it, to meet the hostile cavalry and drive it back. It is of no importance if one of the enemy small patrol gets through his screen. The hostile army commander is not going to act on the information sent by a small patrol. He will not commit his army to a movement without information from his cavalry commander himself.

Now, in this cavalry covering force a good deal of the patrolling on roads on both flanks of the command could be done by armored cars or scout cars. This would be rapid and would save many horses from the great fatigue incident to this work. Thus, the whole front could be covered by mechanized patrols on the roads and small cavalry patrols in the wide spaces where there are no roads.

Information necessary for effective delaying action, or for seizing a strategic position, can be obtained in the same way.

The important principle is to keep the covering force in hand, not dispersed in small columns which are not within supporting distance of each other, and which are not strong enough in themselves to stop or delay a strong force of the enemy advancing ahead of its army to perform some important mission.

Mechanization may be very useful in carrying out this principle. By patrolling the roads, as mentioned before, the detachment of many of the small cavalry patrols becomes unnecessary. And, since the detachment of many patrols weakens the main covering force to an astonishing degree, the use of mechanized patrols assists in keeping the covering force in hand. Furthermore, mechanized force can support the cavalry by denying the use of the roads to the enemy when the main force of the cavalry is moving across country. In addition to this, mechanized force can back up the cavalry in delaying actions or can assist in an attack to seize a strategic position.

During an advance of the covering force, the mechanized troops, except their patrols, should keep in rear of the cavalry, and should move by bounds in order to adjust the different rates of march. If the enemy opposes our covering force with mechanized troops, our own mechanized force can easily be brought up to assist the cavalry or to take over the job by itself while the cavalry moves across country or towards its destination.

If our covering force is attacked by superior forces of the enemy, our mechanized troops, operating on or not very far from the roads, can prevent the enemy from using the roads to get in our rear. And with the cavalry moving across country and the mechanized troops on the roads, a stubborn front can be opposed to the enemy and his advance delayed very effectively.

When there are no roads or they run in inconvenient

directions, the mechanized troops can move across country slowly and the cavalry can assist in keeping them from being outflanked or surrounded by the enemy mobile forces.

Thus, there is room for some interesting thought and experiment in using cavalry and mechanized force together. But independent mechanized force is almost certain to be a failure except in the easiest kind of a situation with a very inferior enemy.

Since one of the rôles of a cavalry division will be its employment as a covering force for a field army, its organization should lend itself to the performance of this duty. The divisional artillery must be horse artillery. Motor drawn artillery could not be relied upon for the cross-country work over any terrain that is going to be necessary. This, and the fact that it is desirable to keep the

cavalry and artillery columns close together during marches in the vicinity of the enemy, and that a uniformity of marching rates is therefore required, determines beyond any doubt that only horse artillery can fill the bill.

The engineer and signal troops may be motorized because they will operate on or near roads and trails and because they can often be kept in rear and be brought up rapidly by motors when required. Signal radio communications must be supplied by horse packs as well as by motor vehicles so that one or the other may be used.

Mechanized troops and motorized infantry may be attached on suitable occasions, as mentioned before.

Fortunately, the organization desirable for the cavalry division in this rôle lends itself equally well to other and even more important rôles of cavalry.



## Do You Know?

BY CAPTAIN WM. T. BRUNDICK  
Chaplain 316th Infantry

THAT the United States Army ante-dates the United States of America?

THAT there are no less than eleven Indian Wars of importance enough to justify specific battle honors for the Regiments engaged? The last serious Indian trouble ended in 1891 and the very last armed conflict took place in 1898.

THAT John Paul Jones led the only armed invasion any nation has made into England in 200 years? Under him the Americans gave England the worst defeat it ever suffered from one commander.

THAT the long-range guns used by the Germans during the World War were called "Big Berthas" because the Krupp works in which they were manufactured belonged to Bertha Krupp.

THAT the Battle of Antietam decided England's position in regard to the Confederacy and gave Lincoln his opportunity to publish the Emancipation Proclamation?

THAT Joseph K. Mansfield, was shot at Antietam, while a Brig. General, but was buried a Major General? The papers for his promotion had been sent from Washington and arrived in time for the rank of major general to be conferred upon him as his body was being lowered into the grave.

THAT the tune for taps was composed by General Butterfield, July, 1862, while the Union Army was in camp at Harrison's Landing, Virginia? His reason for the new tune was that he did not consider the old "Extinguish Lights" suggestive of rest and sleep.

THAT Thomas Jefferson fought the idea of having the Capital of the U. S. located along the Potomac? He was determined it should be located in Columbus, Kentucky.

THAT not since 1743, has an English King commanded troops in Battle? George II was the last King of England to personally lead an English Army.

THAT Nero did not fiddle while Rome burned? There were no fiddles in the day of Nero. The story is the work of political enemies.

THAT more than 2,000,000 Iron Crosses were awarded during the first three years of the World War?

THAT in the War with Mexico, Tennessee won the name of the "Volunteer State?" More than 30,000 men volunteered when the call was for only 2,800.

THAT only Cavalrymen were allowed to wear mustaches in 1851.

From BULLETIN 89th DIVISION—Nov., 1937.



# Mastering the Future

By MAJOR GENERAL J. G. HARBORD

TODAY, through my office window on the fifty-third floor, I hear from the trenches formed by New York's buildings the rumble on that front of a war that goes on forever in every corner of the earth. Few of the millions engaged in it in one way or another think of their part as more than "filling a job." Except perhaps in their rare romantic moments, it does not occur to more than a handful that this universal war, seldom free from monotony, is making history. Yet it does have tremendous significance, for it is the eternal fight of mankind to supply his wants; the struggle along the frontiers of environment. It began in the era of that cave man who first tried to devise ways of making his shelter more habitable. It will never cease because human needs and hopes can never all be satisfied.

A little while ago I stood with many others on one of the world's great military battle boundaries. It was the front of the nearest German advance on Paris in 1918. We had assembled there to dedicate a memorial to American soldiers, who were the final factor in deciding that this historic line should run exactly through that point—and no closer to the heart of France.

The battles that take place on physical fields like that and the struggle the rumble of which we hear daily along symbolic frontiers have much in common. Their similarities exist despite the great difference between them made by our belief—or vain hope—that all physical wars could be avoided, if all men in all warlike countries would be wiser than they show any promise of being. Lives are freely given in both the military and the peaceful engagements; in building bridges, driving delivery trucks, and through sickness contracted in laboratories where the conquest of disease goes on, as well as before the guns of armies.

Failure to take or hold a line against an environmental enemy may decide the future of as many behind that line, as it ever does in actual warfare.

If the scientists contesting the advance of influenza across America in 1918 had known how to halt this invasion finally and conclusively wherever it hit, more than a quarter of a million Americans would have been saved in that one year. Research men still are working to devise a strategy that will defeat this malady. Some day they will learn the way. Their success against other diseases which once took terrific toll is their memorial, marking a decisive step in the long, slow advance toward better, safer living.

If the Allied armies had not known how to block the advance of a war machine in 1918, the lives of millions of people living today would have been darkened. Whatever disillusionment we suffer in contemplating the existing world as compared with what idealists hoped for after the Armistice, the fact remains that without an Allied victory some countries that are free now would not be. Europe's most liberal nations would have seen their borders pushed in. And our own republic could quite conceivably be hedged on every land frontier by a ring of hostile steel.

Overcoming those real threats still seems as important to many of our citizens now as it did in 1917 and 1918. While concentrating attention on the effort to overthrow environmental handicaps and threats, I am willing to let the results of the World War speak for themselves.

How far and how fast civilization moves against its limiting obstacles depends in large part upon the quality of its men. In everyday progress personal valor becomes a comparatively small factor, for the simple reason that we are not dealing with a frontier on which guns roar. The advances here may stir a few prejudices and conflicting claims and cause some pulling back by those reluctant to abandon old ways. But by and large the unconquered areas of science and technology go—amid applause from every side—to anyone who can take and hold them. It is in the other qualities, aside from bravery, that are displayed in everyday life as well as on the battlefield, that the hope of the world lies.

I happen to have had the high honor of commanding typical cross sections of American men during a critical period in France, and I know from personal observation that those necessary qualities were there, besides unquestioned valor. They might be summed up as a combination of well placed self confidence, concentrated energy, fortitude, flashes of vision, humor, and realistic doubt.

American soldiers did not think of themselves as heroes. They were not romanticists. You did not hear from their lips ringing phrases like "a war to end all war" and "a war to make the world safe for democracy." They had a few expressions that had a ringing sound, all right, in certain situations, but these remarks were not intended for the history books. Fine sayings were tossed aside in the trench area, and left to be repeated in safety by some at home whose idea of the importance of their work did not permit them to go to war.

The boys on the line thought of their work as a job to

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**Wars are still won by soldiers with their feet on the ground**

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be done. First they had to stop an enemy. Then they had to go forward and take objectives. Accomplishing those two things was what demanded the belief in themselves, the concentrated energy, fortitude, flashes of vision, the humor, and realistic doubt of highflown dreams; as well as bravery.

The part these factors play in ordinary life is easily seen by a contemplation of the history of progress. My interest in radio communication naturally turns me in that direction for an illustration. Before the day of Marconi, men had done much talking about the theoretical possibility of sending messages over a distance without wires. Some of the principles had even been worked out on paper. The young Marconi saw wireless communication as a task to be accomplished, not as abstract theory alone. He believed he had the ability to do it, and he had the other essential qualities. The result was that he marked a new frontier of science.

Previous movements along the front on which Marconi gained this height had been exceedingly slow. Between the ancient days of the signal fire, the runner, and the tom-tom, and the year 1844 when the telegraph invented by Morse was put to work, men had done practically nothing to speed the transmission of messages. After the new impetus had been given by the land wire telegraph, the determination of Cyrus W. Field laid the first transatlantic cable. Bell's telephone was not introduced until 1876. Americans who are now little more than middle aged can remember when telephones were a novelty in most parts of the United States.

Men who doubted when Marconi announced at the turn of the century that he had succeeded in receiving a feeble wireless signal across the Atlantic, have lived to see this day in which reliable radiotelegraph communication connects America with the most distant parts of the world and with ships on every sea. The first American owned radio company capable of meeting foreign competition and guaranteeing our nation her rightful place in the use of this new medium was organized after the World War with the encouragement of our Government. Events of the war years had shown the necessity for such an organization.

Belief in the possibilities of radio, research, and energy, added rapidly to knowledge. They led not only to the present high efficiency of shore to shore and marine radiotelegraphy, but also to the introduction and perfection of broadcasting, which has pushed back the horizons of homes in every city and remote section of the United States and in nearly every other part of the world.

Work in laboratories in America and elsewhere continues constantly, pressing forward into still unconquered ground of radio science. Every year sees strategic outposts attained—all of which will contribute their part ultimately in widening the daily lives of men. Television, for instance, has been taken into the field by the Radio Corporation of America for a test under actual working conditions. In the tests, through reception checked on experimental receivers in the homes of members of our

technical staff in the New York City area, many things have been learned that are vital to the creation of dependable "sight transmission." At the same time the engineers devoting themselves to the problem—as realistic as doughboys—are searching out every difficulty and flaw. They will stick to their job until television reaches a stage at which it is ready for use by the public.

The story of communications is typical of those in other sectors where advances are being made. First come the many centuries during which there seems to be little possibility of gaining desired objectives; the era of formulating a vague hope for the advance, sometimes of making a few basic inventions. Next the men of action step into the field and things begin to move. Slowly the advance comes in the early stages, but finally with increasing rapidity. In modern times there has been such a culmination of scientific and technological achievements that there sometimes seems to be no chance of going much further. Always the building is done upon the solid foundation of the experience of the past. And always—as in the case of radio—the unconquered territory ahead of the investigators holds promises of new wonders.

Not so long after Columbus in a hazardous sailing boat discovered America, the brilliant Leonardo da Vinci asserted that it was possible for a machine heavier than air to fly. He not only discoursed on the theory—painting, perhaps, the while, on the smile of Mona Lisa—but also drew a diagram indicating what he believed this contrivance might be like. Four hundred years dragged by before the first plane of the Wright brothers hopped off under its own power and skimmed a few hundred feet through the thin atmosphere above Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.

A little more than a decade after Orville Wright made that first jump, planes were swift, staunch, and dependable enough so that aviators were tilting against one another in them, high above the fields of Europe upon which knights in armor, mounted on mailed horses, had fought a few centuries before. Today, less than thirty-five years after the historic demonstration at Kitty Hawk, airplanes fly through ocean lanes, and maintain regular passenger and mail schedules across and between continents. Pilots guide their course on radio beams and carry on radiotelegraph and radiotelephone communication with land stations and with other planes in flight. Yet those who are in the best position to know, assert that the day of the plane's full glory lies still ahead.

Only a comparatively short span separates the present era from that when the best available doctors, half realistic searchers after truth and half voodoo artists, resorted to bleeding as a practically universal cure-all. The mastery of yellow fever by the research of an American army surgeon is only one of an impressive array of victories by modern medicine. Yet a vast expanse of territory remains to be taken in this field too—a positive cure for cancer and other highly dangerous diseases, the discovery of the true function of all the glands, even a never-failing remedy for the common cold. The unconquered area in medi-

ine, despite the brilliant accomplishments of our generation, is a very large one.

Some grandsons of American pioneers who endured privations and at times a scarcity of food blame part of their present trouble on a strange new economic ill called "over production." The capacity to turn out food, houses, clothing, and other things for which men have always sought, was increased so rapidly by the machine age that distribution was thrown out of gear. While some alarmists cry that we already have reached a situation in which millions must be permanently kept out of employment, faster and more efficient machines are being perfected.

In every aspect of human achievement carping critics find something to deplore. Moans about the "impossibility" of offsetting the harm that "over production" brings with its blessings are matched by the unmanly whines of those who assert that all the advances of science and technology come to naught, in the last analysis. They speak as if this old world had run down and there were no future in employing the virtues or following the paths that have brought success in the past. At one extreme are those who are willing to halt where they are, accepting the best terms that will be granted them and sacrificing gains for which other men have died. At the other extreme are the radicals who believe they have the panacea in a departure from all previous experience—the visionaries who see impossible cloudlands ahead, to be attained by untried methods only.

"Suppose medicine has found a way to prevent plagues," say the advocates of the "world-is-run-down" philosophy. The plagues that once decimated populations were nature's device for weeding out those who were not fit to survive. Continue to protect the susceptible and the incompetent until they reach maturity and have children and you will develop a race that is pitifully vulnerable to disease. Some day pestilence will find a foothold in this throng of weaklings and mow them down. Then, in the absence of law to prevent the reproduction of the incompetent, the so called "backward races" will inherit the earth.

"Human progress is only an illusion," the most extreme iconoclasts continue. "What we have attained is only a surface glitter. The experience of countless men who have lived and died before us has taught us nothing really fundamental. In that sense, all men have died in vain."

Without tracing in detail these complaints against the contributions of those who believe in themselves and do things, the fact exists that the temporary upsets that come incidentally with the advancement of experience and knowledge are offset in the long run by wider knowledge itself. Granting even the doubtful premise that protective medicine will leave us open to fatal attacks by epidemic disease, it must also be apparent that the increased skill of medicine provides new ways of fighting them.

When they hear these predictions of woe, military men can think of a comparison in their own field. For years we heard the forecast that the mechanisms of destruction had reached such perfection that another war would kill

practically every man engaged in it and would leave no important building standing in the combatant countries. That was put to a test on a large scale in the World War. The losses in men and property mounted to totals that were terrible to contemplate. But the casualties in proportion to the number of men in the armies and the destruction of property in relation to the entire physical property of the embattled nations were far below that of many ancient wars.

For every device of offense produced in a scientific and mechanistic age, knowledge and skill soon creates a counteracting method of defense. Bomb proof shelters keep pace with the increased power of bombs. If motorization enables an army to assemble troops and strike quicker from a greater distance on land than ever before, radio in observation planes—the commonest of its many possible uses in war—forewarns against the impending attack. Against the increasing speed and range of invading aircraft is set the invention of new guns to protect against an invader. It has been made known publicly that defense guns which are now under test employ a radio principle to keep their muzzles aimed straight at the roar of a plane's motors. In practice, it is revealed, they make the number of hits scored by antiaircraft arms in the World War look like the target record of a nearsighted dowager dragged into a shooting gallery to try her luck for the first time. The advantage still remains with the defense. Just now the increased power of the air seems to guarantee that the great conscript armies of 1917-18 have disappeared from the battlefields of the future. They can no longer be assembled or supplied in such masses. Coördination of movements on such a scale is no longer possible.

Another precept of warfare that continues to be true although aviation gets more headlines, and probably always will, is that wars still are won—finally—by soldiers with their feet on the ground, who take and hold territory. No military invention, however ingenious, can ever take the place of soldiers. When the line does not hold or when an expected advance does not materialize, the failure can be traced to human beings. Modern equipment is necessary to win a moderate engagement, but there must be men of stamina there who know how to use it to fullest advantage.

Turning to peaceful pursuits we find a comparable situation. It is generally in our failure to make best use of scientific and technological advances that the fault ultimately lies if such advances leave us disappointed. Any conceivable forward step in peaceful knowledge and skill is a good thing if we know how to apply it rightly, and if we acquire the knowledge and skills that should come with it to defend ourselves against its doubtful by-products.

Our civilization is not in reverse, nor do we need to turn to a new direction to assure its future progress. What is demanded is more of the well placed self confidence, the concentrated energy, fortitude, flashes of vision, humor, and realistic doubting of dreams, already mentioned. We need a large proportion of readiness to do the



job that is in front of us, the capacity to face unadorned facts; and less talk based on romanticism and abstract theory. If we apply those qualities in full measure, the experience and achievements of all the men who have died before our day and the work of the men who are striving in the present can be put to their fullest use.

A belief of individuals in their own abilities and their own responsibilities, and a critical appraisal of alluring theories, would counteract the trend toward trust in dictators that has left only a few republics on earth. The citizens of the regimented nations should have realized before they submitted to the loss of their freedom that the solution of economic maladjustment cannot come from magic governmental formulas.

In the great republics like ours the characteristics that make for real advances remain unfettered. They still have a free press, scientific research that is free from racial prejudice or political hindrance, and greater freedom in business opportunity than exists in other parts of the world. Our own nation has set an example in developing radio, the most modern means of mass information, as an independent enterprise, thus far unmenaced by government ownership. The greatest hope of future conquests in the region beyond the present frontiers of general knowledge, science, and technology seems to me to exist in the remaining democracies.

To lead the march beyond existing environmental boundaries, the citizens of these countries must hold to the virtues that have formed the background of previous ad-

vances. We cannot disavow the lessons of the past while we look toward the future, a tendency never yet successful. Men have given their lives for the liberty represented in the various republics. Men have lived their lives—and sometimes sacrificed them—in bringing us from the perilous existence of the jungle prowler, looking merely for food and shelter, to our present wider outlook and greater safety and comfort.

Paths ahead will be opened by men unwilling to barter the possibilities of days to come for the false promise of present security held out by totalitarian states, whose restless dream is based upon the denial of all conclusions of their predecessors.

History along environmental frontiers will continue to be made by those with enough sense of reality to reject a ringing catchword, and enough sense of humor to laugh at it, while they hold a threatened strategic line or advance to a new one.

The heroes of the push beyond existing boundaries of environment and thought will not be led into the illusions that come with thinking of themselves as heroes of an impossible, mythical "new dawn." Backing up their occasional flashes of vision of the romance and ultimate purpose of their work will be a willingness and preparedness to meet situations as they rise. They will be men of stamina with their feet on the ground—the type that has met the test in all ages on all battle lines, symbolic as well as physical.



## Tanks Grow Bigger\*

Germany is said to be building 100-ton army tanks.† This would be two or three times the weight of a modern all-steel railroad car. Since the French already have a 70-ton tank with armor that can turn back a 3-inch shell, the new German model is only a step forward in a process of evolution which may yet give us so-called tanks with 6-inch armor, like the battleships of not so many years ago.

Actually these titan tanks are movable fortresses. On their great caterpillar treads they can be shunted over comparatively small distances. But a small distance may mean a great deal in modern warfare, as we know from Shanghai, where the fighting is from house to house, or from the so-called University City at Madrid, where the fighting has been actually from floor to floor in the same building.

### CAVALRY

One thing the modern army thinkers do not do, by contrast with amateur military philosophers: they do not put all their eggs in one basket. On the one hand, we have 100-ton land battleships. On the other hand, we have the cavalry horse still getting attention. The latest news is that, if anything, the cavalry arm is actually being brought up to greater strength. Tanks and trucks are by no means immune against road hazards. In bad weather they can bog down; the Italians thus explain their setback at Guadalajara. *Away from roads the superiority of the horse over the machine cross-country is obvious.*

\*From The New York Times.

†EDITOR'S NOTE: Page the Army Engineer and the designer of Highway bridges.

# A Doughboy's Idea of a Cavalry Leader

By Major E. D. Cooke, INFANTRY

Anyone counting the scores at Leavenworth would find more upsets than in a month's results of national football. Cavalrymen beat doughboys in infantry problems; infantrymen turn the tables in cavalry problems; and then along comes a medico and beats them all in a river crossing.

None of which is meant to infer that I outdistanced any wearers of the crossed sabres in their own games. Far from it in fact. There was too much razzle dazzle for me. I barely managed to hang onto the last combat car in the column—until the final cavalry problem arrived. And when that bump had been passed, I was right in the middle of the road—flat on the seat of my pants.

There was nothing particularly painful connected with my abrupt separation from contact with the cavalry. I had been very glad to work with them but was equally pleased when the time arrived to return to my own branch of service with its more or less familiar duties. Let the cavalry worry over their own problems, I thought. Why should I bother by head about masses of horsemen and groups of galloping combat cars?

But when the Chief of Cavalry announced the axiom that—"The employment of cavalry rests on those in high command; leadership of cavalry rests on cavalrymen," the sound of armored vehicles and the odor of picket lines returned to haunt my peace of mind. What, I wondered, would I do if, as a staff officer, I found the employment of cavalry subject to my recommendations?

Of course, the issue might easily be dodged. A fellow could let his cavalry leader select the cavalry missions; or, to be even more evasive, he could declare that the conditions of modern warfare had rendered the use of cavalry obsolete. Neither of which would be strictly honest. The next war could and should be won by the commander who knows how to use his cavalry effectively.

Not by the reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance, flank protection, and pursuit of open warfare. Any Leavenworth graduate (be he doughboy or medico) would automatically order the performance of such missions—if the situation warranted. But a study of today's battlefields reveals a startling similarity to World War days: there are no flanks and the belligerents confront each other in force, just beyond grenade-throwing distance. Under

such conditions is the use of cavalry justified? My answer is yes!

Back in the middle ages a prince once offered his kingdom for a horse. The magnitude of that offer has since made many an equestrian forget why the proposal was made. As a matter of fact, Richard III wanted to go rapidly from one place to another.

In those days a horse was the only means by which a man could travel faster than he could on foot. And based upon that fundamental fact were laid the necessity for and the tactics of cavalry. Methods of transportation have increased, their speed has advanced tenfold, but a horseman can still go faster than a footman. To use that speed then is the art of employing cavalry against infantry; and it can be applied, even in semi-stabilized warfare.

There is no reason why horses cannot take their chances against machine guns and barbed-wire entanglements. Animals are cheaper than men and in charging over a given distance, cavalry would be exposed to fire for a shorter period than infantry. It is true that horsemen cannot so readily take cover from fire, but their sudden appearance and rapid approach is more likely to cause fear, and consequently to render the fire less effective.

Not that I advocate hurling cavalry frontally against prepared positions. That is a job for doughboys. Cavalry should attack a flank. And if there was no flank, then I would go about making one. But first I would set out to find just the right kind of a cavalry leader.

Commanders need brains but a leader must have the fighting spirit, the willingness to take a blow in order to give one. In plain understandable words, he has to have guts.

That is what I, a foot soldier, would seek in a cavalry leader. A fear-inspiring, swashbuckling, rootin' tootin' daredevil that would ride into the mouth of hell if the gate was open. But I would want to have him on a tight rein. And if he were just the right kind of a cavalryman, he would need curbing, too.

Chafing under the comparative inactivity of his branch in the last war, he would be surging around, wanting to charge everything in sight. He would be proposing new missions for himself, demanding new weapons, crying for action. He would probably tell me I was doing him

wrong, that I didn't even know how to use cavalry when I had it.

"You're overhyped," I can hear him telling me, "A zero-goal polo player on an 8-goal pony."

And—

"Hold your horses," I'd be answering him, "Sheridan knew something about cavalry and he was a doughboy. Remember John Ewell Stuart? Well, he was a cavalryman and where was Jeb at the battle of Gettysburg? Now, calm down. When the time comes you'll get all the action you're looking for. And in the meantime, don't go chasing all over the map so no one will know where to find you when you're needed."

Of course he would go away mad. He'd be cursing the fact that a doughboy could be in a position to dictate the employment of cavalry. And I'd let him stew. I would not bother to remind him that many a cavalryman on the general staff had sent thousands of doughboys and artillerymen into battle. What would be the use? He would still be of the opinion that cavalrymen were different.

And for the job that fellow eventually would have, he'd better be different. He would have to see and recognize opportunity at a glance, and then ride to glory—or to eternity. And not only the chance, but the decision to take it would be all his.

Many a cavalry leader in '15, '16, and '17 prayed for a breakthrough: for a ride into the blue. Some of them got their wish—and never came back. They ran smack into the hostile reserves being brought up to close the breach. And all the while the shoulders of the opening held fast.

There is the strength of the defense. As long as the shoulders hold, an attack can go as far as it likes. The deeper the penetration, the more vulnerable it becomes to counterattack and possible annihilation. It is not the depth of a salient that counts, it is the width. And, in an attack similar to those on Flanders' fields, I would back

up one flank of the attacking infantry with cavalry. Once the doughboys made a hole, I would expect the cavalry to drive in; to crack the shoulder: to widen the breakthrough.

Only those close up to the assaulting wave of doughboys can see the opening and realize when a flank is exposed. If news of the opportunity offered must first go back to division or corps before any action is taken, the enemy will be given ample time to move his own troops. Local reserves will quickly cover the exposed flank and the shoulders will hold.

Thirty minutes after the doughboys jump off, the attack will have either failed or be well on its way through the regimental reserve line. Then comes the crucial moment, the fleeting opportunity for a smashing blow. With the doughboys driving straight ahead, a hostile flank is exposed!

There is where I want my cavalry leader: right behind the assault, watching for that one brief opening. And when he sees it, I expect him to slice in like the stroke of Saladin's sword. No restrictions, no strings tied to his saddle; just smash in, crush the shoulder and roll that flank up like a carpet.

A man to do that would have to have initiative, good judgment, and above all, a fierce courage—mental as well as physical. There is my idea of a cavalry leader, *caballeros*. A man who can fit himself and his weapons to meet any situation: who can be trusted on an independent mission and still remain part of a team.

Perhaps, as happened at Leavenworth, I would draw down a U for my way of handling cavalry. But were I the cavalryman, I'd rather be given a chance than spend my time doing MP duty behind the lines.

I hope my cavalry leader feels the same.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Submitted on special request of Editor.)



## Notice of Annual Meeting

The annual meeting of the United States Cavalry Association will be held at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D. C., at 8 P.M., Monday, January 17, 1938.

Formal notification, together with proxy cards, will be sent to all members of the Association within the continental limits of the United States. Members who will be unable to be present are requested to return the proxy cards promptly to the Secretary, United States Cavalry Association, 1624 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.



# Five Days at Fort Knox

By Colonel Cary I. Crockett, Infantry

Sheathed in an armored carapace like an immense crustacean, the monster burst roaring from its lair in a thicket, scurried down a slope, trailing a caparison of vines behind it, and splashed into a stream. Without pausing for a fresh start, it floundered out of the water, scrambled up a bank, smashed through a forest of young trees, and emerging into the open hurtled across the fields, up hill and down, at the speed of a fast freight train. A horde of other monsters of identical type accompanied it, crashing through the vegetation like elephants in flight.

What has just been depicted is not an imaginary incident taken from Conan Doyle's "The Lost World" or a similarly fantastic narrative. With my own eyes I saw it happen.

To ride across country at nearly forty miles an hour in the turret of a modern tank or combat car is an experience that gives more thrills than steeplechasing, riding to hounds, or flying. Although I had never before had this experience, there was at first a puzzling sense of familiarity about it.

Leaning from the turret I watched us head straight for some trees large enough to wreck an automobile. The impulse to warn the driver came, but before I could shout the trees were already being crunched beneath us. Next we were threshing our way, without slackening pace, through the densest of briar patches. We missed a terrified rabbit by inches and plunged off a bank into a covey of whirring quail—and suddenly I remembered I was actually realizing a childhood dream, often repeated, of possessing the power of a giant with the added capability of swift and effortless movement. In spite of the bumps and the resultant bruises, I wanted to yell with joy.

This was one of the high spots in a recent visit as one of a group observers to Fort Knox, Kentucky, where the 7th Cavalry Brigade is developing mechanization for the mounted branch of our Army. But there were many other high spots. The cavalry, in addition to being wonderful hosts, showed us everything. Each day was crowded with new and interesting experiences.

For some reason, in recording my impressions of the five-day visit, I have a desire to break away from the dry terminology of a military report. If I had the ability to write poetry in prose, I would apply it to describe some of the things I saw and took part in.

I recall vividly a night march, when the brigade moved across Kentucky towards the Ohio with a mission which involved an attack at dawn. An advance of two hundred miles from near Nashville, in Tennessee, to secure a river crossing at Louisville during the hours of darkness of a

single night would be in the nature of a routine mission for this swiftly moving force. Miles are changed into minutes in calculating factors of time and space for its movements.

As it was we actually marched one hundred and forty miles, with plenty of time to spare.

Imagine a river of armored machines flowing steadily northward with a current of twenty-five miles an hour; a stream which could be halted, put into motion, or diverted into various channels through the control exercised by a power moving with the current, and you have the picture which was presented.

The column, composed of about three hundred vehicles, was covered by its own ground reconnoitered elements pushed forward over fifty miles in advance, and also its aerial feelers consisting of a flight of observation planes that preceded the wheeled scouts.

Contact with both the armored cars that scouted ahead and the airplanes covering a still more distant field, was maintained constantly by radio.

The Brigade Commander and his Operations Officer rode at the head of the main body in a car which carried a radio set tuned in to the command radio net. Commanders of the squadrons, artillery, machine-gun and mortar organizations, each had radio contact through this net and thus were under constant control by the Commanding General. In other cars following the General were staff officers with radios tuned in to the reconnaissance, air-ground, and administrative nets. Communication was maintained by both voice and Morse code radio. As an alternative, swarms of motorcyclists were available and were used to insure constant inter-communication.

To illustrate how the system worked while the column was in motion let us assume that the commander of the reconnaissance troop forty miles ahead wished to get important information immediately to the Brigade Commander. He would send the message by radio from his command car to the brigade staff officer riding in the car which had its radio adjusted to the wave length assigned the reconnaissance net. The receiving radio operator riding in the staff car near the head of the main body would hand the message to the officer at his side who, by winking his flashlight, would signal to one of the motorcyclists following the car. The officer would then attach the message to a wand a few feet in length and hold it out to one side. The motorcyclist would then move up on the right of the car which would make way for it by inclining slightly to the left. When opposite the car the motorcyclist would take the message from the wand and deliver it as directed,



*A Modern Crustacean: The Combat Car*

making due report after delivery as he dropped back to his place in rear.

The method I have outlined worked with perfect success. I must say that the motorcyclists won my admiration by their skillful performance of duties as scouts, messengers, and guides. Each cyclist is armed, or will be, with a sub-caliber machine gun attached to the vehicle so it is in readiness for instant use.

The advance to and delivery of the attack at the crack of dawn was Jules Vernesque—I create this adjective for the want of a suitable word.

Although I have seen various foreign armies operating in both peace and war and am educated, I suppose, in the modern sense, as a survivor from Victorian days and methods I find it difficult to accustom myself to the spectacle of a commander maneuvering the ground and air units of a command with ease and celerity by means of the radio telephone.

Of course, the radio may fail at times. Sometimes it does fail. It didn't in this case. Nevertheless, I inquired as to what would be done should it go out or be drowned out purposely by hostile interference. The answer was that, except of courses for air-ground communication, equal dependence was placed on motorcycle messengers. I was told that adequate provision was made for duplicating every message sent by radio with another carried by motorcyclists.

The motorcyclists were used constantly, and their ability to travel across country when the going was rough astonished me.

From what I saw, I am inclined to the belief that the 7th Cavalry Brigade is approaching the solution of the problem of inter-communication which, as is well known, is one of the most difficult problems to overcome in operating a mechanized force.

Control by subordinate leaders, troops and platoon commanders, was effectively exercised, according to my observation, through the use—in addition to motorcyclists—of visual signals; colored flags and cavalry hand and arm signals. As another control measure there was the designation of specific places on the terrain as assembly points for fighting vehicles after completion of predetermined phases in the attack.

Appropriately to describe the attack by this force, as I witnessed it, would require literary gifts which unfortunately I do not possess. The enemy force was located in advance of and along the crests of a ridge line. The ground was rough, broken up by ravines, and covered with patches of woods and thicket.

The armored cars of the two reconnaissance troops kept up reconnaissance and also supported the attack. The artillery went into position promptly and opened fire. Being howitzers the pieces could use either flat trajectory or curved fire. It was a matter of seconds for the two machine

gun troops to dash up, halt under cover, dismount the guns, set them up on the ground and open fire. Used as a holding force they delivered such an immense volume of fire that a living enemy would have been unable to move when subjected to it.

In preparation for the assault, the mortars put down a smoke screen to blind hostile tank weapons.

Under cover of the smoke screen, the squadrons of combat cars (less a small element held initially in reserve), closing in from both flanks of the hostile position, drove home a smashing attack.

If the surprise concentration of superior forces at a decisive point means victory, this mechanized force would have won it. Added to the paralyzing effect of the converging fire of several hundred caliber .50 and caliber .30 machine guns plus four batteries of howitzers is the effect produced on the defenders by the onrush of swarms of steel protected "hell wagons," practically invulnerable to ordinary small-arms fire. Concentrated fire power plus great mobility, with armored protection for the personnel, characterized the action of this force.

I was impressed by the speed with which the attack was started and carried into completion.

In another instance, which I observed, from the time the outlined enemy was first located to the conclusion of an attack conducted over about two miles of rough ground, only twenty-five minutes elapsed.

Of course, the maneuvers at Fort Knox took place on ground with which the brigade presumably was familiar. However, I was present at the 1936 maneuvers in Michigan in which the mechanized force participated and noted at the time that the operations on strange terrain were also conducted with speed and efficiency.

In one maneuver at Fort Knox it seemed to me that surprise could probably have been effected had not the noise coming from the exhausts of the armored cars disclosed a flanking movement. Here the wind was blowing towards the enemy and the characteristic noise of the exhausts was audible at a long distance.

With respect to the staff functioning in this brigade, what impressed me the most was the simplicity and swiftness of procedure. Of course, in such an organization where every minute counts more than double, the staff work has to be quick and good. Orders and messages were brief and to the point. Fragmentary orders prevailed. Good training and the practice of working together have developed the command, staff, and all the units of the 7th Cavalry Brigade into a composite working team that is highly efficient.

Limitations as to space do not permit lengthy references to the auxiliary units and maintenance elements upon which, in a mechanized force, so much depends. Of the three hundred or more vehicles that made the 140-mile journey that culminated in an attack across rough country, all but three finished the operation under their own power. Merely to announce this low figure of vehicular casualties is to give praise to all connected with the service of maintenance.

Touching the matter of communications, if a layman

may be permitted to comment, I should say that the communications officer and his assistants, particularly the enlisted operators, are likewise entitled to all praise. The enlisted men, in addition to the technical duties as radio operators, are also trained as gunners and drivers.

As my viewpoint is objective, the following comments—intended as constructive—may not be amiss. The personnel of this brigade, in so far as quality is concerned, is of the highest. At the top, middle and bottom all is good. The enlisted men seemed to be well above average. The difficulty is that, from my viewpoint, there are not enough of them. Nearly every man is a specialist. Should this command take the field at its present strength, after a week or two of war time attrition it would be in a bad way for man power. More men per organization are needed.

It seems also that in constructing the vehicles not enough attention was paid to the comfort of the men operating them. This seems wrong, especially as due to the scarcity of personnel the men operating the vehicles are obliged to spend long hours without relief.

The scout cars impressed me as being expensive, conspicuous and vulnerable. I believed that each should be accompanied by two or more motorcyclists equipped with sub-caliber machine guns, whose rôle would be to act as the pilot fish does to the shark. If I recall correctly, due consideration has been given already to this matter, and additional motorcyclists are to be provided.

There are no engineers with the brigade. That a unit of these indispensable troops is essential goes without saying. Moreover, I feel certain that to each regiment should be added a company of riflemen with the required number of armor-protected troop carriers. Only a few more vehicles would be needed.

The new barracks at Fort Knox were a pleasure to behold. They are fine as far as they go. It is too bad that no quarters other than madeover war time buildings are available for some of the organizations. Officers and men necessarily are worked hard. There will always be great responsibility and a lot of work. Therefore, the living conditions for everyone should be satisfactory.

I have seen something of the mechanized forces of other nations and do not think that our own cavalry mechanized brigade need fear comparison with any nation; that is to say, from the qualitative viewpoint. As to numbers and strength we are far behind. Russia has at least eight mechanized divisions and is creating more, and Germany has three.

Summarizing my impressions of the visit to Fort Knox, my conclusion is that, all pseudo-military scientists to the contrary, the machine has not taken the place of the man in war and that now more than ever before it is the man who operates the machine that counts. Having seen the men who are operating the machines, I came away with the satisfying feeling that the mechanized cavalry brigade is in good hands.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Colonel Cary I. Crockett, Infantry, was one of the observers from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the last week in October, attending the mechanized cavalry demonstrations for the staff, faculty, and students of the Cavalry School.



# Fourth Army Maneuvers - 1937

## Some Comments by Colonel Dorsey R. Rodney, Cavalry

(EDITOR' NOTE: Colonel Rodney forwarded to the JOURNAL a detailed account of the participation of the Provisional Cavalry Brigade in the Fourth Army Maneuvers conducted at Fort Riley. The general and special situations (with maps) together with tactical activities were published in the September-October, 1937, issue of the JOURNAL. The comments contained in that article, written by Major William C. Chase, pertained mainly to larger forces and abstract principles. Colonel Rodney's remarks pertain more to smaller units. The following article contains *extracts* from his paper dealing *only* with lessons and comments.)

### PROVISIONAL CAVALRY BRIGADE IN THE FOURTH ARMY MANEUVERS

This paper will deal briefly with the operations of the Provisional Cavalry Brigade and on some of the lessons pertaining to units smaller than the division.

\* \* \* \* \*

The outstanding lessons of these exercises, which are not new or startling but which are still important are:

A squadron of cavalry, ordered to seize a certain hill, advanced beyond its objective because the enemy had pulled out. They stopped on a hill much farther on. Seen there by the rest of the brigade, which did not know of the move, they were thought to be enemy troops and erroneous conclusions were drawn which to some extent upset the original plans. Had the commander of this squadron of cavalry informed either his regimental or brigade commander *at the time he left* his objective that he was doing so, there would have been no confusion.

Commanders should keep their superiors informed of their actions and also units on their flanks.

The commanders, especially the regimental commander of the leading regiment, must be well forward when contact is expected and their command posts must be well to the front.

Artillery which is attached to cavalry organizations as small as a brigade must move into position very rapidly when it is decided to organize an attack. It must consequently be given all facilities as regards roads. The gaits must therefore be mainly the trot and gallop.

The remarks made above concerning the artillery apply as well to machine guns and all supporting or auxiliary fires.

\* \* \* \* \*

When a brigade of cavalry consists of one regiment of cavalry with artillery attached it seems that there are but two alternatives for command; either the brigade or regimental commander runs the show. In this case the brigade CP was just an unnecessary link in the chain of com-

munication. During several actions in these maneuvers, six squadrons (two regiments) could have been better or more rapidly controlled by the brigade commander without the interjection of the regimental commanders or one regimental commander could have controlled the six squadrons. It seems possible therefore that we may have too many links in our chain of command. Where success depends on rapidity of action and therefore promptness in transmitting orders as it invariably will in the cavalry, short cuts must be availed of, even when precedents must be broken.

The Provisional Cavalry Brigade operated, during 24 August, under the following letter of instructions:

"CAVALRY DIVISION (PROVISIONAL)  
FORT RILEY, KANSAS

23 August 1937

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions.

TO: Commanding Officer,  
Provisional Cavalry Brigade.

1. Commencing at daylight the 24th and upon orders from these headquarters, you will prepare to operate against the north flank and rear of the Blue attack with the *primary mission* of relieving the pressure of the Blue attack against our Infantry. You will accomplish this by moving rapidly, avoiding all cross roads or other points of likely artillery concentration and by not allowing yourself to become seriously engaged with minor units.

2. Your objectives should be enemy artillery, enemy reserves, or the enemy principal command posts.

3. When one of these major objectives is definitely located you will strike with your entire force with the purpose outlined in your primary mission.

4. It is desired when blocked that you leave a small containing force and continue your flanking action with a view to diverting fire and attention from our Infantry positions and with the objective of keeping Blue reserves from being committed to the attack.

5. Your main difficulty will be to get around the Blue Cavalry with which it is not desired that you become seriously engaged but that you avoid it and proceed upon your mission.

By command of Brigadier General HENRY:

C. B. HAZELTINE,  
Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry,  
Asst. C of S, G-3."

\* \* \* \* \*

We have often heard of the use of letters of instruction to a cavalry commander but few of us have ever actually received or seen one. Here seems to be an excellent example. It is true that it did not cover a very extensive

operation either as regards time or space but it did serve to make clear to the cavalry commander the exact wishes of the division commander. And sometimes being in other than the set form of a field order it has a tendency to fix attention and express the desired object a little more clearly.

During the maneuver the 2d Cavalry had in its command organization a command post truck and a command scout car marching at the head of the main body in advance of the regimental commander (when the latter rode his horse). The Provisional Cavalry Brigade also had in its command organization a station wagon (with radio for communication with division) and a command scout car. This made four motor vehicles at the head of the 2d Cavalry besides such motorcycles as were available. It is believed in most cases like this in travelling along the road that the brigade commander should be in the command car of the leading regiment with the regimental commander (when they are not on their horses) and that the command vehicles of the brigade headquarters should be farther to the rear, say just ahead of the artillery, so as not to have too many vehicles at the head of the horse elements. The same question relative to the possibility that we may have an unnecessary link in our chain of command as was mentioned in comments under August 23 arises when we consider the proper location of the several command cars in a marching column.

\* \* \* \* \*

We are too prone to indicate a line of advance on a map and assume it can easily be covered and that very little difficulty will be encountered. Any time troops leave the road their march is considerably reduced and, especially in maneuvers, higher authority is apt to get impatient at the apparent though natural slowness of the movement.

Sometimes the boldest and most unexpected plan is attended by marked success. This was the case with the attack of the 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry against the command establishments of the Blue force.\* It entailed a movement through a very restricted area, really a bottleneck, where discovery by the enemy of the movement of the squadron would probably have subjected the squadron to very heavy losses. But probably on account of its very boldness the movement was not discovered and no steps had been taken to guard against such a movement. As a matter of fact the division commander had given serious consideration to a movement by the entire Provisional Cavalry Brigade, similar to the movement made by the 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry.

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Assumed mustardization of a large area of ground was encountered by a part of the Provisional Cavalry Brigade on this date. While experiments are being conducted to protect horses from gas, it is believed the main protection of cavalry must consist in avoiding such areas and only in very exceptional situations should they be expected to traverse the contaminated areas. The same of course ap-

plies to areas, road junctions, etc., under heavy artillery fire. (See article page . . . on this subject).

Although it may not be possible for cavalry to envelope a hostile force to such an extent as to involve a mounted attack, in many cases a cavalry command can use its superior mobility to place its units in position to make dismounted attacks from several directions. The failure of the several units to have direct physical connection with each other is not then attended with such danger as is the case with infantry units.

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The attack of the 2d Cavalry during August 23 and again during August 24 by nine of the most modern types of attack plans provides food for thought. This regiment probably has had as much training as any other regiment in the Army in regard to measures against hostile planes and an exhaustive article could be written on the many questions arising. For instance, it has been found in most cases impracticable to have air scouts parallel the marching column on the ordinary terrain where the roads are bordered by fences.

In the Provisional Cavalry Brigade signals to indicate the approach of hostile planes or mechanization were given by the hat, raised and lowered rapidly to indicate planes and swung in a horizontal plane to indicate mechanization. At either signal the units moved rapidly into a dispersed formation, more or less similar to the "approach formation" in which they had been trained. When traveling on a road bordered by fences the dispersion is often limited to moving on both sides of the road. It is always a disputed question whether the force attacked by airplane should dismount to fire or should fire from the saddle. Although it is often stated that a dispersed formation is an unremunerative target for the planes still it is thought that dispersed troopers will be attacked and they should themselves attack the planes. For this purpose it is the thought of the Provisional Cavalry Brigade that, if time permits, the troopers should dismount, because it is not much more difficult for the plane to hit members of a column moving than at rest and the fire of the troopers is much more effective if fired from the ground. The first attack on this day was met by dismounting Numbers 2 and 4 who opened fire, the odd numbers continuing to move with the horses. Other attacks were met by dispersing and firing from the saddle.

Scout cars are particularly useful in meeting an air attack as they have their automatic weapons always ready. If there are sufficient of them available to distribute through the column they are particularly effective.

The question arises whether a command in bivouac or assembly area should strive to escape losses from airplanes by concealment or should take up a dispersed formation and rely on their automatic weapons, properly disposed, to keep off dangerous enemy planes. Many times commands attempt to conceal themselves in ravines which in case of air attacks would be veritable death traps. In general, if there is reason to believe the enemy airplanes have

\*The Blue Command Post was captured.

no knowledge of the approximate location of the cavalry, concealment is the proper course. And if it can be combined with effective covering fires by automatic weapons such a course is indicated. During Fourth Army Maneuvers the assembly area of the Provisional Cavalry Brigade was on one occasion "protected" by a battery of anti-aircraft machine guns, which, being placed in the open in a rather conspicuous position, practically indicated to the hostile airplanes that some important installation was established nearby and it would have required very little imagination to be able to fix on the exact location. Fortunately no hostile plane sensed the situation.

Radio communication has come into quite general use in the cavalry and this is well. But we must be sure that we are prepared and trained to keep up communication when the radio fails to function as at times it most certainly will in active service. The means of providing communications when the radio will not function are mounted and motorcycle messengers or "officer riders." It should be stressed again that messenger horses should be especially selected, trained and *conditioned*.

Motorcycles are especially valuable for this work, especially on roads being used by other troops. The motorcycles assigned to regiments should not be detached by higher headquarters. A regiment or brigade and of course a division is greatly handicapped without motorcycles.

Recently the prohibition against simple codes by unit communication officers for use locally (within the unit itself) has been rescinded (AR 335-5) which helps to speed up radio communication.

Motorized command posts within larger units to include the regiment are essential.

Scout cars have become a very important part of the organization of each cavalry regiment. While their normal and proper uses are in connection with reconnaissance missions, there are times when part of them may be diverted therefrom. Such a use occurred during these maneuvers when two scout cars were used to temporarily block the passage of a defile in the protection of the artillery until other force was made available. They were also used at times to give added protection to engineer detachments establishing road blocks.

A motorized detachment of engineers is very valuable for a rapidly moving cavalry unit, to establish road blocks

and thereby prevent the enemy from breaking in on the cavalry during its movement. It is necessary to study carefully, and clearly designate the positions of such road blocks in accordance with the special situation.

Artillery attached to cavalry such as in this maneuver must expect to be placed in action in some relatively exposed positions as regards hostile patrols. However, the cavalry commander must foresee the danger, make provision to guard against it by the use of his reserve or other troops or indicate to the artillery what the danger is. The latter are by no means defenseless in such situations, as there are six automatic weapons in each battery.

It was brought out rather forcibly in these maneuvers that the advance guard commander should be very fully informed as to the intentions and plans of the main body commander so that the actions of the advance guard may be in furtherance of those intentions and plans.

It has often been said that "the enemy is the true objective" of an attacking force. This is apt to lead to a confused idea. Frequently, as in the capture of Campbell Hill during the maneuver of August 25, a critical terrain feature is the proper initial objective. The advance and seizure of successive critical terrain features after the most vital one has been secured places the attacker at a great advantage.

A command, especially a cavalry command, to which artillery is attached should constantly be on the look-out for OP's for the artillery. If artillery personnel is not with the advance elements information of suitable OP's should be sent back. This is an excellent mission for scouts or intelligence personnel.

Infantry must, as never before, expect to protect themselves from all directions—front—flanks—and rear.

Such success as the Provisional Cavalry Brigade obtained in these maneuvers in carrying out its assigned mission, especially as regards the envelopment of the hostile flank and rear on August 24 and August 25, was obtained by concealment and rapid movement. While it may be too much to expect similar successes in time of war, it should on the other hand be realized that the enemy is not always going to act with intelligence above criticism, and that rapidity of movement and surprise are still the characteristics which will retain for the cavalry its important rôle.

**MARCHING:** *The first rôle of Cavalry is to march—mobility. There are two methods of marching: first, under an antiquated system resulting in fatigue to men and animals; the second under a modern system with minimum fatigue to the whole column. The real combat rôle of cavalry is but a distant dream to a unit which cannot march.*



# Cavalry in Modern Warfare

## A Conversation With a Great Turkish Cavalry General

By Lieutenant Colonel M. Braun, German Army, Retired

From *Militär-Wochenblatt*, Berlin, July 2, 1937. Translated from the German by FRED W. MERTEN.

"Strung in a long column, the Turkish Cavalry Corps of General Fahreddin Pasha winds its way along a narrow path and, during the night of August 25-26, 1922, slips through a poorly guarded gap in the hostile front, thus gaining the flank and rear of the surprised Greek forces. There the Cavalry Corps establishes itself, severs the hostile line of communications, blocks the approach of hostile reinforcements and completes the investment of the Greek I and II Corps. By an enveloping (encircling) pursuit, the Cavalry Corps drives the enemy back to the coast as far as Smyrna and, on September 9, is the first Turkish contingent to enter this city."—With these words Major M. Larcher, French General Staff, in his book entitled *The Operations of the Turkish Cavalry Corps in the War of Independence*, describes the outstanding achievement of the Turkish cavalry in the Greco-Turkish War of 1921-1922.<sup>1</sup> In studying this remarkable "Battle of the Generalissimo" in all of its ramifications, it is indeed a pleasure to read of the splendid spirit that imbued the Anatolian troops and of the well-nigh classical leadership with which General Fahreddin commanded the Cavalry Corps, although he was not, originally, a cavalryman. Poor communications and lack of supplies; days without any instructions or messages whatsoever; fighting in all directions; a most difficult terrain—nothing was spared him. And yet he rode and fought his way forward, covering almost 200 miles in 13 days (see Sketch No. 1). Twelve hundred horses lost their lives on the march; the others, tired and starved, were barely able to walk during the "final spurt" of the drive on Smyrna.

General Fahreddin, still on the active list, recently was kind enough to grant me an interview and to tell me of his experiences.

I am sure that an account of the highlights of this conversation will be of great interest to the readers of this publication, especially inasmuch as it was the object of our conversation to apply, to modern conceptions of war, experiences of that period and to evaluate them accordingly.

To begin with, General Fahreddin drew me a sketch from memory (see Sketch 1). He then described the situation as follows:

<sup>1</sup>The defeat of the Turkish armies in the World War was followed by a Greek military occupation in Asia Minor. Greek forces entered Smyrna May 15, 1919. In opposition to the foreign invasion and oppression and the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920), the Turkish Nationalists established a separate government at Angora, organized a new army and drove the Greeks from Asia Minor.—Tr.

"In six night marches, we quietly departed from the region east of Akshehr (about 60 miles southeast of Afium) and, unobserved by hostile aviation, moved near the mountains. False rumors, misleading propaganda and erroneous reports in the press, all served to aid our undertaking. The mission of the Cavalry Corps was, under cover of the Turkish 57th Division, to cross the mountain range at Cigil Tepe and, in descending to the plain, turn in a northwesterly direction with the view to gaining the enemy's rear. The execution of the cavalry mission thus depended upon the successful outcome of the operation of the 57th Division which, jointly with the entire army, was to attack at 5:30 AM, August 26.

"The Cavalry Corps was formed in two columns: one division with only two batteries of artillery on the right; two divisions in column on the left (see Sketch No. 2). From the cautious and limited (geographically) reconnaissance conducted by small elements, on August 25, I learned, to my pleasure and surprise, that the enemy was not occupying the mountain pass between Cigil Tepe and Chai Hissar. Apparently in an effort to make good this mistake, a column of Greek cavalry rode up to the pass in the course of the afternoon, but turned back shortly before reaching the pass without putting up a fight.

"In view of this situation, I requested the High Command to alter my mission. My intention was to pass through the gap during the night, overtake the 57th Division on the left flank and, at the break of dawn, push on into the plain. My request was approved.

"The night march up the mountains proved to be a tremendously difficult task, for the long cavalry column marched in column of troopers on a rocky and precipitous path which in most places was only a yard wide. It was even more difficult for me to make my way from the trail to the head of the forward division in the left column. While I crept past the heavily burdened men and animals, much abuse was heaped upon the Corps Commander whom no one recognized in the dark. However, from the very outset of the operation it was clear to me that my cavalry corps was occupying a vital position in this battle and, moreover, was favored by a rare stroke of good fortune; hence I was prepared to dare anything. Finally, I reached the advance guard. At the break of dawn my cavalry was on the descent. Its orders were, for the present, to assemble on the north slope of the mountains for proper development and concentration. It would have been impossible to strike at the enemy with the necessary power from the long column of troopers. At 5:30 AM,



Sketch 1

### TWO HUNDRED MILES THROUGH MOUNTAINS IN THIRTEEN DAYS

The Turkish Cavalry Corps in Pursuit of the Greek Forces  
August 26 to September 9, 1922

we heard the sound of battle on our right; the 57th Division was attacking.

"In the early morning hours, still undisturbed by the enemy, I issued orders to demolish the railroad, intensify reconnaissance against hostile reserves to the north, north-east and west, and resume the advance in an approach formation. At that moment I received the shocking news that the attack of the 57th Division had ended in failure after two vain attempts to dislodge the enemy. (Upon a severe rebuke by telephone from the High Command, the unhappy Commander of the 57th Division committed suicide while the offensive was still in progress.) Furthermore, I was directed to turn the division on the right of my corps in an easterly direction (see Sketch 1), for the purpose of supporting the drive on the 57th Division and attacking the hostile forces that were hastily establishing a refused flank guard position in the region of Sinan Pasha. Besides, it was necessary for me to remove the rear division of the left column and shift it farther to the left in the direction of Dumlupinar, whence hostile cavalry was reported on the approach. The center division now inherited the principal mission. As it was about to push forward along its entire front, I learned that the division on the right was delayed six hours owing to the slow progress made by its artillery. This and other delay-

ing influences continued throughout the following days. Yet everything turned out well in the end. Around noon, a mounted messenger reported to me with beaming face and brought me a large piece of rail, as tangible evidence that the demolition of the Afium-Ushak-Smyrna Railroad was accomplished. Thus a blow of vital concern to the enemy had been struck."

At this point of the conversation, General Fahreddin fell silent, musing upon the most glorious hours of his life. Breaking the silence, I inquired: "Assuming, your excellency, your cavalry corps had been organized according to modern standards and included both motorized and mechanized elements. Would it have been possible as well as practical to employ the Corps in these circumstances?"

GENERAL FAHREDDIN: "Motorized forces could have participated in the march from Akshehr to the foothills, but could not have followed us through the mountains."

AUTHOR: "Does that apply also to modern vehicles with great cross-country ability, such as the Italian light combat car, the so-called *carro veloce*, or the Italian light mountain truck, or the excellent 1.5-ton truck with mountain chassis, one-meter track and low-gear drive, used in Italy for the transportation of Alpine troops—all of which vehicles stood the test in Ethiopia, where they were widely used in mountainous terrain—or the light truck of the British *portée* cavalry, or the new Austrian light motor car, and other marvels of the motor industry?"

GENERAL FAHREDDIN: "While I am no technical expert, I am familiar with the principal characteristics of most of these vehicles. Even they could hardly have followed our horses over the mountains, not only because of the difficult terrain, but mainly because we had to march quietly by night. Nothing can alter the fact that, in the dark, the horse is superior to any motor; indeed, he is superior even to the human being. You know how nimble-footed and hardy our Anatolian horses are and what splendid mountain climbers they are; our success was largely due to them. You must also bear in mind that the horses of my cavalry corps consisted entirely of hastily conscripted mounts with little military training and very poor equipment. Three thousand beautiful cavalry saddles, which had been ordered from Germany and which we were sorely in need of, lay well-packed at the custom house in Smyrna, where we later found them upon entering the city."

AUTHOR: "Let us assume a modern cavalry division comprises two horsed brigades and one motorized brigade, similar to the organization used in the French maneuvers of 1932 and in the Italian maneuvers of 1935. How could the motorized brigade have been employed in this case?"

GENERAL FAHREDDIN: "There would have been only two solutions. One would have been for the motorized brigade to move to the east flank of the 57th Division and turn north at a point west of Afium; in other words, the motorized brigade would have had to follow

the front of the 57th Division in an easterly direction, then advance through the front and join the horsed brigades which meanwhile had advanced through the mountain pass. The other solution would have been for the motorized brigade to turn in a westerly direction and push on via Gutvis to Ushak and there join the horsed brigades. While I appreciate that either solution would have been quite difficult, particularly for the division commander, I believe these missions could have been carried out, especially if aviation had been on hand to maintain liaison. In making this statement, I think of the success had by the Italians in employing the motorized "Starace" contingent in the Ethiopian campaign. This motorized unit likewise had to make an envelopment on a large scale, but, in the end, gained contact with the other forces for joint action."


AUTHOR: "To return to your story, your excellency. How did the situation develop further?"

GENERAL FAHREDDIN: "There is little of importance to tell in connection with the events that took place after August 26. As soon as we had possession of the railroad and scored our first success in an encounter with the Greek 9th Division, a part of the hostile GHQ Reserve which was approaching by way of Ressit Dag, the enemy lost heart and subsequently offered only minor resistance. We simply kept at his heels day and night. However, there is one amusing incident which I would like to mention. During the pursuit, the 1st Cavalry

Division encountered weak hostile elements in position on a high ground. The Division Commander decided to make a frontal attack with the 1st Brigade, and envelop the enemy on the right flank with the other two brigades (see Sketch 2). Leaving the animals behind in care of horse holders and fighting on foot, the 1st Brigade steadily gained ground. Success was within reach, when the hostile artillery suddenly opened a violent fire on the assembly areas of the lead horses, who probably were placed in unfavorable positions. The outcome was that the lead horses broke loose in a body and raced back toward the location of the last bivouac. The troops had no alternative but to run after their horses and round them up, which forced the Division to postpone the relentless pursuit for a considerable length of time. This delay permitted the enemy to escape. A motorized<sup>2</sup> unit could have worked wonders there. Besides, motorized forces would not have become as panic-stricken as these troops with lead horses."

AUTHOR: "Your excellency, may I refer once more to the feasibility of employing a cavalry division which includes a motorized brigade. In what manner could the motorized brigade have been employed during the pursuit via Ushak to Smyrna? I am asking this because of the tremendous difficulty encountered in coordinating the different speeds. True, for tactical purposes, it is very

<sup>2</sup>(EDITOR'S NOTE: The term "motorized" appears to include both mechanized and motorized forces.)





well to combine horse and motor. This combination may be used in all kinds of weather and on any kind of ground. If the motorized contingents fail, there still remain enough horsed elements; then again, if the ground is suitable for motorized forces, one may let them have 'the run of the field,' so to speak. However, for strategic purposes, the inherent speed of the motor as a rule cannot be exploited because of the relative slowness of the horse."

GENERAL FAHREDDIN: "I am aware of these difficulties, but feel sure they can be overcome. After all, during our pursuit, the Greeks did not run away without offering some resistance. At many points, fire was exchanged and minor engagements developed before the enemy would continue his retreat. Therefore, if the motorized brigade had been assigned the mission of conducting an enveloping pursuit in the area south of the railroad (which opportunity existed after the Battle of Dumlu Pinar), the brigade no doubt would have repeatedly encountered the enemy and would have had to fight him. This would have taken up time, but afforded the horsed brigades an opportunity to rejoin the motorized brigade. This method of fighting in divided groups—which may be separated by many miles—is rather new to us; yet in a future war it will be an every-day occurrence to any commander of modern mobile units, whether they be mechanized, motorized, semi-motorized or tank divisions or entire motorized corps. The terrain of Turkey is not like that of Europe, our military geography is totally different; hence the organization of our army must be different. By all means, we must keep in step with the progress of motorization, but we must not over-emphasize its importance. In many parts of the Anatolian mountains the horse remains superior to the motor. And so the large cavalry unit, let us say the cavalry corps, probably will remain a vital part of our military establishment in a future war. Of course, I am referring to modern, partly motorized cavalry with powerful and well-distributed fire arms, suitable accompanying guns and other first-rate equipment. The tactics of this cavalry will consist in a maximum of mobility. Its activities will be mainly riding, dismounting for rapid action, again mounting, riding, encircling, enveloping, swiftly shifting position, withdrawing and once more advancing, pursuing and delaying. The mounted attack probably will be the exception, however."

This concludes my conversation with General Fahreddin. I feel that the thoughts of this great man and eminent military commander are worthy of serious consideration. It was not only at Dumlu Pinar, but in the operations of the previous year of the Turkish War of Independence as well, that General Fahreddin proved his marked ability to combine mobility with combat, to act with determination, to use initiative and to think strategically. His is the rare gift of appreciating modern progress and retaining the spirit and stamina of his youth, as befits an old cavalry leader.

The Polish publication entitled *Bellona* contains some serious thoughts by Colonel Machalski on the prominent rôle which cavalry will play in a future war. The new Polish cavalry combat regulations likewise reflect the importance attached to this arm. It is interesting to learn of the organization of so-called "Voroshilov" cavalry units in Soviet Russia. In 1936, the Austrian army introduced a "mobile division" during maneuvers, with the result that, "suitably employed in mountains of medium elevation, horse and motor do not exclude, but supplement, each other."

Colonel Sherburne, a British army officer, recently had this to say in honor of the horse: "The horse remains the most mobile means of transportation for short distances and on the battlefield; moreover, horsed cavalry possesses relatively greater fire power than infantry (that is, in proportion to actual numerical strength)."

The foregoing may serve to caution radical friends of motorization and mechanization to pause a while.

No one denies that the motor industry is making strides and produces marvel upon marvel. Yet the motor has and will retain certain limitations; and it is essential that these limitations be recognized if motorization is to progress. This is shown by recent events in Spain as well as by the Battle of Dumlu Pinar, whose application to modern standards some critics might describe as "senseless dwelling upon a dead past." It is common knowledge that the Moorish cavalry of General Franco on numerous occasions contributed materially toward deciding the issue of an operation. Unfortunately, we still lack detailed accounts of the employment of this cavalry. In the Ethiopian campaign, the native Spahis of the Italian forces performed wonders on their speedy and hardy horses; time and again they showed their heels to the motor which lay helplessly by the wayside, because of dirty spark plugs, lack of fuel, a broken drive shaft, or overheated pistons. In order to gain a clear perspective in the field of motorization, as in any other field of endeavor, one must leave the confines of Europe and observe matters from a distance. Anyone who, like the author, has ridden a horse for weeks on end through the mountainous countryside of Turkey will learn instinctively how to differentiate between zones suitable for horsed troops and zones suitable for motorized forces. Without once failing me, my brave *topac* carried me over mountains 9,000 feet in elevation, through deep gorges, across precipitous cuts and through miles of brush. There is not a motor built that could have accompanied my horse indefinitely.

In conclusion, I wish to stress that the foregoing arguments are not directed against motorization. I have no occasion to denounce the motor, for by profession as well as by inclination I am an enthusiastic advocate of the advancements made in the field of motorization. However, my words are written in defense of the horse and of the cavalry which must not be neglected despite its opponents.



# Cavalry Combat



(EDITOR'S NOTE: The widespread appreciation of *Cavalry Combat* continues. Two analytical reviews of the book from widely different sources are of great interest. Both reviews, which follow, merit thought and attention.)

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A review from the *Field Artillery Journal*, September-October, 1937:

*"If you want to win your battles, take and work your blooming guns."*—KIPLING.

This is a book which does for the Cavalry what "Infantry in Battle" did for the foot soldier. It is a compilation of historical episodes, each chosen to illustrate some feature of patrolling, counter-reconnaissance, rearguard action, and the like, taken from every field of the World War—and it is likely the reader will receive somewhat of a shock, after hearing, for years, only of "The Desert Mounted Corps," or "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom," to learn that troopers, armed with saber or with lance, thrust home so many widely separated charges in the teeth of modern weapons. For instance, we learn of the action, colorfully told, of the 4th Squadron 10th Chasseurs, cavalry of the French 74th Infantry Division, south of Soissons 30 May, 1918. The French 299th Infantry had been driven back, with serious losses, from the ridge at Berzy-le-Sec. A mounted attack was necessary to relieve the pressure. Eighty troopers drew saber and charged. "In a few minutes the charge had covered a distance of two kilometers . . . It had swept the plateau first from east to west, then from south to north." The Germans were driven back in confusion. Members of the German 7th Grenadiers over whom the charge had passed surrendered without resistance. One chasseur was wounded; none was killed. Eleven horses were killed, ten were wounded, three were missing. From which one might infer, perhaps, that machine guns sited for knee-high fire, if surprised, are not as effective against cavalry as supposed.

It is too often a vice of the reviewer that he interpret a book in the light of his special interests. But let some virtue attach to examination of this book in terms of artillery. Here it is, a large, well-bound, well-illustrated volume of 512 pages, with 120 maps and sketches; after each episode, a discussion of the tactics involved, the errors made, or the opportunities seized; preceding each chapter, the appropriate text from official doctrine.

And under the heading of Chapter Twelve, Miscellaneous, we find but a dozen pages devoted to Horse Artillery, much of it a reprint from this JOURNAL for 1920. The discussion which follows this section emphasizes the draft-mobility handicaps imposed on horse artillery, and

looks forward to the lessened weight of the new 75-mm. howitzer as measurably improving the situation. Matters such as these are obvious to the sister arm.

But nowhere, even in the many incidents described where horse artillery is mentioned, are there many conclusions to be drawn concerning proper or improper employment of the arm.\*† The text, of course, does not describe modern artillery practice. It treats of the lessons to be learned from what was done in the World War. And one can only surmise that the proper employment of its artillery was largely a hit-or-miss proposition to the commanders of the cavalry units whose operations were described.

Is it because artillery support of cavalry was so little effective? Is artillery-cavalry teamwork so mysterious? Is it the fault of the artillery, or of the cavalry, that but casual stress on artillery support appears in these incidents?

We need but to look back to the World War for the answer. Before that time neither infantry nor artillery understood the other. But position warfare permitted complete organization of the attack. The rolling barrage, and the progressive concentration, under which armor the doughboy crept, step by step, and close in front of whom the devastation of artillery fire spread itself upon the enemy, made him appreciate the guns.

However, a mounted attack cannot lean up against a barrage. It is launched under the shelter of fire so far-flung—the events occur with such bewildering rapidity, that the action is over, the decision has been obtained, and only the tenseness and the thrill remain.

What were the gunners doing? Oh, they threw a few rounds as we started. But didn't those enemy wagon-soldiers tear us up!

There is one feature common to the majority of these instances. The narrator was conscious of the effect on himself, his comrades, and their mission, of the hostile artillery. This made, naturally, the profoundest of impressions on him. He was less subject to a sentence of his own artillery, and what it was doing, and it is not too much, perhaps, to suspect that on the occasions friendly artillery

\*It is known that teamwork between cavalry and artillery has been greatly improved of late years. Indeed, a forthcoming issue of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, it is said, will contain an article by an officer of horse artillery experience, which will go far to explain details of technical cooperation. Its reading is recommended as supplementary to this work, certainly to that chapter on "Communications," which, dealing mostly with larger units, omits mention of cavalry-artillery radio, which is perhaps the framework of present methods.

†EDITOR'S NOTE, Cavalry Journal: The foregoing article appeared in the September-October CAVALRY JOURNAL under the title of "Artillery Support of Cavalry," by Major Douglas Wahl, 82d Field Artillery.

was not even mentioned, that it was, indeed, present, and performing deeds vitally affecting the outcome of the action. This would be but natural, as the comparatively great range of the arm places the emphasis of action, not on the far end, but the near.

On those occasions when the artillery galloped up with the leading supported elements, slammed into action and engaged the enemy and the hostile guns from positions in the open, employing direct laying, it attracted attention, and the drama of its operations is enthusiastically and appreciatively described. This is bound to affect—and it is known that it has affected—the feeling of many cavalrymen that such positions are those most to be desired for cavalry support.

Perhaps they are. Yet, if time and knowledge be available, surely the less-attention-attracting indirect-laying position concealed from air observation is that which lends itself to best effective employment, and assures a continuity of support unbroken by the contingency of changing position under fire. Only the most accomplished artillery, the most thoughtful cavalry, can team to employ such positions. Time is precious. Support is needed. Reconnaissance is short. We may not be able to fire from that screen of wooded hills to the left rear. But we can from this plateau. Action front! Target, base of those trees!

At any rate, the editor and compiler made thorough search, with the military libraries of the world at his disposal, for examples of detailed cavalry-artillery coöperation. Such instances were comparatively few. The cavalry commander was concerned with the disposal of his troopers. After that, it would appear, he thought of his artillery—but after, not simultaneously. One receives the impression that the Germans, more than any other, were artillery conscious, and constantly thoughtful of the value of their guns.

Not that the cavalry did not want guns with them. British brigadiers, for example, demanded attached batteries, and got them. But when it dawned upon the high command that some brigade might need *all* the artillery support of the division, at times when an attached battery was "sleeping peacefully" with its reserve brigade, the guns were formed into division support. That so elementary a principle of employment should have to be learned in combat continues to pose the question: Whose fault is it—that of the cavalry, or of the artillery?

Well might each of us study the sketches of this volume, examine the mission, and ask ourself: "Where, in this set-up, could I best emplace my guns?"

That might have something to do with it.

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A review from the *Canadian Defense Quarterly*, October, 1937:

In this book the Cavalry School of the United States

Army has produced a worthy companion volume to the Infantry School's *Infantry in Battle*.

The tactical evolution of cavalry is traced in the opening chapter. The second chapter indicates and discusses the theatres of the great war in which the larger operations of cavalry occurred. The next eight chapters exemplify the action of cavalry units and sub-units in the various operations of war, and the last two chapters deal with marches, horses and horsemanship, artillery, coöperation, communication, maintenance and mechanization.

Most of the chapters devoted to the various operations of war begin with a quotation from "Tactical Principles and Logistics for Cavalry." Appropriate examples from the recorded history of one or more of the belligerent powers are then quoted or summarized. Each study concludes with a discussion in which lessons are drawn, and the manner in which the quoted principle or principles were applied is examined in some detail.

The great value of the book is that it is a study not of generalship but of leadership. In other words it is military history from the tactical standpoint with examples specially selected and interpreted for the mid-senior and junior officer. It deserves to be widely studied not only by the cavalry officer but by serving officers of all branches of the land forces. It appears at a time when contemporary military thought in most countries is favoring mechanized rather than horsed cavalry. The protagonists of either point of view would be well advised to study the many examples of cavalry action given in this book and, in each case, to substitute mechanized for horsed cavalry and speculate upon the probable results.

The Cavalry School of the United States Army is deserving of the thanks of all serving officers, particularly junior officers, for the compilation of such a valuable study.

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CAVALRY COMBAT is the most expert appraisal in our literature of the present rôle of the mounted trooper. . . . Prepared by The Cavalry School, it reflects official doctrine; on this account, as well as because of the extensive and interesting historical research it includes, CAV-ALRY COMBAT commands the attention of officers of all arms.—CHEMICAL WARFARE BULLETIN.

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Letter received from the French Minister of War, Paris, September 15, 1937:

I am in receipt of the book "Cavalry Combat" which you have been kind enough to send me. I thank you very much.

The numerous narratives contained in the book clearly show the rôle played by the cavalry in the World War. Our young generation will find it to be a source of valuable lessons.



# CAVALRY in the Spanish Civil War

By M. SVETAYEW

(Translated from the Russian Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, October 2, 1937, by Charles Berman.)

Cavalry operations in the Spanish civil war to date have received little attention from the foreign press. This is due to the fact that cavalry has been employed in Spain on a small scale only, and various foreign observers have been inclined to draw erroneous conclusions concerning the importance of cavalry not only in the Spanish conflict but in modern warfare as a whole.

As a matter of fact, cavalry has been employed on a rather limited scale in the past year on both sides in the Spanish civil war. The reason for this is to be found primarily in the nature of Spain's economic development. The number of horses on the Iberian peninsula has never been very great. Mules and donkeys usually have performed the duties of the horse. This has always been a feature of Spanish rural life and remains true today.

According to available data, Spain, in 1933, had a total of 808,000 horses of various types, about 1,500,000 head of mules and more than 1,000,000 donkeys. The horse in Spain has been primarily, the property of large land-owners—there being about 150,000 large estates in Spain. About three million of the poorer peasant households got along with mules and donkeys, and only the wealthier ones could now and then afford horses. The Spanish farmer was not used to horses, and he seldom used the horse for riding purposes. This is one of the main reasons for the retarded development of cavalry in Spain.

The cavalry occupied a small place in the old Spanish army before the civil war (for the reasons already mentioned); it was used mainly on parades. The Spanish regular army had a total of 10 cavalry regiments. The cavalry arm included also an automatic rifle battalion and two cyclist battalions. In addition there were two Moroccan cavalry detachments in Spanish Morocco organically assigned to other units; and probably employed as divisional cavalry.

Six cavalry regiments were organized into a cavalry division comprising the following: A division headquarters, three cavalry brigades of two regiments each, a horse artillery regiment of 36 guns, a battalion of motorized infantry, an armored car squadron, a sapper squadron, a communication detachment and an airplane flight. The aggregate strength of the cavalry division was as follows: 3,500 men, 60 heavy machine guns, 36 guns, 9 armored cars and 6 planes. Each of the cavalry regiments comprised 5 squadrons including one machine gun squadron (6 heavy machine guns carried on pack animals). The organization of the cavalry division closely resembled the modern cavalry division, but in reality the equipment and training of the division was far from meeting the requirements of modern warfare.

The cavalry soldier was armed with a Mauser rifle of Spanish model without bayonet, and with a saber. The cavalry had no automatic rifles. The artillery regiment

had no howitzers, being equipped solely with 75-mm. guns.

The Moorish cavalry regiment had 3 saber squadrons, but no machine guns or automatic rifles.

The tactical training of the cavalry was very poor, reflecting the general condition prevailing throughout the old Spanish army. The Moroccan cavalry squadrons were better off in this respect—having gained considerable practical experience in the course of their colonial fighting. The individual training of the cavalry personnel here also left much to be desired. The only exceptions in this respect were the noncommissioned officers who continued in the army after the expiration of their regular term of military service—and the number of these was quite large in the cavalry.

The old Spanish cavalry in existence before the insurrection took no part in the civil war as organized cavalry formations. During the insurrection the cavalry units ceased to exist as regular cavalry organizations. The greater part of the officers and professional noncommissioned officers went over to the side of General Franco, while the line soldiers participated in the fighting with various other organizations.

The Moorish regiments served as the nucleus for the organization of the insurgent cavalry. Together with Moorish infantry and legionnaires, which at the outset of the insurrection constituted the principal force of the insurgent army, Moorish cavalry forces were also transferred to the peninsula. These cavalry troops at the beginning of the rebel attack on Madrid in October, 1936, formed the so-called "column" of Colonel Monasterio, later referred to as his brigade.

Monasterio's "column" played an important rôle in the attack on Madrid. Operating on the right flank of the fascist offensive, the cavalry produced a tremendous effect on the morale of the rather weak loyalist infantry. The organization of this cavalry column was not permanent—it was changed to meet varying missions and situations.

Early in October Colonel Monasterio's cavalry comprised 5 or 6 squadrons with 1 or 2 batteries of artillery (armament included no antitank weapons). Loyalist resistance stiffened considerably as the fascists approached nearer Madrid. It therefore became necessary to reinforce the "column" with motorized infantry. This need became particularly urgent after two squadrons of Monasterio's brigade had been annihilated by loyalist tanks on October 29, 1936, in the fighting at Secena.

At the beginning of November Colonel Monasterio's "column" was converted from a cavalry into a composite brigade. It comprised 3 cavalry and 1 machine gun squadrons, and infantry group of 3 battalions with an artillery battalion of 3 batteries.

Monasterio's squadrons were employed on essentially cavalry missions before the fighting became stabilized. Thus, for example, in the fighting on the 5th and 6th of

November, the fascist cavalry forced its way into the Casa de Campo park and held a section of it until the arrival of infantry reinforcements. Later, when position warfare set in at Madrid the fascist cavalry could no longer carry on its former activity. However, it was filled up and maintained as a complete and independent cavalry brigade.

It is particularly interesting to note that this cavalry brigade participated in all important insurgent engagements at Madrid. In December, 1936, it took part in the fighting at Las Rosas, Machadaonda and other sectors. All the fighting of the Moorish cavalry during this period, however, was carried on dismounted.

During the operations along the Charama river in February, the insurgent cavalry brigade attempted also to attack the loyalists in a mounted formations. The attack was organized without a previous artillery preparation, but with the aid of tanks, which preceded the advancing cavalry echelons. A loyalist battalion occupying a hastily prepared entrenched position withstood this attack, even though some mounted cavalry elements did succeed in penetrating the loyalist position. The battalion repelled the attack and inflicted such heavy casualties on the fascist cavalry that the latter was put out of action for a long time. (EDITOR'S NOTE: Again demonstrating that a cavalry leader should reflect carefully over a mounted action against infantry in position.)

In subsequent fighting at Madrid the insurgent cavalry no longer participated.

On the south front the insurgents frequently formed separate cavalry squadrons into cavalry groups of 5 or 6 squadrons and reinforced these groups with motorized infantry. These mixed mobile groups played an important part on the south front during the latter part of 1936. At that particular time the loyalist infantry operating here had been insufficiently prepared for mobile warfare, notwithstanding its use of motorized transportation. Under these circumstances the loyalists found it impossible to cope with the mobile forces of the insurgents.

The insurgents, frequently, were successful by concentrating a mobile group successively against the more vulnerable sectors of the loyalist lines. Mobility, the outstanding feature of the cavalry, was here utilized by the insurgents to the fullest extent.

By summer of 1937, the fascists no longer possessed any strategic cavalry units. Individual cavalry squadrons were now being used primarily as mounted detachments assigned to various units and only rarely were the mounted troops formed into cavalry or mixed groups.

The loyalists had no regular army at the beginning of the insurrection. Their forces during the initial stages of the conflict felt no particular need for cavalry troops, since they were making extensive use of motorized transportation, and were operating along roads without undertaking systematic reconnaissance to insure proper security. As the loyalist forces increased in number and became better trained, prompted by a desire to be able to meet the fascist Moorish cavalry with mounted troops of their own, the loyalists began organizing cavalry formations for employment as mounted detachments. In October, 1936, the

loyalists mounted troops earned for themselves a proper place among the fighting forces. Each newly organized loyalist regular army brigade received a squadron of mounted troops.

Later, the loyalists adopted various measures for the organization of independent cavalry brigades. Individual elements of these cavalry brigades participated in numerous large-scale operations. As in the case of the insurgent cavalry, the loyalist cavalry endeavored to have infantry troops regularly assigned to their cavalry formations.

A loyalist light column comprising three cavalry squadrons, an infantry battalion and an artillery battery took part in the operations in the Teruel sector during December, 1936 and April, 1937. At the present time regiments of loyalist cavalry are participating in all important engagements. In the loyalist operations at Madrid, during July, the cavalry took an active part in the fighting. The loyalist cavalry here, attached to one of the army corps, successfully attacked the fascist infantry in the Quichorna area and assisted the loyalist forces in capturing this locality. The loyalist cavalry participated also in the operations on the Aragon front in August of this year.

The loyalist cavalry is still deficient in modern equipment. And yet, its successful action on the various fronts once more emphasizes the potency of this arm of the service. If the loyalists had possessed sufficient strategic cavalry during the fighting at Brunete when they penetrated the fascist front, it is quite likely that they would have achieved much greater results there, for cavalry might well have been employed here to exploit the success.

It is noteworthy that the cavalry in action suffered comparatively small losses in spite of the fact that it came under the fire of every type of weapon on the ground and was subjected to aerial bombardment. Only where the cavalry failed to take the necessary protective measures against aircraft and tanks did it suffer heavy losses from those sources.

Thus, for example, the commander of a fascist cavalry column of Monasterio's brigade, consisting of about two squadrons, was leading his men through the streets of the Secena village (on October 29, 1936), and assumed, apparently, that the column was quite safe because it was marching behind the front. He, therefore, took no antitank measures of any kind, not even to the extent of using patrols. Suddenly, while marching in column of fours through a narrow village street, the column was subjected to an attack by a loyalist tank company, and some of the tanks succeeded at the same time in gaining the rear of the column and in blocking the retreat of the fascist cavalry. As a result of the negligence of the column commander, the insurgent cavalry here was completely destroyed, only a few men managing to escape.

In another instance a battalion of Moorish cavalry which had failed to adopt antiaircraft defense measures was surprised by a loyalist patrol of pursuit aircraft. The cavalry could not disperse in time and suffered heavy casualties.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: It is interesting to note the close resemblance of the mixed cavalry, infantry and artillery groups above described, to the "legions" of the American Revolutionary War.

# Attack vs Defense

Editorials from THE FIGHTING FORCES, London, England, October, 1937.

**THE INTER-DIVISIONAL MANEUVERS.**—In the inter-divisional exercise which took place, from the 9th to 11th September, in the East Anglian Maneuver Area, *the 2d Division—which was almost completely mechanized*—assisted by every known device to ensure the success of its final big attack on the Great Chishall position, helped by tanks, by a barrage, half smoke and half high-explosive, helped by mechanical transport for its infantry for wide outflanking movements, and, above all, by the audacity and initiative of its temporary commander, Brigadier-General Nosworthy, failed to drive home its attack.

The defending 1st Division, under its very able leader, Major-General Armitage, remained complete master of the situation, and, moreover, inflicted very heavy losses on its enemy.

Brigadier-General Nosworthy cannot be accused of adopting stereotyped methods; on the contrary, he showed great flexibility of mind. For example, his method of conducting the approach march of his division, on a broad front, was a departure from normal procedure, although the value of this method was proved up to the hilt (both positively and negatively) on certain occasions during the War, e.g., at the Aisne and at the Petit Morin. Brigadier-General Nosworthy moved his division with the three brigade groups in line, and had no advanced guard, though each brigade group had an independent protective detachment. Let us hope this method has come to stay, and that the days of spearhead advances with ponderous advanced guards are gone for ever.

However, in spite of all this the attack failed, and, not to put a fine point on it, failed completely.\* One may well ask, What is to be done about it?

**THE ATTACK IN CURRENT WARS.**—The war in Spain has been in progress for nearly a year, and it may be truthfully said that no attack has achieved anything approaching a decisive result. A town or village is captured here and there, but, for the most part, attacks on both sides fail to achieve appreciable decisions. Stalemate has ensued in Spain, and seems likely to continue.

Japan, in her war against China (carried out in accordance with modern ideas involving the indiscriminate slaughter of countless non-combatants), despite the overwhelming financial necessity for her to achieve a quick decision, following on her criminal and utterly unscrupulous aggression, is, in spite of her unquestioned superiority

in armaments, failing to do anything of the sort. Long, drawn-out warfare seems, once more, likely to result.

In fact, "attack" in up-to-date warfare on land seems to have gone to 33 to 1.

It may be, as Captain Liddell Hart suggests in his masterly comments on the Inter-Divisional Exercise in *The Times* (London) on 13th September, that a complete revolution in our military system is the only answer to the present dominating power of the defence.

On the other hand, if the attack on land is really found to be no longer a practical proposition, and if the menace from the air is, as we believe it to be, definitely neutralized by an all-round equality in air armaments, the future of this world may become a lot brighter.

## Editor's Note:

A detailed description of the foregoing maneuvers in Great Britain would enhance the interest of this report. It is impossible to furnish this information at this time. However, several points in these editorials are of current interest.

### 1. Covering Forces.

The employment of covering forces is a matter which has concerned the British Army for the past several months. Evidently it has been concluded that the presence of an advance guard will frequently lead to confusion and delay if not actually involving large units to combat when the high command has no such desire nor intention.

The operation and conduct of covering forces is a subject that should receive constant attention.

### 2. Envelopment.

Reference is made to wide outflanking movements by mechanical transport of infantry. Inasmuch as the mechanized force advanced with brigades in line, it might be concluded that any preconceived maneuver played no part in the attack. If any envelopment was made by infantry alone, it stresses once more the importance of power derived only from the use of combined arms in any attack. Success of an envelopment involves both the principles of surprise and mass. If there is no surprise, hostile counter-measures deprive it of success. With surprise and mass (power) both present, effective action should normally result. It would appear that mobile transport, only, is not sufficient for such a maneuver. Not only is mobility of approach required, but a high battlefield mobility is essential in such an enterprise. This leads to the thought of massed horse cavalry, properly supported by mechanization and artillery, for employment in this type of action.

### 3. Stabilization.

Undoubtedly an inevitable stabilization permeates most foreign military minds insofar as future war is concerned. Only the conception of great citizen armies (which existed only after 1915 in the World War) can substantiate the view that the initial line of contact will permit no open flanks. Peace time armies do not exist in sufficient strength to warrant any such conclusion. There was distinctly an open flank (west) in the World War, and future wars will reveal like conditions. The Germans anticipated this open flank but failed to capitalize the opportunity presented. For Germany, Von Schlieffen was born twenty

\*Major-General Temperley, writing about this year's maneuvers, in *The Daily Telegraph*, of 20th September, says, "Making due allowance for the inevitable artificiality of maneuvers, I do not think I saw a single attack launched on a prepared position in daylight which could have succeeded."—Ed.



years too soon. The answer to stabilization, naturally, is the timely presence of a highly mobile force of great power, and so committed that once a flank is open it is never closed. Competent leadership of the mobile element is the one great requirement.

Captain Hart's reference to a problematical stabilization in China has failed in view of subsequent activities. Once the Japanese lodged an effective force to the south of the

Chinese position the latter were forced promptly to withdraw to a prepared position well to the west of Shanghai. Notwithstanding Chinese plans to resume the defensive there, they were kept completely on the run, so to speak, by repeated flanking action by the Japanese. Within the space of days, the Japanese were knocking at the doors of Nanking. Once again is demonstrated the power of an envelopment when it is properly executed.

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## Special Activities

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### Annual Convention of the National Guard Association Demonstrates Great Interest in Cavalry Affairs

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The Mounted Service Section of the National Guard Association presented to the convention its problems in the form of three resolutions which received the support of the Resolutions Committee and were passed on the floor of the convention without a dissenting voice.

Brigadier-General Newell C. Bolton, commanding 54th Cavalry Brigade, Ohio National Guard, was elected chairman of the Mounted Service Section for the coming year to succeed Brigadier-General Edward J. Stackpole, Jr., commanding 52d Cavalry Brigade, Pennsylvania National Guard. An Executive Committee will be selected with a representative from each State which has Cavalry or horse-drawn Field Artillery, and the chairman announced that he will call a meeting of the Executive Committee to be held in Washington, D. C., concurrently with the meeting of the Executive Council of the National Guard Association later this year.

The three resolutions passed included the following:

1. That the National Guard Association of the United States recommend to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau that he include in his budget for the fiscal year 1939 a sum necessary to purchase sufficient horses to fill shortages currently existing and those which may be properly estimated as of July 1, 1938. Further, that the Executive Council of the National Guard Association be

requested to support the necessary appropriation for this purpose before the Appropriations Committees of the Congress.

2. That the National Guard Association of the United States urgently recommend to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau that an appropriation be requested for the purpose of properly equipping the entire National Guard, including the first, second, and third 5,000 increases, and that the funds appropriated by Congress for the current fiscal year to activate the third 5,000 increase in the National Guard, which have been impounded, be released for the purpose originally authorized; and

Further, that from the third 5,000 increase in the National Guard as authorized by the last Congress, not less than 2,000 enlisted men be allotted *for completion* of the four Cavalry Divisions.

3. Whereas the next major emergency in which this country becomes involved will in all likelihood call for the initial use of Cavalry as covering, reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance forces for the main armies,

Be it therefore resolved that the National Guard Association of the United States emphatically opposes any change in the status of the four Cavalry Divisions of the National Guard.

# The Third Cavalry at Indiantown Gap

By Major George B. Millholland, Third Cavalry

At the urgent request of Ye Editor who very politely informed me that he wanted no long-winded boring accounts of just what Colonel "A" was doing every minute or what line the troops had reached by 3:27 PM, herewith are a few brief highlights of the Third Cavalry's participation in the Third Corps Area Maneuvers during September, 1937.

Lack of maneuver area for all troops, and particularly Cavalry exists in many Corps Areas and notably the Third. This condition then was no stranger to the Third Cavalry (less 1st Squadron) and with the Machine Gun Troop, 10th Cavalry attached, under Colonel J. M. Wainwright, when it arrived at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, the summer training camp of the Pennsylvania National Guard.

This area, did however, have the advantage of being new terrain and therefore the old custom of winding up each maneuver at Dead Man's Hill, Fort George G. Meade, Md., was eliminated for the time being. Heretofore, no matter how a problem was written, or who wrote it, the "Piece de resistance" was Dead Man's Hill. This final battleground began to get a bit boring, especially when the usable portion of the reservation is so small that when cavalry picks up a trot, it finds itself out of bounds and in some private citizen's back yard. It was a splendid prospect then to know that at least some new terrain was available and it would not be necessary to make our tactical dispositions down the same old groove.

The Indiantown Gap Reservation is located about 22 miles north and east of Harrisburg, Penna., and has an approximate usable area of 5,000 acres. It is shaped roughly like the letter "Z" with the campsite (or good maneuver) area forming the bottom horizontal, a narrow pass thru the mountain the diagonal and a rough narrow strip between two mountains forming the top horizontal. (See map.)

We had been informed previously that the first week of the maneuver period was to be spent in Regimental and Brigade Exercises and the second week devoted to the Corps Area Maneuvers, proper. With later information that we were to oppose, during the second week, a Provisional New Infantry Test Division, it was decided to spend most of our available time the first week in "brushing up" on our Delaying Action for we knew that everything the Blues had, except the Commanding General's comfortable shack, was to be thrown at us.

Consequently, during the first week, we had some very excellent and beneficial "Tactical Drills," practically all involving Delaying Action. Tactical Drills have, of late, been recognized by most of our better and successful cavalry leaders as probably the best form of tactical training, for all ranks, that can be had. Due to the fact that Colonel Wainwright had been detailed as a Chief Umpire,

practically all the exercises were held under the direction and supervision of Major A. W. Roffe.

The available drill and maneuver area at Fort Myer is so limited that one can almost stand in the middle of the drill field and throw a rock off it, in any direction. This being the case, the deployment of even a Squadron is practically an impossibility. It was a pleasure then to get on sufficient ground to be able to stretch out the Regiment and see what it looked like, and we did have the advantage of having that much ground. And so passed the first week, and it might be mentioned in passing, with plenty of cold weather and considerable rain.


During the second week, as mentioned, the 3rd Cavalry, with a Battalion of Tanks (66th Infantry) and a Battery of 16th Field Artillery attached, formed the Red Force. The Blue Force consisted of the Provisional New Infantry Division. This Division was composed of all the Regular Troops in the Third Corps Area, augmented by a few theoretical battalions. So, in the good old customary style, we Reds had two strikes called on us before we even saddled up.

With our dream of playing a true cavalry rôle ended, we started what was destined to be a series of Delaying Actions which lasted through three days of "fire and fall back." It was, of course, a bit disappointing not to be able to perform all the normal missions taught at the Cavalry School, but we sacrificed our ambitions on the altar of experiment.

The problem started on the eastern edge of the reservation south of the mountain. The weaker Red Force occupied a series of Delaying Positions retiring westward, thence northwestward through the Gap and westward through the valley between the two mountains. At dusk on the third day the enemy threw down a very successful smoke screen on our line but failed to follow it up, so night overtook us with the lines holding.



Third Cavalry crossing Susquehanna River Bridge on the way to Indiantown Gap. Colonel J. M. Wainwright, 3rd Cavalry, leading, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Stackpole, 104th Cavalry, P.N.G.



About 9:30 PM, reinforced by a large theoretical Red Force (another break for us), the enemy was forced to initiate a retirement, closely pursued by our Cavalry. Although it was as dark as the inside of a boot, the Blues were successfully driven out of the valley (toward their camp site), through the pass, and out into the open where the problem ended.

We successfully performed our mission and received many commendatory reports, but it was not our kind of fighting.

Conclusions drawn from the maneuvers may be summarized as follows:

1. The new tanks have much difficulty in rough and wet terrain. They are of questionable value in a surprise movement. In this maneuver they could be heard for miles back of the lines. The effect of their fire while in motion is much curtailed, for their guns swing through

a vertical arc of considerable magnitude.

2. Cavalry, as a delaying force or a pursuing force is still supreme. The ability to cover ground rapidly, dismount, take up a position, pull out, etc., cannot be approached in speed by dismounted elements even in rough and heavy going.

3. Dirt roads, when wet, are still practically impassable to wheeled vehicles.

4. Smoke screens are of great value if properly laid and followed closely by the attack, assault and reorganization.

5. When opposed by mechanized forces protection of the rear and flanks is extremely important.

6. Motor elements must remain well to the rear if the enemy has any artillery at all.

7. The mounted attack is almost always a success even against great odds, if the terrain is favorable and the element of surprise is accomplished.

*TERRAIN: Combat is made up of your own force, the enemy and the terrain—have you an eye to terrain? The ability to determine a key point at a glance has won or critically influenced many battles. Appreciation of terrain can be developed.*



# The Inter-American Horse Show

By Major Frank L. Whittaker

The Inter-American Horse Show which was held in Washington from October 21-24, claims three points of distinction: 1st, that it is the only outdoor international horse show on this continent similar in most respects to the great international horse shows of Europe; 2d, that it is the only horse show in the world which limits all entries to ribbon winners; and, 3d, that it puts up the biggest and best jumps on the American continent.

Reports from the officers of the foreign team and from our own horse show team indicate that the first claim is well founded. A glance at the Prize List or Catalogue will indicate the correctness of the second statement, and there is no doubt in the minds of anyone that attended any one of the four shows that the jumps set up for the Military Classes were the biggest they had ever seen.

The Inter-American Horse Show is unique in another respect in that it is, in effect, an army show but it is financed by the interested horsemen of Washington and vicinity. The arrangements for this show and the actual conduct of the show are handled by an officer of the Chief of Cavalry's Office and by the troops at Fort Myer, in addition to their other duties, while all expenses are underwritten by civilians and the civilian treasurer pays the bills.

Preparations for the show were slow in getting under way this year due to the apparent impossibility of securing a foreign team. Chile had decided not to come to this country this year, Mexico could not attend and reports from New York indicate that the National Horse Show was having similar difficulty. It was not until September 10, that the definite assurance that the Belgian Army Horse Show Team would attend permitted the plans to go on.

Every effort is made to make this show attractive to the sport fan who ordinarily attends baseball and football games and races. To do this, it is necessary to get away from a long drawn-out parade of horses of all ages with innumerable classes lasting from early morning till dark. As a result, only eight classes are scheduled at each performance, including an opening and closing ceremony and a dressage exhibition. Two hunter classes are offered



*Capt. Milo H. Matteson, Captain of the U. S. Army Horse Show Team on Masquerader*

each day, one open class and one military class, a close time schedule is worked out and events follow each other with the precision of a military ceremony. That this policy is effective is shown from the fact that the Inter-American Horse Show yearly draws the largest crowds of any horse show in this part of the country, the majority of whom are sport fans who are attracted by the competitive idea behind the show.

No attempt will be made in this article to give a detailed recitation of the various events but rather an effort will be made to show the appeal that this show has and a few of the highlights of the actual competition. As was the case last year, Mrs. John Hay Whitney dominated the hunter events with her nationally famous hunters. While the competition was not very keen, still her presence at the show enabled the committee to carry out its policy of showing only the "tops" among the civilian horses. After the four-day showing, *The Bear*, a young horse, was adjudged the winner, while the old campaigner, *Gray Knight* was reserve.


The United States Army Horse Show Team took good care of the open jumping classe by wining two of the four with *Ugly* and *Scamps Boy*, while Fort Myer won the handy jumper with *Eyes Delight* and Captain B. F. Luebbemann's horse *Billy* was adjudged winner of the \$500.00 stake after the winning horse *Joe Aleshire* was ruled ineligible for this class.

The highlight of the show was, of course, the military competitions between the military horse show teams of Belgium and the United States. Belgium brought over

four officers, Captain Henri de Menten de Horne, Lieutenant Paul Mondron and Lieutenant I. von Strydonck of the 1st Regiment of Guides of Brussels and Lieutenant Ferdinand Poswick of the 1st Regiment of Lancers of Spa. They had with them a string of eight horses which had competed very successfully, over a number of years, in the great horse shows of Europe. The American Team consisted of Captain Milo H. Matteson, Team Captain; Captain Royce A. Drake, who joined the team just prior to its departure from Fort Riley; Lieutenant Franklin F. Wing, Lieutenant W. H. S. Wright and Lieutenant Scott M. Sanford.

There were four military events during the show, one a three-day competition open to one team of four horses from each of the countries who were to jump singly with only the best three scores to count each day, the winner to be the team with the best aggregate score for the three days, and one international individual military championship where these horses competed as individuals in order to determine the best military horse in the show.

As a result of the first day's competition, the Belgian Team led with a score of 20 to 23. *Ramona*, with Lieutenant von Strydonck up, and *Whisky*, with Captain de Menten up, were charged with eight faults each, while Lieutenant Paul Mondron's *Ibrahim* had four faults. Cap-



*Trial Course for Military Team Event*


- |                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Brush, 4'.                  | 11. Bank, 4' 3"—ditch 2' on near side.                        |
| 2. Rustic gate, 4'.            | 12. Double Oxer, 5'—6' wide.                                  |
| 3. Chicken Coop, 4' 6".        | 13. Aiken 4' 6".  |
| 4. Wall and In and Out, 4' 6". | 14. Rail Fence, 4' 6".  |
| 5. Logs and Rider, 4' 3".      | 15. Toronto Bank, 5' 6"—6' spread.                            |
| 6. Double Rails, 4' 6".        | 16. Water, 14'—Brush take off and double bars over the water. |
| 7. Stone Wall, 4'.             |   |
| 8. Liverpool, 5'—6' spread.    |   |
| 9. Rustic Fence, 4' 6".        |   |
| 10. Detour Sign, 4' 6".        |   |

tain Drake's *King-Hi* had 13½ faults, *Dakota*, Lieutenant Wing up, 5½ and *Renzo* with Lieutenant Wright up was charged with four faults. This event was jumped over a difficult course, the outstanding fence of which was a so-called "Toronto Bank" at 5' 6". This was an interesting jump and caused more comment than any other jump in the show although it was perfectly jumpable. It was a half-round affair 6' wide, 3' high, painted in alternate black and white stripes with black and white poles as riders extending up to a maximum height of 5' 6". The day of the competition the going was very heavy and the approach to this jump was such that, according to qualified observers, it was equivalent to at least a 6' 3" jump under ideal conditions. Three of the Belgian horses jumped it clean, while only *Dakota* of the United States Team negotiated it successfully and he only after a refusal.

Friday brought the individual class which was a walk-away for *Dakota* who had the only clean score the first round. *Whisky* of the Belgian Team was second with four faults, *Renzo* of the United States Team third with four and a half faults and three horses were tied for fourth.

Early Friday evening it started to rain and it rained steadily throughout the night. An examination of the ground very early the next morning indicated that it would be impossible to stage the show at the regular show grounds so, after a hasty conference, the decision was made to move to the Riding Hall at Fort Myer. The wheels were set in motion and by 12:00 o'clock every horse entered in the afternoon events was at Fort Myer schooling in the hall and every seat in the Fort Myer hall was renumbered to correspond with the seating arrangements at the show grounds. As the distance between these two points was some fifteen miles, the transfer offered a problem in logistics comparable to the most difficult ever given at Leavenworth and the solution was certainly worth an "S-Ex."

The course set up for the second day of the three-day



*Ibrahim* owned and ridden by Lt. Paul Mondron, Regiment of Guides, Belgian Army, over water jump.

military competition was Course "G" of the National Horse Show except that practically all jumps were raised, with the last jump similar in type to the famous "Toronto Bank" at the show grounds, again at 5' 6". Upon walking the course the Captain of the Army Show Team remarked, "I have never seen jumps up this high indoors," whereupon he was advised to take a good look as it was expected that international horses would jump international jumps. On this day the United States team redeemed itself, winding up with a total of twenty-four faults to twenty-eight for the Belgians and moving up to a lead of one point for the two days. *Dakota* again jumped very well with four faults while *Ibrahim* had eight.

Late on the evening of Saturday, the decision was made to move back to the show grounds and again the complete organization made it possible to start the show on time at the show grounds on Sunday afternoon.

The finals in the military jumping on this day were probably as thrilling as any event ever seen by the 7,000 people present. A reference to Course "I" (see sketch) will indicate the difficulty of the course, which was 754 yards long. In line with a practice which should be routine in classes of this nature, the jumps on the course were made progressively harder so that after completing sixteen jumps (including triple in and out) the horses were faced with two of the biggest jumps on the course consisting again of the Toronto Bank at 5' 6" and a water jump with a spread of over 14'. This was a course to test the jumping ability and stamina of horses of international calibre and, without a doubt, the biggest course ever set up anywhere on this continent. With a one-point difference separating the scores of the two teams, the interest in this class can well be imagined. *Acrobate*, with Lieutenant Poswick, jumped first for Belgium, ran out once on the Liverpool and on his second run-out popped another

jump on the course, thereby eliminating himself. *Dakota* was the first horse in for the United States and, with a very fine ride by Lieutenant Wing, faulted only on the double Oxer, which, by the way, was 5' high and 6' broad, a most inspiring obstacle. *Ramona* of the Belgian Team then repeated *Dakota's* score, faulting on an apparently easy double rail jump. *Renzo* had eight faults, being unfortunate enough to drop a foot in the water on the last jump. *Whiskey* then jumped the course clean but, unfortunately, was charged with two refusals on a simple wall jump which was only 4' high. *King-Hi* jumped the big jumps clean but took down two little ones for a total of eight faults and, after *Ibrahim* had gone clean to the last jump where he also dropped a foot in the water, it was apparent that the competition would depend on the last United States horse, *Masquerader*. With the youngest member of the United States Team, Lieutenant Sanford up, and he riding in his first big international competition, it was a tough spot indeed but, as horse and rider cleared jump after jump, the crowd rose to its feet in its endeavor to help them along. *Masquerader* got off wrong on the double Oxer and took off the far pole but went on to jump the Aiken and the rail fence. The two biggest jumps in the course were left and it was necessary for him to be clean over both of them to win for the United States. When he cleared the big 5' 6" Toronto Bank, the class was apparently won. However, *Masquerader* took off too close to the 14' water jump and hit the take-off brush. As a result, his momentum was decreased just enough so that one hind foot dropped in the water on the far side. And so, by one foot in the water on the last jump, the United States lost the three-day competition by 1¼ points, the final score being, Belgium 65¾, United States 67.

### Modern Cavalry Doctrine

(EDITOR'S NOTE: The editorial office, for several months, has searched for a clear and succinct exposition of the rôle of cavalry in modern war. By good fortune a most satisfactory article on this theme has come in from a foreign source—Poland. If you are interested in a very readable and highly analytical outline of this subject, your attention is earnestly directed to "Cavalry in the Foreign Press"—Page 563.)



# Fort Meade-Black Hills Annual Horse Show

## JOHN A. BARRY STADIUM DEDICATED

The Horse Show opened October 22d with a formal dedication of the new post stadium through an eloquent address by Colonel Stanley Koch which follows:

To eulogize the memory of the man to whom we are dedicating this stadium today is difficult. Not that he was not worthy of praise and love but that he had so many admirable qualities it is hard to single out the most outstanding.

Colonel Barry won his commission from the ranks of the 3d Cavalry having failed to graduate at the Military Academy. Almost from the first he showed his ability as a horseman and finally reached the position of Director of Horsemanship at the Cavalry School. He served as Captain of one of our Olympic Teams that competed in England and Europe.

Although probably better known for his ability as a horseman than for any other activity that was only one of his many qualifications. Always of an inquisitive nature he was a deep student of military and western history and of current affairs. He had a keen and analytical mind and although in the last few years of his life his body had begun to fail him his mind and wit seemed to sharpen with experience.

Endowed with a wonderful sense of humor he was also gifted with a sharp sarcasm, but never have I seen him use this gift unkindly.

I knew John Barry intimately for twenty-five years. I have argued and fought with him but never have I known him to do an unkind act. To his wife he was a devoted and loving husband. So much so that after his death his wife, seeing no further reason for living, simply gave up to a weak heart so that she could join him in the hereafter.

It is not given to many of us to exert an influence that is felt throughout the whole army. Such a one however was Colonel Barry. Hundreds of young officers were brought under his influence and training while at Fort Riley and it is safe to say that he left his mark on every one of them. The name of John Barry will be known and remembered in the army when most of us are long since gone.

Colonel Barry would have appreciated the honor we are doing him today. He always believed in developing young men feeling that the older ones would take care of themselves. That is what we are doing today in this stadium and many a young soldier here will be able to look back and see that his first real knowledge of horse shows and riding date from his participation in the horse shows to be held here.

I am not given to imagination but it is not difficult for me to vision John Barry riding into this ring on any one of many horses which he made famous. I can see him ride in this ring with his gay and debonair air, hat on the side of his head, giving a critical word here, a kindly word of advice there; and then, with that easy grace which only a master of the horse can show, riding over our jumps

with a clean performance, and disappearing again in the distance into the unknown.

His example should stand before us for all time. He rode his jumps straight and took his falls as they came. In the highest sense of the word he was a sportsman and a gallant soldier and a gentleman.

As regimental commander of the 4th Cavalry I formally dedicate this stadium to Colonel John A. Barry.

The efforts of Colonel Stanley Koch, post and regimental commander, and his committee, to make the horse show a fitting and proper testimonial to the memory of Colonel Barry, were highly successful. Civilian competition and competition from Fort Robinson, Nebraska, contributed to the color and significance of the occasion.

The coöperation and generosity of the United States Cavalry Association, the city governments of Sturgis, Rapid City, Belle Fourche, Deadwood, and Lead, and of the businessmen in those cities, made possible the presentation of beautiful trophies of cash prizes to the winners of each of the thirty-six classes. The event attracted more than four thousand spectators. The post was especially honored by the presence of the Seventh Corps Area Commander, Major General Stanley H. Ford, and Mrs. Ford.

The John A. Barry Stadium lies in a beautiful, carefully selected spot, just south of the post proper. Hills enclose



Colonel John A. Barry



Upper left: Lieutenant John G. Minniece, on "Johnny Mack."  
Upper right: Corporal Nubin, Troop B, on "Custer."

Lower left: The John A. Barry Stadium.  
Lower right: Troop B Musical Drill.

it on three sides; at the base of the hills stands the jumping ring, while the outside hunter course extends along the hills and the east over a comparatively level area, so arranged that the entire course is within easy view of all spectators.

Interest within the regiment concentrated on the initial competition for the John A. Barry Trophy, to be awarded annually to the troop that scores the greatest number of points in classes in which performance counts, in the Annual Fall Horse Show. There was a total of two hundred ninety-four entries in the twelve classes for enlisted men, with one hundred two different men competing as follows: Headquarters Troop, twelve; Machine Gun Troop, sixteen; Troop A, seventeen; Troop B, fifteen; Troop E, twenty-one; Troop F, twenty-one. Troop E, commanded by Captain Louis B. Rapp, won the coveted trophy with a total of seventeen points, representing two first places, five second places, and one third. Machine Gun Troop finished second with fourteen points. *Chester*, ridden by Sergeant Scheuer, *DuSallie*, ridden by Corporal Storm, and *Custer*, shown by Corporal Hubin, performed admirably in leading Troop E to victory. Other outstanding performers in the enlisted men's classes included *Dutch*, ridden by Private First Class Vander Ark, Machine Gun Troop; *Virginia*, ridden by Sergeant Rice, Headquarters Troop; *Chink*, ridden by Corporal Mobry, Machine Gun Troop; *Bozo*, ridden by Sergeant Jones, Troop F.

Two of the most prominent horses shown came from

the Remount Depot at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. Lieutenant John G. Minniece, who is stationed there brought two fine chestnut geldings that he has been training for the past several months. One of the two, *Johnny Mack*, took seven first places and one third place and annexed both the jumper and hunter championships, while his stablemate, *Tony*, won three first places, three second places, and became reserve jumper champion. *Big Ben*, a strong bay gelding remount of eight months' service, claims the distinction of showing the most promise of horses assigned to the regiment, trained and ridden by Lieutenant John F. Rhoades, he acquitted himself very creditably by winning three events, placing second in three, placing third in three, and taking the reserve hunter championship. The polo classes were warmly contested, and the judge made them unusually interesting—both for the riders and for the spectators. Lieutenant Perry E. Conant's green pony, *Frank*, won the novice class and placed second to *Babe*, ridden by Captain Henry C. Hine, Jr., in the playing pony class. Lieutenant William W. Culp raced *Kid* to victory in the bending race, but yielded to Captain Hine and *Babe* in the Championship class.

The concluding feature of the show was the presentation of the John A. Barry Trophy by Colonel Koch to Captain Rapp and First Sergeant Williams. The all-around success of this show indicates that the Fort Meade-Black Hills Horse Show will live on with the memory of Colonel John A. Barry, and will become an important and permanent annual Black Hills institution.



"'Untin', XXX *The Sport of Kings, the image of war, without its guilt, or five and twenty per cent of its danger.*"—JORROCKS.

Organized hunting with packs of hounds is one of the oldest sports in history and has come down to us through the ages with many traditions and customs. In Europe, whence we inherit the sport, hunting is principally followed in France, Italy, Russia, Hungary, and England. Naturally, as the years have passed there have been certain modifications in customs, but the objective remains the same: to provide good, healthy, outdoor sport in which all can participate; to encourage good fellowship, cross-country riding, and horsemanship.

#### HUNTING TERMS

"Hoick—Hoick—Gone away—a-w-a-y!"

*Hunting* is the sport of chasing a wild animal or a represented wild animal with a pack of hounds. It is, purely and simply a sport for sportsmen, for the love of the game.

*The Staff* consists of the Master, the Honorary Whippers-in, the Kennel Huntsmen, and the Whippers-in.

*The Field* consists of all those participating in the hunt who are not members of the hunt staff.

*The Master* is the club official who leads the hunt, controls the field, and is responsible for the training of the hounds. His full title is "Master of Foxhounds" (abbreviation "M.F.H.").

*The Master of the Field* is the member of the hunt staff designated by the M.F.H. to lead the field.

*The Honorary Whippers-in* are hunt officials who assist

the master to control the pack at a hunt, and who also assist him in the field training of the pack.

*The Kennel Huntsman* is the hunt employee who has charge of the kennels and who cares for and handles the hounds under the direction of the M.F.H.

*The Whippers-in* are hunt employees who assist the kennel huntsman in the care and handling of the hounds.

*The Pack* consists of the hounds considered collectively in any one kennel.

"*Riot.*"—When the hounds run hare or rabbit.

"*Stearn.*"—Tail of a hound.

"*Pack In.*"—A term used by the master and the whippers-in to get the pack to assemble at a check, or to get them back on the line during a run.

"*Meet.*"—A meeting of the members and guests of the hunt club for the purpose of riding to the hounds.

"*Line.*"—The line of scent.

"*Strike.*"—The point where the scent is first picked up by the pack.

"*Full Cry.*"—When the whole pack gives tongue.

"*Gone Away.*"—The call of the M.F.H. when the pack has found and is following a scent.

"*Drag.*"—Type of hunt wherein the pack follows an artificial trail left by a sack saturated with scent which has been dragged over the ground.

"*Check.*"—Hounds stopped.

"*Hold Hard.*"—Warning to a rider to stop or slow down.

"*Kill.*"—The climax of a hunt. The incentive for the pack to run. In a drag hunt the kill is represented by raw meat, which is carried to the last check and there thrown



to the hounds. In a live hunt it is that stage of the chase in which the fox (or other wild animal) is caught.

"Mask."—Head of a fox.

"Ware!"—A cry of caution used by members of the hunt to warn each other to beware of something. For example: "Ware hounds!" "Ware hole!" "Ware wire!"

#### POINTS TO OBSERVE

"Hold hard, Sirs,

Give them half a minute."

In recording the following "Points to Observe" and "Hints," *no claim is made to originality*. In fact, everything has been taken from the writings or the actual experiences of men who have spent years in the hunting field with the best hunt clubs in the world.

Remember at all times that hunting is a sport and in no sense a competition.

Remember that the sport in hunting is to follow the hounds and not to race with them.

Remember to stay in your proper place, which is in rear of the master of the field, and not to crowd or be over-anxious.

Remember that hunting is a gentleman's sport and always observe the rules of courtesy.

Remember not to offer assistance or to interfere with the hunt staff. They believe they know their job, and any help offered is more than likely to be a hindrance.

Always give the M.F.H. room to handle his hounds. He is in charge of the hunting, like a captain of a ship at sea. Keep in rear of the master of the field and his whips. The M.F.H. will handle the hounds with one or more whips on each flank. The master of the field with one or more whips will form the head of the field. Never precede the line of the master of the field.

If a member of the field inadvertently finds himself ahead of the pink coats or to one side with the hounds turning towards him, he should stop his horse and keep perfectly still until hounds and staff have passed.

In jumping, the rider in front should be given plenty of time to get well over, and a rider about to jump should never be cut off. In case of a refusal, place should be yielded to those coming on before another attempt is made.

It must be remembered that hunting is an individual sport. No one is checking up for faults either in the riding of the individual or the performance of the horse. Proficiency in hunting is not judged by the speed you make or the place you ride, but by the expertness with which you conduct your horse across country and finish the hunt without accident to yourself or contributing to accidents of others. It is not necessary, nor is it contemplated, that you follow the line of the hounds. Ride your ground and follow the general direction of the hunt with the maximum comfort to yourself and horse.

#### HINTS

It is of paramount importance to be at the meeting place at the designated hour, or a few minutes before.

This is particularly true in drag hunting, in which a scent is laid in advance of the arrival of the field and if not followed within a few minutes becomes cold and impossible to follow. On dry days the scent becomes cold within ten or fifteen minutes.

Take advantage of your early arrival at the meeting place to adjust your equipment.

For reasons that should be apparent, the M.F.H., whom tradition endows with the power of an autocrat in the hunting field, is in complete charge, and his requests and signals must be instantly obeyed. In this connection the following remarks on the M.F.H., made by the late Major William Austin Wadsworth, who for forty-two years (1876-1918) was M.F.H. of the Genesee Valley Hunt, are interesting:

"The M.F.H. is a great and mystic personage to be lowly, meekly, and reverently looked up to, helped, considered and given the right of way at all times. His ways are not as other men's ways; and his language and actions are not to be judged by their standards. All that can be asked of him is that he furnish good sport, and so long as he does that he is amenable to no criticism, subject to no law, fettered by no conventionality while in the field. He is supposed by courtesy to know more about his hounds than outsiders; and all hallooing, calling, and attempts at hunting them by others are not only very bad manners but are apt to spoil sport. As a general rule he can enjoy your conversation and society more when not in the field, with the hounds, riders, foxes, and damages on his mind.

"N.B., the proffer of a flask is not conversation within the meaning of the above."

The honorary whippers-in are assistants to the M.F.H. and must be obeyed promptly, because they have many difficult tasks to perform.

Old-time hunting custom suggests a courteous exchange of greetings between the M.F.H. and the field, as soon as possible upon arrival at the meeting place.

When the pack is led to strike, the field should not follow closer than 50 to 75 yards. If followed too closely hounds find it hard to follow the scent, because the strong odor of horses partially benumbs their scenting ability. Also, if the hounds are pressed too hard from behind they become fretted and fearful of being trampled upon, and consequently become distracted from their work, which is to follow faithfully the line of the scent.

"Sufficiently forward, yet still keeping bounds,

His wish to ride after, not over the hounds."

To ride ahead of the M.F.H. or the honorary whippers-in is an unpardonable breach of hunting field etiquette.

If a hound drops back take care to avoid trampling him underfoot. He may be sick or injured, or for some other temporary reason unable to keep up with the pack.

Do not say "Ware horse!" to the hounds. Say "Ware hounds!" to the horse. Hounds always have the right-of-way.

The field should ride well scattered with ample interval and distance between riders.

Never follow a rider in trace closer than five or six horse lengths.

Always ride your own line. Never cross in front of another rider.

When a horse becomes unmanageable, take him to either flank of the field and circle him until under control. If a horse becomes completely out of control leave the field and return to the stables.

Never hesitate to ask the hunt staff or a member of the field for aid. Hunting field courtesy demands that riders be considerate of and helpful to one another.

At a check, seek a convenient place not too near the hounds, dismount and adjust equipment, water your horse if water is available, and walk him around until the time to mount for the next run.

#### "WARE HOLE"

In riding across dangerous country it is a nice courtesy to warn those following you of a bad hole or ditch or other dangerous obstacle. For example: "Ware hole!"

#### "STAFF PLEASE"

In approaching a jump, be sure that members of the hunt staff are over first, then be careful to choose a time when the jump is not crowded. Never follow another rider in trace over a jump. Often serious accidents occur from such thoughtlessness.

If a rider should fall or call for assistance it is the obligation of a good sportsman to go to his aid.

Accidents, however trivial, should be promptly reported to the M.F.H.

Many miles of extra riding may be avoided by watching the leaders of the pack, following their turns, and by guiding on the M.F.H., who usually knows the line and looks for an opportunity to cut the corners.

Do not leave the kill until the hounds have been dismissed or the M.F.H. had indicated that it is permissible to go home ahead of the hounds.

"Thank you, Sir—Good day."

After the kill and before leaving for home it is an old custom to express your pleasure with the hunt to the M.F.H. If it is impossible to reach the M.F.H. conveniently, it is perfectly proper to express your appreciation to one of the Honorary whippers-in.

#### DRESS

"To be correctly dressed is a compliment to society."

Hunting is a formal sport that has come down to us through the ages. In this country it dates back to pre-Revolutionary times, and is becoming decidedly more popular, there being 123 organized hunt clubs in the United States today. Hunting encourages companionable qualities, is conducive to good health, breeds a faith in and love of horseflesh and confidence in cross-country riding. It is likewise a means of making and cementing lifelong friendships.

Dress is a part of all social intercourse. Your hunt staff will be properly turned out. It is expected that the field will return the courtesy by also being correctly attired.

\*Through the courtesy of the M.F.H., The Cavalry School Hunt.

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*Sure to be the standard for years to come—if not the final word on the subject.*

## Military History of the World War

By GIRARD LINDSLEY McENTEE

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out—down to the last triumphant advance of the Allies and the end of the War. The maps are based on the official records, not only of the Allies but also of the Central European powers.

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## Health—Physical Fitness

A well known general officer during the World War stated:

"I would place the factors that go to make a successful military leader in the following priority:

Health  
Professional knowledge  
Character.

"For without health all other attributes may well amount to nothing."

By health, this old gentleman intended to include all the elements of physical fitness. He knew that many of the commissioned ranks which found themselves at Blois during the war did so through physical breakdown. That physical exhaustion brought on a mental breakdown. That inferior combat orders frequently came from exhausted leaders.

Many a soldier has died on the modern battlefield due directly to his own physical exhaustion. Modern weapons demand the observance of every bit of available cover and concealment. The tired man neglects cover and is killed.

Are you physically fit? Can you, on order, ride twenty miles in three hours, and have enough left to advance dismounted under combat conditions for an additional two miles? Those conditions entail running, crawling, and even wriggling, in addition to the strain of leading a unit.

Can you do it? Are you fit?

## Potential Authors

The pen is mightier than the sword—so 'tis said.

The Editor has concluded that within the Cavalry the sword is far mightier than the pen. For during the past few months the *voluntary* pen accomplishments of the "gentlemen in the field" have been about nil. In other words, voluntary contributions to *The CAVALRY JOURNAL* are few and far between. It is true that requested articles are furnished almost without fail. However, there are so many pertinent questions abroad today that certainly the Editorial desk can not adequately cover all that need to be brought into the open.

Analytical studies either military or political will be welcomed with open arms. New thought on technique, armament and equipment is hard to locate. World War experiences are particularly invited.

Occasionally comes the plea: "Let the writing men take care of it." Was it Shakespeare who said: "'Tis clear

thinking that produceth the clear word"? Let us not be so concerned with the word as with the thinking.

Every Cavalryman carries a lead pencil in his knapsack.

## Memberships

The following chart indicates the circulation field of *The CAVALRY JOURNAL*:

Component	Total Number	Members	Percentage
Regular Army ...	891	860	96.5
National Guard ..	2,000	1,040	52.0
Organized Reserves	4,200	950	22.6
	7,091	2,850	40.2

The foregoing figures prompt us to look to the cavalry officers of the Organized Reserves for an expansion of membership. We do this for a twofold purpose: a wider dissemination of cavalry information, and additional funds to cover a growing budget.

It was with much pleasure, therefore, that we recently received from the 308th Cavalry, stationed in and around Pittsburgh, 12 new members, 7 renewed memberships from former members and the sale of 9 copies of *Cavalry Combat*.

Similar messages from other Reserve Regiments are anticipated. They will be appreciated.

## Blue Prints

Blue, as a color, will not photograph under the strong light used in modern photography; therefore, a map in this color or even a blue print cannot be used for this purpose. During the past several months many articles have been forwarded to us with attached blue prints for use as maps. When this is the case it has been necessary, at additional expense, to have the map redrawn in black. When possible, authors are requested to obtain an original map or utilize a sketch drawn in black in order that they may be properly reproduced or printed. Such action will save the treasury considerable expense.

## Roster of Regular Army Cavalry Officers

In accordance with custom, this issue of *The CAVALRY JOURNAL*, the last in 1937, carries a roster of the entire commissioned personnel of the Regular Army Cavalry (see page 584). By early publication of *The JOURNAL* it is hoped that this roster may be of assistance in the exchange of Christmas Greetings.



# The United States Cavalry Association

Organized November 9, 1885

## DESIGN

*1. The aim and purpose of the Association shall be to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science, to promote the professional improvement of its members, and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of the Cavalry of the Army of the United States.*—ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.

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## MEMBERSHIP

Membership shall be of three classes, which, together with the conditions of eligibility therefor, are as follows:

- (1) Active, for which all general officers of the Army of the United States and all commissioned officers of the Cavalry of the Army of the United States shall be eligible.
- (2) Associate, for which all present and former commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers of honorable record of the military or naval services of the United States not included in class 1 shall be eligible.
- (3) Honorary.

Application for membership, showing present or former military status, should be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. Cavalry Association, 1624 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., and be accompanied by remittance of dues for one year.

## DUES AND SUBSCRIPTION TO THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

There is no initiation fee. Annual dues, payable in advance, \$3.00, which includes subscription to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, 60% thereof being so designated.

Any person or organization not eligible for membership may subscribe for the JOURNAL at the regular subscription rate of \$3.00 per year. Canadian and foreign postage, 50 cents additional.

*Members and subscribers are requested to give prompt notice in advance of change of address. Changes in address are made only on notification.*

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## Letters To The Editor

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YE EDITOR:

The letter from the West Point cadet which you forwarded was from Cadet Elmer D. Ducrot. Young Mr. Ducrot reads *The CAVALRY JOURNAL* and he noted my offer in the first installment of "Crazy Business" to send any young gentleman about to graduate from West Point (if he desired it) my war time saber, express charges prepaid. This young man takes advantage of the offer and tells me frankly he does so for two reasons. First, it will save him ten dollars in his equipment budget, since he will have to obtain a saber before his graduation in June, 1938. Second, it will make his brothers (of which he has six) green with envy.

He expresses the fear that he may not fully qualify for the saber because he is not of Spanish-Irish descent, but he claims to be a mixture of Scotch, Irish, English, a touch of French and Swedish. His home is in the northwest, and after graduation he expects to be stationed with the 4th Cavalry at Fort Meade, South Dakota. He says he is of medium build and has standard eyes and face to match red hair and will be twenty-three come grass, so I imagine he is a country boy and I have a notion he will make a good soldier because he heads straight for his objective and writes a good letter.

Faithfully yours,

PETER B. KYNE.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For obvious reasons of an intra-corps nature the true name of the foregoing gentleman of merit has not been given.)

✱ ✱ ✱

### Educate the Layman

SIR:

It has seemed to me that each issue of *The CAVALRY JOURNAL* has been increasingly interesting and worthwhile each succeeding year. Your last was incomparable!

When it comes, it doesn't leave my possession until it is finished from cover to cover. It travels with me from prospect to prospect, customer to customer, meal to meal, and finally gets additional reading in bed before I fall asleep! Whenever a spare moment shows up awaiting a dealer or customer's pleasure, or a slow waitress, a few more paragraphs get digested!

I am writing you re: General Hawkins' article, "We Must Have Cavalry." He has put the case for cavalry as concisely and plainly as possible, so that it is understandable, I believe, to any layman, any congressman.

For years, we have had it drummed *into us* how vitally important cavalry is. It appears to me that this constant effort is like "carrying coals to Newcastle"; trying to

convince Esquimaux that they need fur suits!

When are we going to put our story (upon which we are all agreed) before the public-at-large; congress in particular? We don't need further "*pepping-up*"—we need more "*backing-up*." . . . The public and congress needs an education *far more* than we do regarding the purpose and value of cavalry, the need for more cavalry, the need for more and larger cavalry regiments already formed and trained. . . .

Have you ever noticed the volumes of anti-cavalry news articles—"Horses Obsolete"; "Horses Being Replaced by Motors"; "Cavalry Days Are Over"—most of it emanating from foreign sources? Even in a large Chicago paper recently, I saw a leading article about our new "stream-lined" division stating that it was cavalry converted to motors! Why not instigate a propaganda campaign to instill the truth in the public?

I know that all the above does not sound like War Department procedure, like officer reasoning, but if we have "hit upon a truth," why not systematically "sell" our ideas!

Never, in the last 20 years, has the public itself been so interested in horse shows and horseback riding as it is today. Why not strike "while the iron is hot?" One of the most interesting articles I have read relative to government-public-military equestrian cooperation appeared in the December, 1934, *American Remount* magazine. It depicted horsemanship as taught to the German civil population by German non-coms from the cavalry. I believe it predicted that Germany would have one of the finest cavalry in the world resulting. . . .

You see, I feel this so strongly because I am in the motor truck sales game and have been for about ten years. I *know* the motor truck vehicle's potentialities under the *best of civilian peace-time conditions*; under the same conditions, I know its *liabilities*. I hate to think of our country becoming so irrevocably motor-minded in National Defense that we have neither the trained horse personnel, nor horses, when manufacturing conditions, road hazards, and terrain finally show us under calamitous war-time conditions that we must use horse cavalry or are forced to do so.

I have just finished reading the translation of Rudolph Binding's, *A Fatalist at War*. Nothing could better portray a cavalryman's horror of becoming locked in a stabilized war of position; nothing could better portray a need for adequate horse-flesh resources—when manufacturing facilities for trucks, and replacement parts and accessories for some are inadequate. (The breakdown of German morale in the final spring drive of 1918 is most excruciatingly portrayed.)

I hope that some spark of good in the above copious remarks can be found to enhance the future of our arm, to ensure an adequate horse supply, an adequate number of trained personnel for M-day.

Sincerely,

1st Lt., Cav.-Res.

(2d-in-command, Troop — Second Army Maneuvers, 1936.—Scout Car Platoon C.O., —6th Corps Area Maneuvers, 1937.)

### An Able Article

(The following letter to Captain Koch was furnished us by Captain Schick. Professional appreciation of a professional article is pleasing.—Ed.)

Captain Oscar W. Koch,  
Ninth Cavalry,  
Fort Riley, Kansas.

Dear Capt. Koch:

I read with great interest your article on "The Psychology of Instruction" in the September-October number of *The Cavalry Journal*. It is packed with practical ideas which are applicable to teaching of all kinds. It appealed to me so strongly that I have distributed it among the officers of this department directing each to read same. It met with enthusiastic reception and I hope that its effect will be noted in an improvement in our individual efforts with cadets. We all consider it an admirable condensation of volumes of sound educational material.

Of the 19 officers of this department, four are Cavalrymen, and we take some pride in the fact that *an article of such calibre* as yours is written by one of our branch and *appears in our Journal*. I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to the Editor.


Sincerely yours,

L. E. SCHICK,  
Capt. Cavalry,  
Asst. Prof. of Drawing,  
United States Military Academy.

### 37-mm. Sub-Caliber Practice

Dear Sir:

The picture shows a simple device that I used to teach



target designation and sight setting for the 37-mm gun, when I was in command of the Machine Gun Troop, 12th Cavalry. It has been in use ever since and has been found very useful. The air rifle is an ordinary commercial air rifle, held firmly to the barrel of the 37-mm by clamps. *Steel shot* must be used; not lead. The air rifle is fired at a sand table about 50 feet away. The sand table is about 3'-0" wide with a slope of about 30° from front to rear. On the telescopic sight the equivalent of the deflection in mils and the change in elevation per 100 yards, in inches, is determined on the sand table by experiment. The men in the squad take turns acting as corporal and gunner. The corporal gives the fire order. The gunner manipulates the sight and gives the command fire. An additional man cocks the air rifle and squeezes the trigger when the gunner commands fire. Small objects are used as targets on the sand table. A small block of wood or a toy automobile about 2½ inches long can be drawn across the sand table to represent a moving target.

The men took great interest in seeing where their shots hit and learned to get on the target rapidly. They became proficient in giving fire orders and their efficiency in firing the 37-mm on the target range was increased to a marked extent.

This device can also be used on the .50 caliber machine gun for firing on moving targets.

HEYWOOD S. DODD,  
Major, 12th Cavalry.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Another practical system for conducting sub-caliber practice with the 37-mm gun was covered in the November-December, 1935 issue of *The Cavalry Journal*. That system utilized a pistol barrel centered in a 37-mm cartridge case. Caliber .45 ammunition was fired in the actual practice.)

IT TAKES a couple of decades to learn military discipline and tactics.—New York Times.

### WAR


TWO FACTORS appear in every war. The economical factor is the wheel horse that gives it motion. Watch the political factor—it is the one that gives the wheel horse motion.





## NOTES FROM THE CHIEF OF CAVALRY

### What Would You Do?



(EDITOR'S NOTE: The following "Opus" comes to us unexpurgated and verbatim from one "Lieutenant Slinkovitch" (a well-known chaacter who always commands a platoon of cavalry in the tactical arguments of the east wing of the Academic Building). It is without a doubt the result of his eating a bowl of chili at midnight and then reading "The Defense of Duffer's Drift." Its authenticity, therefore, cannot be questioned.)

"I recall it all too vividly," Lieutenant Slinkovitch was saying, drawing his hand slowly across his forehead as if still in more or less pain.

"I was Captain Otto Pulse, in command of Troop "A" (the armored-car troop) of the 10th Cavalry, Mecz.\* Our regiment reinforced, in bivouac about thirty miles to the north, was ordered by the I Corps to move at 6:00 AM to seize all crossings in the vicinity of ABBA and DABBA (see sketch) and protect the crossing of units of the corps at ABBA until relieved by the 10th Infantry

(in trucks) at 11:45 AM. A hostile cavalry brigade had been reported in bivouac twenty-five miles south of ABBA the day before.

"Colonel Oilbern R. Diesel, our regimental commander, assembled his staff and commanders, informed them of the situation, and issued his warning orders. He also issued his reconnaissance instructions to me, which, in part, directed that the armored-car troop reconnoiter the crossings of the OLEMAN RIVER from MILLS FORD (twelve miles northwest of ABBA) to NEDOG (six miles east of DABBA), the route of the main body, and ABBA, and report the strength, composition, and movements of any hostile forces encountered.

"We cleared the bivouac at 5:00 AM, and at 6:30 AM the situation was as follows:

"The 1st Platoon (Patrol No. 1) reported MILLS FORD clear and the bridge there intact, but was being held up by a strongly defended road block at the bridge over the creek on the MILLS FORD—ABBA road. (A)

\*From the ancient Greek, meaning mechanized.

It was reconnoitering to the north for a route across the creek.

"The 3d Platoon (Patrol No. 3) reported the bridge at NEDOG intact but was fired on by several scout cars defending a road block at the bridge over creek at (C). The patrol had crossed the OLEMAN RIVER at NEDOG and was continuing reconnaissance toward DABBA from the east. It had just reported the bridge at DABBA destroyed (F).

"The 2d Platoon (Patrol No. 2) reported a hostile force estimated as a troop of cavalry moving north on the road at (D). It opened fire on the hostile force, which took cover east of the road. Further movement of this patrol south or southeast was prevented by heavy fire from anti-tank weapons in position on the high ground to the northeast. Patrol No. 2 had one section each under cover on hills at (B).

"At 6:30 AM the troop (less the platoon) was at (G). At this time I received the following oral radio message from Lieutenant Idler W. Heel (Patrol No. 2):

'From hill at (B) just observed hostile horse cavalry force estimated as a troop or larger moving north on road at (E). Head of column 500 yards north of the hill. I remain in observation.'

At this point in the narrative Lieutenant Slinkovitch (alias Captain Otto Pulse) paused for a moment, took a small fingernail cleaner from his pocket (which, by the way, he always carries with him), and removed a dab of cup grease from under his left thumb nail. Then looking off into space and giving a slight shudder as if he were actually going through the ordeal again, he broke down completely and gasped incoherently, "Put yourself in my place in that situation—

#### WHAT WOULD YOU DO?"

#### SOLUTION

We shook our head in complete bewilderment and dared not speak. "What should one do?" we thought. After what seemed like an interminable silence, a gurgle somewhat resembling an overheated armored-car radiator emanated from Captain Otto Pulse's throat, and after this sound had been decoded by the G-2, who happened to have just entered the room, we knew what the solution was. It was given us as follows:

"I knew that something must be done, and that quickly. I recited under my breath the tactical principles that were involved in the crisis at hand.

"First: 'The armored-car troop or subdivisions thereof engage in combat when such action will further the mission of the main body.'

"Second: 'Before engaging in combat the platoon leader or troop commander must ask himself the question: 'Have I accomplished my mission; is its accomplishment impossible under present conditions; and will combat assist the accomplishment of my mission or the mission of the regiment?'

'If elements of the armored-car troop can prevent occu-

pation of the high ground at (B) and the hill one mile to the northeast thereof by the Red forces pending arrival of the regiment, considerable time and effort will be saved for the accomplishment of the principal mission of the command.'

"Could anything be simpler? My decision was made. I decided to employ my reserve platoon in the vicinity of the hill one mile northeast of (B) and delay the hostile force south of the line: hills at (B)—hill one mile to the northeast thereof.

"Now," continued Lieutenant Slinkovitch with an air of finality, "I must be on my way. But before I leave I would like to ask a favor. Will you tell our kind readers to tune in on the next issue of *The Cavalry Journal* and therein they can read the final episode and find out what happened to the 10th Cavalry Mecz in the final phase of the battle."

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Words fail us. The above is self-explanatory.)

1 1 1

#### Instructions for Assembling, Attaching and Adjusting New Type Stirrup Strap and Buckles on Officers' Saddles

**STRAPS, STIRRUP**—*New Type*: The stirrup strap and buckle furnished with the Phillips Military Saddle, M. 1936 has been adopted as standard for all officers saddles. The buckle is attached to the stirrup strap so that the smooth side of the strap is "out" or next to the rider, thus conserving the rider's boots and breeches. To assemble the strap, the tongue is passed over the top of the buckle, thence inward through the tongue opening, thus placing the free end of the strap between the two folds. The stirrup strap is attached to the stirrup loop of the saddle with the top of the buckle just *under* and in line with stirrup loop. (See cut.)

Note: This arrangement admits of a flat strap, eliminates wear on the buckle as well as the objectionable features of the former buckle which rested upon top of the stirrup strap loop.



To adjust the length of stirrup straps while riding, pull or push the straps downward away from the stirrup strap loops, thence pull upward on the free end of strap, as with the old type of buckle.

### Chief of Cavalry's Question

What is the prescribed system of defense against attack aviation in your regiment? Is this scheme satisfactory? If not, what are its defects? If the system used is unsatisfactory, give your solution for a satisfactory one.

Following is an answer from the Border to the last question of the Chief of Cavalry: Is there need for a Command Car with Horse Cavalry?

My answer is an unequivocal yes.

These comments are based on Horse Cavalry the size of a Regiment. Further, they are based on purely the tactical situation and not the specialized communications officer point of view.

My conception of a command post is, that it is a unit set up for the speedy relaying of orders to all subordinate units and various detachments; a reception center for early information from all reconnaissance agencies and security detachments as well as subordinate units at all times; a unit that can receive promptly and pass on to the commander immediately, the orders and wishes of the higher command; if friendly airplanes are operating with the command, to be able to communicate with them preferably by voice and most assuredly to communicate without using the time losing, laborious, pannel method or pick up and drop message scheme.

These functions, leaving out the voice radio feature, can all be performed by our present pack radio set to be sure. But a terrific loss of time will occur in all situations except a stabilized one. With a fast moving column, radio packs must be dropped out and leap frogged in order to maintain constant radio communication with scout car sections. Without further comment we can readily see what two hours of this will do to say nothing of the time lost in relaying messages and information received up to the commander.

The value of scout cars in getting back timely information when obtained. To force these cars to radio on a certain schedule in order that command posts will be open and still keep within reasonable distance of the main column, is sacrificing in character.

If commanders are not given a Command Car they are

going to keep one of the voice radio equipped scout cars as their command car, of necessity, and you then sacrifice one scout car section.

As to the mechanical requirements of the vehicle and how these requirements can be met, I am not qualified to say except this, mechanically, they *must work*. Specialist must equip them with proper radio equipment, both voice and key and other specialist with motor. As speed is not a factor, but as the ability of this car to go with the column is, a type of vehicle to go cross country is desired. When the column goes where no vehicle can go, as frequently happens, the car must join the field trains and the pack sets relied upon entirely though at a sacrifice to time.

Beside the point—I think the field trains must be equipped with radio.

CLARK L. RUFFNER  
Captain, Cavalry.

### How to Get New Equipment

Under the current system of supply there are a number of important items of new equipment that are issued automatically on a priority schedule made up by the War Department. Scout cars are an example. Although they are carried in Table of Basic Allowances, they cannot be secured on requisition and should not be requisitioned for, since this only entails needless correspondence.

Items in the current T/BA which will be automatically supplied but not supplied on requisition are:

#### ENGINEER

Kit, demolition, Cavalry, complete

(Your Corps Area Engineer Officer will notify you when the parts for this kit are available for issue).

#### ORDNANCE

All types of vehicles.

Gun, machine, cal. .50, Browning, M2, heavy barrel.

Gun, sub-machine, cal. .45.

Rifle, U. S. Cal. .30, M1 (semi-automatic).

#### QUARTERMASTER

All types of vehicles.

#### SIGNAL

All Radio sets and Frequency Meter sets.

The Chief of Cavalry is glad to answer inquiries addressed to him direct with respect to the status of any of the above items.

IF WE SEEK PEACE, *we must be stronger than those who seek war.*—MAJOR GENERAL  
JAMES C. HARBORD



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## General Hawkins' Notes

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### The Need for Pioneering

Ignorance of the rôle of Cavalry, and of the powers and limitations which affect this rôle, has created a skepticism or even a hostility in many quarters against this valuable arm.

In war, Cavalry is used whenever the situation seems to justify its employment for a specific purpose. It should never be used with a vague idea in accordance with military formula. Its known powers and limitations will determine whether or not it is the suitable arm to employ in any given case.

Since Cavalry is the most mobile of all arms for cross-country movement, and is equipped, organized and trained for both mounted and dismounted action, its employment is determined largely by these characteristics.

But Cavalry has certain limitations. Unless, in any given situation, we turn Cavalry into infantry by leaving its horses out of the theater of maneuver and battle and by giving it the full equipment of infantry, it is not suitable for prolonged dismounted attack or defense, or for what is known as trench warfare. Cavalry has been used in this way when the situation was desperate. When the Cavalry of an army is so used, the army has, temporarily, no Cavalry for use as such. And, in this employment, it may be used-up to such an extent that the army will have no Cavalry until it is completely reconstituted. It is obviously as unwise to use Cavalry in this way as it would be to turn artillery into infantry in like circumstances.

Dismounted Cavalry, in its proper rôle, with its horses only a short distance behind it and ready for use when needed, is capable of a powerful attack and a stubborn defense for comparatively short periods of time. Thus it can attack and seize a position and hold one until infantry can arrive to take it over. Or, it may cover retiring infantry for a period long enough to permit the latter to withdraw in good order. And it may be used in many other ways.

Mounted Cavalry can attack in many situations and bring about decisions much quicker than when dismounted. Experience has proved that mounted actions, well timed and well supported, are frequently less costly than dismounted actions. When to use the one and when to use the other constitute the principal art in the cavalry leader's practice of tactics.

But these forms of action are considered in a discussion of the rôle of Cavalry only because they pertain to those powers and limitations of the arm which affect its employment. They must be understood therefore by commanders of armies or other mixed forces. The use of the best tacti-

cal means in any cavalry situation is a matter for study and thought by cavalrymen. The employment of Cavalry is a matter needing study and thought by all officers of the army who may expect to serve as staff officers of a mobile army or to command one.

A commander of a mixed force of mobile troops who does not know how to use his Cavalry is unfit to command. The success or failure of the Cavalry in any army is more dependent upon the knowledge of the general commanding the army than upon the leader of the Cavalry. The Commanding General must know how to use all members of his team and how to make them combine and cooperate in a united effort. We do fairly well in teaching our prospective commanders and general staff officers how to use the infantry, the artillery, the engineers, the air force, etc. But it is believed we are leaving them in ignorance as to the use of the cavalry.

Frederick the Great lined up his generals once and told them that the cavalry was falling into disrepute through their ignorance of the arm and of how to use it. He demanded that they should learn the value of cavalry and how to employ it when it was assigned to their commands. Failure in this respect meant demotion. The result was that the cavalry played a very important part in his victories. We need something of the same thing, but applied by an adequate course of instruction to our students at The Cavalry School, at Fort Leavenworth and at the Army War College.

The exposition of the rôle of cavalry needs a pamphlet or a whole book. It cannot be stated in a list of captions or headings, as is frequently attempted in field service regulations, because, as stated in that brief way, the different rôles of cavalry overlap each other or actually include each other in many cases. For example, the caption, "Delaying actions," is often listed as a rôle of cavalry. But delaying action is often used by cavalry in its rôle of acting as a covering force in front or in rear of an army, or in flank guard duty, or in actions against the enemy reserves. And these actions are also listed as the rôles of cavalry. The duties of a covering force include reconnaissance and screening. The duties of a mobile reserve include delaying actions and attacks against the flanks and rear of the enemy, or attack upon the sensitive spot at the critical moment.

The whole matter requires detailed discussion and explanation. It needs a text book, not a chapter. More space, more time and more importance should be given to it at the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College.

The ignorance which prevails is very serious. Not only

because our future generals will not know how to use cavalry, but also because its numbers will not be made adequate for the tasks imposed upon it or which would be performed for the army by a numerous cavalry. By a real knowledge of the powers, as well as the limitations, of modern cavalry in modern war, and of the manner in which it can and should be employed, the unbiased student can be convinced of the fact, because it is a fact, that it is indispensable. If the army is convinced, the members of congress will also be convinced.

However competent they may be in training small units how to march and fight, the large majority of cavalry officers themselves are none too well informed as to the missions that the Commander of a mixed force, con-

taining cavalry, should assign to his cavalry, or in other words, as to how the army or mixed force commander should employ his cavalry.

There is the task for loyal and outstanding officers. They must not be content with mere proficiency in one or two departments of their arm. They must be proficient in all the requirements of a good cavalry officer. Mere proficiency in horsemanship or in the use of arms will not do. They must study history and tactics and use this knowledge in their imagination as to the employment of armies and as to the cavalry part in the great team of all arms.

Many men say that they like pioneering work. Well, here is plenty of pioneering to engage the enthusiastic attention of the best officers we have. More power to them.



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Foreign Editor, *The Digest*

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The battles are arranged in chronological order, with an alphabetical index. The general course of each battle and the reasons for victory or defeat are the clearer because the accounts are brief.

There is little that is new in war, yet each new situation has new points of interest. The principles of the art of war apply in all times. The tactics of Miltiades at Marathon were successfully applied by Hannibal at Cannae. They formed the basis of the German war plans, and were successful at Tannenberg under a skillful commander, and a failure on the Marne under a timid leader.

One can start reading at any part of the book, as each account is complete in itself.

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# With the Mechanized Cavalry

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## The Cavalry School Revisits Fort Knox

In 1934 the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized), stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, visited Fort Riley where it participated in maneuvers with the horse cavalry, but this procedure has not been possible recently due to lack of funds. Therefore, The Cavalry School visited Fort Knox this last spring and again this fall, as Brigadier General Guy V. Henry, Commandant of The Cavalry School, feels that the student officers should receive practical instruction in mechanization. The group this fall consisted of forty-seven instructors and students who were privileged to witness a week of demonstrations, beginning October 25th.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the above date, Brigadier General Daniel Van Voorhis, Commanding the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz.) and Fort Knox, Kentucky, greeted the officers from Fort Riley and discussed the development of mechanization and its functions in our armed forces. Afterwards all were present at a vehicular show and a road review of the Mechanized Brigade. During the remainder of the week officers rode in all types of mechanized vehicles, saw the various troops in operation, took part in a night march which terminated in a daylight attack, witnessed two tactical demonstrations in one of which there was firing with ball ammunition, and received instruction in communication and maintenance activities.

All the demonstrations were done in a highly efficient manner, and those who were present came away with a

much broader conception of the powers of the Cavalry arm. Under present conditions the cavalry officer must be a mechanized as well as a horse cavalryman.

The trip was made overland under the command of Colonel Clarence Lininger, Assistant Commandant of The Cavalry School, and due to the kindness of Brigadier General Charles M. Bundel, Commandant of The Command and General Staff School, who loaned a suitable number of reconnaissance cars, it was made in comparative comfort.

It is hoped that next year the Mechanized Brigade, or at least a regiment thereof, will come to Fort Riley; but, if not, a visit of this character will be repeated.

1 1 1

## New Batteries of Mechanized Field Artillery Activated Today

As a result of recommendations recently made to the War Department two additional firing batteries of the 1st Battalion, 68th Field Artillery were activated on November 1st with appropriate ceremonies at Fort Knox, Kentucky. General Van Voorhis, stated that this expansion reflects the growing realization of the importance of artillery fire support within the Seventh Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized).

With batteries C and D, the new units, this battalion now consists of four batteries; 2 batteries of 75-mm gun ( ? ) and 2 batteries 75-mm howitzer (mecz).

*BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS that prevailed on the Western Front, possibilities for tank employment were limited to frontal assaults. Due also to the mechanical unreliability of the machines then in use, no more extended operations could probably have been successfully undertaken. The result was that tanks came to be generally regarded as weapons useful only for close support of heavy infantry attacks, with their required speed indicated by the rate of marching troops and with their capabilities limited to the disruption of organized small-arms fire along strongly fortified fronts.*

*This function of combat vehicles is a most important one. But this constricted conception of mechanization fails utterly to conform to the principles which must guide the American Army in its further development.—MACARTHUR.*





## CAVALRY IN THE FOREIGN PRESS

### POLAND

#### POLISH VIEWS ON THE ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF MODERN CAVALRY.

(From *Wissen und Wehr*, Berlin, October, 1937. Reviewed by Fred W. Merten.)

The German publication *Wissen und Wehr* presents an interesting review of a number of articles published in recent issues of the Polish Cavalry Journal. The subject of these articles deals with the much debated question concerning the future of the cavalry arm.

Like Soviet Russia, Poland has decided in favor of a strong cavalry. Poland still regards her cavalry as an organic and important part of the larger combat team. Hence the thoughts expressed in the Polish Cavalry Journal are worthy of serious consideration.

The reasons for maintaining a strong cavalry—40 cavalry regiments in a military system including 90 infantry regiments—are strategic, tactical, technical and psychological. A comparison of the geography of Poland with the means at the disposal of her national defense will confirm the Polish views that a large theatre of operations will contain wide areas that are either undefended or held by weak elements in delaying action until the issue of the operation has been decided on some other part of the front, but also present an opportunity for aiming a strong blow at the hostile flank and rear.\* According to the Polish conception, cavalry is highly suitable for such missions; it is a speedy and mobile arm and is well fitted for employment on wide plains and in wooded regions.

The poor condition of the Polish road system, especially in the eastern part of the country, the small number of heavily constructed bridges and the marshy banks of the rivers and streams still impose serious limitations upon the employment of motorized and mechanized forces. Moreover, the industrial and economic state of affairs in Poland probably would greatly impede the organization of large motorized and mechanized units in a war.

Nevertheless, the Poles are well aware that, in order to meet the requirements of warfare, modern cavalry must keep in step with the progress made by the other arms, with special regard to mechanization and aviation. The Polish Cavalry Journal cites numerous examples taken from past wars, especially from the World War and the Russo-Polish War, and shows that the failure of cavalry operations was due to poor armament and faulty organization as well as to inexperienced command. From this, the Polish Cavalry Journal concludes that it is now time to modern-

ize the cavalry so as to avoid a repetition of the old mistakes.

In introducing the ideas expressed by the Polish authors, the German publication briefly describes the peace-time organization and armament of the Polish cavalry of today.

The 40 cavalry regiments are organized into

- 1 cavalry division and
- 12 independent cavalry brigades.

The cavalry division is composed of

- 3 cavalry brigades.

Each cavalry brigade includes

- 3 cavalry regiments;
- 2 battalions horse artillery (three 75-mm guns each);
- 1 squadron mounted engineers;
- 1 signal troop.

The independent cavalry brigade consists of

- 2 to 4 cavalry regiments;
- 1 to 2 battalions horse artillery;
- 1 squadron mounted engineers;
- 1 signal troop.

For exercises, and in war, armored cars and light tanks, armed with machine guns, are attached to the cavalry units.

The cavalry regiment comprises

- 4 rifle squadrons (6 to 9 light machine guns, carbine and lance);
- 1 heavy machine gun squadron;
- 1 signal troop.

No provisions are made for the organization of cavalry corps in peace.

Lieutenant Colonel Mossor, G. S. C., Polish Army, in an article entitled "Strategic Cavalry in Modern Warfare," clearly defines the necessity of a large cavalry and expresses sound advice on the modernization of the mounted arm. Colonel Mosser has this to say:

"Ever since the invention of the firearm, particularly in the past 50 years, the cavalry has had to fight a struggle for its existence. And yet, a careful unbiased study of military history must lead to the conclusion that the cavalry, suitably armed, wisely employed and, above all, led with a true cavalry spirit, is still a principal arm. The conception that cavalry is obsolete results from the mistakes made in the World War, when the High Commands dissipated the strength of their cavalry by dividing it into small units and employing them for purely tactical purposes without establishing a point of main effort, so that the cavalry lost its striking power and was doomed to failure.

"However, the usefulness of cavalry must not be judged

\*See The CAVALRY JOURNAL, July-August, 1937, p. 387.

entirely by its mistakes. There are many examples of highly successful cavalry operations, such as the employment of two German cavalry corps in the Battle of the Marne, a German cavalry division in the Battle of Tannenberg, a German cavalry corps during the withdrawal of the German Ninth Army from South Poland, a German cavalry corps in the Battle of Lodz, the Soviet-Russian cavalry corps in the Russo-Polish War of 1920, and many others. In numerous instances, these cavalry corps did not even operate against the hostile flank and rear, which is the most favorable direction for cavalry action, but were employed in frontal defensive action.

"Cavalry must operate only in large bodies; in other words, it must be organized into large cavalry units. In no circumstances must the cavalry be distributed over the various armies for purely tactical employment. The mission of these large cavalry corps is to decide the issue of an operation by attacking the hostile flank and rear.

"Strategic reconnaissance, in modern warfare, can be executed with greater ease and to better results by aviation.

"For tactical and combat reconnaissance, small cavalry units should be assigned to the various armies.

"Armed and organized for modern warfare, cavalry possesses great striking power as well as great mobility. Above all, a modern cavalry is capable of seizing both ground and consolidating its gains. No other arm combines these three characteristics which are so vital for the accomplishment of strategic missions on a large scale.

"While we must not underestimate the possibilities of the mechanized arm, but must bear in mind that the tank is the most dangerous opponent of the cavalry, mechanized forces cannot replace the cavalry so long as they are dependent upon the weather, terrain, season of the year and road conditions. Furthermore, the contest between armor and missile is not settled. An infantry, armed with a small arm effective against heavily armored vehicles (it is quite possible that such a weapon will be invented some day), would preclude the use of mechanized forces, thus more or less depriving an army without cavalry of its organs for tactical and combat reconnaissance and rendering it incapable of envelopments on a large scale—the only form of maneuver that promises success. On the other hand, as long as the armor is superior to the missile, joint action of cavalry and mechanized forces is highly effective; the mechanized units may serve materially to increase the radius of action of the cavalry, especially in large theatres of operations and in interfering with the hostile concentration at the outbreak of a war.

"The modernization of the cavalry must be threefold: the commanders must become experts in the handling of large cavalry units; the cavalry must be organized according to modern standards; and its tactics must conform to the demands of modern warfare.

"Of these, the training of commanders of large cavalry units is the most important point to be considered. *A large cavalry unit cannot be successful in war, unless its staff is organized in time of peace.* The commanders must be afforded opportunities, by serious study, command post ex-

ercises, map maneuvers and, above all, practical experience, to become familiar with the command of large cavalry units. The staffs must be trained in the tactical and strategic command of such units as well as in the handling of the service of supply, which is a highly difficult problem in the case of speedy and mobile forces that maneuver over wide areas. A good tactical cavalry commander need not make a good leader of a strategic cavalry unit. While physical courage and boldness are the characteristics of the leader of a tactical unit, the leader of large cavalry units must combine experience and wide knowledge with a deep appreciation of strategic missions, responsibility, determination in critical situations, far-sightedness and organizing ability.

"The problem of organizing the cavalry along modern lines primarily concerns the assignment of motorized and mechanized elements. It is not advisable to assign organically large motorized and mechanized elements to tactical cavalry units up to division strength, for it is difficult to coordinate the inherent difference in the speed of the motor and horse within small units, and so the cavalry is forced to dissipate its strength in providing security for the motorized elements. Hence it is preferable to furnish tactical units only mechanized elements for their own reconnaissance.

"Some authors propose a motorization as follows:

Cavalry regiment: motorcyclists for the maintenance of liaison; partly motorized signal troop and ammunition train.

Cavalry brigade: same as the regiment, with additional partly motorized artillery and engineer squadron.

Cavalry division: motorized heavy artillery regiment; mechanized squadron with motorized infantry.

"Yet very effective may be the combination of large cavalry units with motorized and mechanized units, such as the organization of one command comprising one or several cavalry corps, a mechanized division, a motorized infantry division and aviation. The mechanized forces, with their great striking power, will clear the path for the cavalry and speedily penetrate deep into the hostile front; the cavalry, being the most mobile weapon, may be employed anywhere along the front and is capable of exploiting and consolidating the gains of the mechanized forces. A unit organized in this manner combines the three characteristics enumerated above as being essential to the success of a strategic operation on a large scale.

"From a tactical point of view, modern cavalry must be capable of extended night marches over difficult terrain, as it must take advantage of darkness in general, owing to the ever increasing threat of hostile air and tank attacks. The cavalry must be armed and trained to fight the tank both by defensive and offensive tactics. It must further be trained in the execution of raids that strike the enemy at short range and with surprise effect. In combat, unlimited use of firearms must be made. The mounted attack may

be employed normally only by small units or by larger units when in a clash with hostile cavalry."

In consideration of these three requirements, Lieutenant Colonel Mossor reaches the conclusion that the cavalry is thoroughly capable of remaining a principal arm in modern warfare. Only countries whose probable theatres of operations do not permit of a war of movement, the author contends, may think of decreasing their cavalry.

The problem of the employment and tactics of large cavalry units is treated by Colonel Praglowski, G. S. C., Polish Army, in two articles entitled "Operations of Large Cavalry Units." The author confirms the viewpoint that cavalry is necessary in modern warfare both for tactical missions, executed by units not exceeding the strength of a cavalry division, and strategic problems, carried out by one or several cavalry corps.

Colonel Praglowski bases his discussion of the employment of large cavalry units on a cavalry corps comprising two or three cavalry divisions or independent brigades, reinforced by reconnaissance and combat aviation, armored cars and light tanks, and motorized heavy artillery.

The author introduces his discussion by making general reference to the methods employed in cavalry combat.

*Speed, striking power and surprise effect* are the characteristics of cavalry combat. By these means the cavalry compensates for a number of disadvantages and shortcomings which do not apply to the infantry. The cavalry executes nearly all of its missions by offensive tactics. Therefore, the art of leading a cavalry unit in action does not rest with the decision whether to attack, but with the ability to determine when and where to attack and to what length to go in carrying on the combat. Even a defensive mission must be executed by offensive tactics, if possible.

Contrary to the infantry, the cavalry must attack with speed and by immediately employing its entire strength, so as to present the enemy with the accomplished fact before he can gather his wits. This speed and striking power will lead to surprise effect, which is of even greater importance to the cavalry than to the other arms. The cavalry commander must not hesitate in a crisis quickly to make a decision and to take a chance. The tactical mobility of the cavalry in action and the ability to shake off the enemy with comparative ease permit it to take a chance. It is of greatest importance in an attack to create a definite point of main effort by a concentration of force on the vital point of the front, while the remaining elements are containing the enemy and feigning attacks along the broad front usually occupied by cavalry. However, to be avoided in any case is a dissipation of strength caused by an excessive width of the zone of action, by an exaggerated activity of the reconnaissance elements and by the execution of numerous partial and preliminary attacks on various parts of the front.

From these remarks about the general principles, the author proceeds to the discussion of cavalry combat by a cavalry corps.

He regards a concentration of force as the most im-

portant principle for cavalry on the march. While a cavalry brigade on the march may occupy only one route, the cavalry corps on the march of necessity must develop both in width and depth; however, this development must be limited so as to permit all components within a relative short time to concentrate for combat in a narrow zone. The author bases the extent of this development on the assumption that the distance between the three cavalry divisions and a theoretical center measures nine miles. This distance assures a concentration of the corps within a period of from six to eight hours. To be avoided at all costs is a fan-like development of the individual components in width without enough depth; this form of development contains the danger of rendering the separate elements incapable of breaking away upon encountering the enemy and depriving the corps commander of the reserve which he needs to control the course of the action.

As in the case of infantry units, frontal security on the march must be provided by advance guards. However, contrary to the infantry, it is a mistake to provide flank security in the form of large detachments separated from the main body by great distances. If an adequate ground and air reconnaissance is maintained, the cavalry commander will learn of a threat in his flank in sufficient time to employ part of his forces in the direction of the danger. This, too, confirms the principle of the concentration of force.

In addition, a column on the march must be covered against air and tank attacks. This security may be provided by antiaircraft and antitank guns as well as by concealment, suitable march formations and, in antitank defense, by an "antitank defense point," consisting of antitank guns, tanks armed with light cannons and communication means, which precedes the main body at a distance of from six to eight miles, receives the initial blow struck by the hostile tanks and warns the column on the march.

In discussing the attack, Colonel Praglowski takes exception to two rules that are often applied to the cavalry attack. One of them is: "The cavalry must advance on its entire front, locate the most vulnerable point of the enemy and attack." To be sure, this method may be employed in attacking an enemy who is on the defensive and affords the party on the offensive time to determine the weakest spot, assemble and attack with strongly concentrated effort. In any other situation, compliance with this rule must needs lead to a dissipation of strength and preclude success.

The other rule deals with the double envelopment of the hostile flank and rear. This form of offensive promises the greatest effect to cavalry as to any other arm. Nevertheless, Colonel Praglowski is justified in emphasizing that, in combat against an opponent of equal or superior strength, this method of attack may be employed only if the enemy is badly shaken or on the retreat; whereas a double envelopment of an able opponent calls for a great numerical superiority in a cavalry attack the same as in an infantry attack. Therefore, the cavalry corps as a rule may attack only in flank. To conceal the direction of attack



from the enemy, minor cavalry elements must also be employed against the other hostile flank. The objective of the flank attack must be the terrain features that dominate the zone of action.

*The success of the flank attack depends greatly upon the ability of the cavalry to pin down the enemy in front.* In this connection, the composition of the screening elements and their action are of decisive importance. The Combat Regulations prescribe that the advance guard of a column on the march, upon encountering the enemy, must attack in force without leaving behind a reserve. Likewise, the screening elements of the cavalry corps must immediately attack with full force; seize vital points on the ground before the enemy reaches them, take the enemy by surprise, deceive and contain him by developing great fire power and so prepare the flank attack of the main body.

Even though the opponent may be superior in numbers, the screening elements must not delay in making a determined attack. While it might not be possible to repulse the enemy, the frontal attack nevertheless will reveal the strength and composition of the hostile forces; in other words, it will serve as a means of reconnaissance and lend the commander of the cavalry corps that freedom of action which he requires to employ his main body against the hostile flank.

The initial encounter with the enemy usually takes place on a broad front, corresponding in width to the advance of the cavalry corps which marches in several columns. Yet the flank attack of the main body must be executed within a narrow zone. The width of this attack, in general, should not exceed two miles. A broader attack conducted on a larger scale will not be successful even though it may be directed against the hostile flank; for, no matter how effective the frontal attack of the screening elements may be, the enemy in any case will retain enough reserves to oppose the flank attack and so convert it, too, into a frontal attack.


For the purpose of creating a point of main effort, the cavalry commander must be assured of artillery support at the decisive point of the operation; this support must come from the horse artillery of the cavalry division as well as from the horse-drawn or motorized corps artillery. As far as practicable, both from a technical and tactical point of view, the artillery of the units attacking in front must support also the flank attack. The corps commander may even concentrate the artillery of two divisions under one command and establish a point of main effort of the artillery fire, provided conditions are favorable for artillery observation.

If aircraft and tanks are attached, they must be employed at the point of main effort.

The employment of cavalry for defense is exclusively an emergency measure, Colonel Praglowski contends; for the cavalry, by nature, is most suitable for offensive action. Yet experience has shown that the situation may demand the employment of the cavalry in the defensive. As a rule, this occasion arises when infantry units are with-

drawn from the front to be shifted to more critical sectors and the secondary front must be covered against an inferior enemy, or, again when it becomes necessary, in the course of the action, to close gaps. In either case, the strength of the cavalry unit employed will hardly ever correspond to the width of the defensive sector. There are no objections to taking over a broad front, provided the cavalry conducts the defensive by delaying action or wards off an inferior opponent who cannot strike a decisive blow. However, if the cavalry is assigned the defense against an opponent of equal or superior strength, it cannot solve its mission with the aid of infantry tactics which, in this case, call for a rigid and comparatively limited organization in depth and absolute defense of the positions held. On the contrary, here too, the cavalry must conduct the tactical defense according to the principles of strategic defense, that is, it must remain mobile, attack and, if necessary, withdraw temporarily, with the sole object of being in possession of the defensive sector at the conclusion of the operation.

Therefore, the cavalry will frequently employ the "mobile defense." (This "mobile defense" is a special form of tactical defense. It is employed where the width of the defensive sector does not permit the establishment of a solid screen of fire. The hostile advance is checked initially by delaying action and defensive tactics. Hostile elements that have broken through the front of the screening detachments or have been allowed to pass through the screen are repulsed or destroyed through counter attack by the main body which has been held in reserve under cover.) This method of tactical defense lends itself particularly well to the cavalry, for the mounted arm is capable of delaying action and, moreover, possesses great tactical mobility; this permits the cavalry to rush its reserve to the critical point for a violent surprise attack, abruptly to halt an action and to resume it at some other point of the front.



*Cavalry in a Mobile Defense (Schematic).*

A cavalry corps consisting of three independent brigades, reinforced by heavy or horse-drawn light artillery and armored cars, Colonel Praglowski believes, can easily cover 30 miles of frontage in "mobile defense." The disposition of the cavalry corps in a situation of this kind is described by means of an example (see sketch).

Outposts, in liaison with distant ground and air reconnaissance, will furnish the corps commander the first information about the enemy. Just before the hostile attack, the outposts will retire to the front of the screening detachments. In this case, the screening elements include 4 squadrons of cavalry with 8 heavy machine guns, 1 battalion of infantry, 4 batteries of horse artillery and 1 squadron of armored cars, with an approximate total strength of a cavalry brigade. They will defend points vital to the attack of the main body or engage in delaying action, with the view to checking the advance of the enemy, inflicting losses upon him and deliberately drawing him into a direction favorable for the attack of the main body. Thus the screening detachments will deprive the hostile attack of its impetus and dissipate its strength, furnish the corps commander information about the strength of the hostile forces and their direction of advance, and prepare the attack of the main body. The latter will decide the issue at stake by attacking the most dangerous and nearest or the most vulnerable part of the hostile forces.

As mentioned in the foregoing, the sector assigned to a cavalry corps often may be considerably wider than 30 miles, but measure from 50 to 60 miles in width and so seemingly exceed the defensive power of the cavalry corps. However, Colonel Praglowski points out, the "mobile defense" is ideal in situations of this kind. The cavalry corps may execute its mission in two ways. The corps may attack in force, striking certain parts or all of the

enemy on a line far in advance of the actual defensive sector and so forcing him at least temporarily to halt his advance. Then again, the corps may place all of its forces in reserve, with exception of the reconnaissance elements and outposts though without establishing a screen, and within the defensive sector attack and defeat the enemy that has penetrated the line of the outposts.

On the defensive, too, the author emphasizes, concentration of force is of cardinal importance. Even though the defensive sector may be very wide, the cavalry must not distribute its forces over a thin line that may be easily penetrated. On the contrary, an unfavorable relationship of width of sector and numerical strength calls for an *active defensive*; therefore, the cavalry must be disposed so that in any case it may strike with concentrated effort in one direction. The cavalry commander must not approach the execution of his defensive mission with his attention fixed solely on the width of his sector; but he must primarily gain a clear picture of the hostile disposition, take advantage of the terrain and *determine where and how to accomplish his defensive mission by offensive tactics*.

Although the views expressed by Colonel Praglowski are not necessarily those of the official authorities, they are without a doubt those of the leading Polish cavalry officers. The name of the author, itself, serves to vouch for this. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on the offensive on every occasion is in full accord with the views on strategy and tactics and the training principles of the Polish Army, whose Combat Instructions contain the motto:

"The offensive is the essence of the war of movement. It is characteristic of our nation. The leader must carry out his missions by offensive tactics, for the offensive alone will lend moral superiority over the enemy, and it alone will lead to his defeat."



# A Christmas Present

## CAVALRY COMBAT

Order Blank on page 569



GENERAL VON STEUBEN. By John McAuley Palmer. The Yale University Press, New Haven. 434 Pages. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by Colonel Clarence Lininger, Cavalry, Assistant Commandant, The Cavalry School.*

Generals von Steuben and Washington are classified by the author of the above book as the two men indispensable to the achievement of American independence. Steuben, he says, was Washington's indispensable staff officer, rendering to his chief technical assistance essential to military success, assistance that could not have been rendered by anyone else then in the American Army.

This is a strong statement, but the author is a retired general officer of the U. S. Army, with a fine sense of military values, who devoted eight years of research and reflection to the preparation of this history of von Steuben's life and his conclusion, therefore, is not a hasty one.

A little of General von Steuben's background is necessary to an understanding of the qualities that made him so valuable to the American cause. He was the son of an officer of Prussian Engineers who spent his life in the great training school of practical experience both in war and peace, and one who for a period of years took service for the wars under the Czar of Russia. His grandfather was a self made man, a Protestant minister, who raised his family from plebeian rank to aristocracy by his own hands when he assumed the prefix "von." This little trait of playing a rôle was a family one which influenced and colored von Steuben's life tremendously, as will be seen later, although his military reports are a model of truth and accuracy.

Frederick William Ludolf Gerhard Augustine (changed later by himself to Frederick William Augustus Henry Ferdinand) von Steuben was born in the fortress of Magdeburg, September 17, 1730, and lived the life of an army boy in various military stations in Germany and accompanied his father and mother to Russia. He entered the Lestwitz Regiment of infantry as a lance corporal in 1746, became an ensign in 1749 and a second lieutenant in 1752. Membership in this regiment classified him as a member of the most highly trained corps of infantry officers in the world.

In 1756 began the Seven Years' War, in which we find von Steuben in the thick of the fighting and from which he emerged as captain and aide-de-camp to King Frederick. After the war he was a member of the special class in military art formed and instructed by the King for

the purpose of training those we now designate as general staff officers.

However, during the general demobilization and for reasons which are not quite clear, von Steuben was dropped from the army. Soon he obtained a position as chief minister or chamberlain at the court of a German prince. He retained this post until a short time before departure to America acquiring the rank and title of Baron.

Due to financial reverses on the part of his Prince, Baron Steuben in 1776 and 1777 began to look about for a suitable military appointment in the French or some other army and in this way encountered Benjamin Franklin and other Americans in Paris. Aided by the French War Ministry, von Steuben arranged to go to America as a volunteer and was heralded by Franklin as a Lieutenant General in the King of Prussia's service. This was not true and was surely known by Franklin to be not true, but was considered necessary as the colonists were tired of foreign adventurers of little talent, and were sorely in need of the aid and advice von Steuben was capable of giving.

De Steuben (no longer von Steuben) reached America in December, 1777, and his services as a volunteer having been accepted by Congress, he joined Washington at Valley Forge in February, 1778.

At this time the American Army was in a sad state, not only with respect to equipment but training as well, and Washington needed a corps of trained inspectors. Becoming impressed with de Steuben's abilities, Washington appointed him Acting Inspector General and launched him on his duties. March 19, 1778, was a critical date in the Baron's life, as on that day he started to drill the American Army. He first drilled a squad—did it himself—a simplified Prussian drill. That squad trained others, and so on until the whole army was drilling. In the meantime he had to write the regulations to go with the drill. He did not forget training with the bayonet and the results of his training showed next year when Wayne captured Stony Point without firing a shot.

On May 5, 1778, Congress made him Inspector General with the rank of Major General. From that time on the life of Major General Baron de Steuben is written in the history of the Continental Army. He surrounded himself with a corps of inspectors and improved the drill and the field training. He inspected every soldier, going into care of equipment, military discipline, police and sanitation. Some general officers supported him and some opposed, but Washington was behind him. He varied his inspection duties with occasional periods of command,



and when Lee's defection at Monmouth almost caused disaster, de Steuben was on hand to help rally and reorganize the troops who had grown to feel confidence in him. When the war was transferred to the South, de Steuben was sent to Virginia to organize and send troops on to Greene in the Carolinas, but his task was made difficult by Governor Thomas Jefferson's failure to support him, resulting in lack of success for which he had hoped.

Cornwallis eventually took refuge in Yorktown where he was hemmed by the French fleet and the American and French troops. The American Army was formed into three divisions, commanded by Lincoln, Lafayette and de Steuben, and Washington's field orders giving detailed instructions for the conduct of the siege betray de Steuben's training under Frederick the Great. When Cornwallis opened negotiations for surrender, de Steuben's division was in the trenches, and he refused to leave until the capitulation had been accomplished.

After the war de Steuben wrote treatises on military education and national defense. His thoughts on the former had their influence when West Point was established. The present National Defense Act is identical in principle with that proposed by de Steuben and approved by Washington in 1784.

On March 20, 1784, de Steuben tendered his resignation to Congress and lived thereafter in New York or on the grant of land given him on the Mohawk. In the conduct of his personal finance he was improvident and a trial to his friends of whom there were legions—many most devoted. With public funds and property he was scrupulously careful and honest.

He died near Utica, New York, in November 28, 1794, and was buried on his estate.

To the non-military reader this book carries an interesting story of a remarkable character and his part in our War of Independence. To the military reader there is in addition a lesson to illustrate the point that courage, fortitude and determination are not sufficient to carry an army to victory. There must be training based upon the means at hand and the end in view. There is a technique in movement and in the employment of weapons and matériel that can come only as the result of application and correct methods of training.

As we put down the book we agree with the author and with the epitaph on a bronze tablet embedded in a granite boulder near the tomb of de Steuben which says that he was

### INDISPENSABLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

175 BATTLES. By Shaw and Vestal. The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 268 Pages. \$2.00.

*Reviewed by Captain Oscar W. Koch, 9th Cavalry, Instructor, Department of General Instruction and Publications, The Cavalry School.*

This work, the author of which is Roger Shaw, Foreign Editor of the Digest, and which was edited by Colonel S. C. Vestal, General Staff Corps, U. S. Army, Retired, is a remarkable achievement. As may be noted from the title, which in its complete form is "One Hundred and Seventy-Five Battles By Land, Sea, and Air, From Marathon to the Marne and After" and by reference to the number of pages in this volume, the general average is about one battle per page. This of itself is of great assistance to the military student inasmuch as it is possible to start anywhere and to finish anywhere. It is not necessary to read lengthy general and special situations to get the gist of the battle under consideration.

It is paragraphic in style, almost telegraphic, lacks the habitual references to source material in works of this nature, thereby eliminating considerable confusion. To the military student it is of particular value as a reference work, giving the much sought after historical background and historical examples for a great number of types of action. Its résumés are concise. The general brevity and completeness should make it a valuable book on any historian's shelf.

The lack of sketched maps is noted, the use of which might have been a decided advantage, but inasmuch as this is a book of interesting character from a historical viewpoint, any reader desiring further information of any of the battles therein portrayed will have sufficient material from the text to elaborate upon it further.

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## 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) Fort Knox, Kentucky

COLONEL BRUCE PALMER, *Commanding*

The fall months at Fort Knox have been largely devoted to the supplementary target season and to combat firing. The latter has been most interesting, involving firing from the vehicles in place and in motion against both stationary and moving targets. Tactical exercises, for the Regiment alone or as a part of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, have been held each week, the most extensive being a Regimental overnight march to Lexington on September 17th and 18th.

A group of Pennsylvania National Guard Officers visited Fort Knox from the 17th to 19th of October. During this period the Regiment was called on for demonstrations of various types to fire and also participated in the Brigade road review and attack demonstration.

The visit of the Cavalry School to Fort Knox from October 24th to 30th was the occasion for a more extended schedule of demonstrations. The Fort Riley group were given an opportunity to ride in each type of vehicle, each Troop put on a series of problems and a night march followed by a dawn attack was held.

From September 4th to 8th one Platoon of Troop A, under command of Captain John K. Sells, was absent from the post participating in the Hazard Coal Carnival at Hazard, Kentucky.

A Brigade Vehicle Show was held on October 24th with classes for each type of vehicle and an award of prizes. A great deal of competition was developed, each Regiment holding a preliminary show on the 16th to select the entries for the Brigade Show.

The Regiment was sorry to lose Colonel Henry W. Baird and Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Conard on September 1st, both these officers going on Organized Reserve Duty. Captains Charles H. Bryan and Francis P. Tompkins, reported September 1st, Captain M. E. Jones on September 9th, Lt. Colonel Jack W. Heard on September 22nd, and Lieutenant Carroll H. Prunty on October 1st. Colonel Robert Rossow, Cavalry Reserve, from Culver, Indiana, reported for two weeks active duty on October 24th.

## 2d Cavalry—Fort Riley, Kansas

COLONEL ARTHUR W. HOLDERNES, *Commanding*

On September 1, Colonel Arthur W. Holderness relieved Colonel Dorsey R. Rodney as regimental commander. The latter became Director of the Cavalry Board at this station.

The following officers have been or will in the near future be relieved from the regiment: Lieut. Colonel Robert O. Annin; Majors John W. Carroll and Fenton S. Jacobs; Captains W. C. Scott, J. M. Williams, John B. Cooley and H. W. Miller. The following lieutenants: Walter E. Finnegan, Hugh W. Stevenson, Whiteside Miller, Bogardus S. Cairns, Jack W. Turner, David V. Adamson, S. Whipple, Jr., Anthony F. Kleitz, Jr., Norman K. Markle, Jesse M. Hawkins, Jr., and David Wagstaff, Jr., were relieved to become students at the Cavalry School.

The following officers have joined the regiment recently: Major Cyrus J. Wilder, Captain John H. Stodter; 1st Lieutenants Carl D. Womack, Theodore F. Hurt, Jr., James W. Snee, Joseph A. Cleary, Karl T. Gould and James O. Curtis, Jr. Captain Norman M. Winn has been ordered to rejoin the regiment.

Second Lieutenants Carlton B. Starkes, Gordon S. Shotwell, Richard K. Preston, Tommie M. Philbeck and Robert H. Calahan, all of the Cavalry-Reserve, joined the regiment in July for one year's active duty under the provisions of the Thomason Act.

First Sergeant Joseph V. Downes, R-1166814, Troop E, 2nd Cavalry, was placed on the retired list of the Army on August 31. As in the past, a regimental picnic was held in his honor, on August 30. Prior to this picnic, a short farewell address was given by Colonel Rodney to the enlisted men, followed by a short address by his successor, Colonel Holderness; after which an 84-piece silver set from the enlisted men of the regiment was presented to Sergeant Downes.

Additional battle honors have been awarded to the regiment by a recently approved decision of the Historical Section of the AWC. The new honors for the Mexican War are: Tamaulipas 1846; Monterey and New Mexico 1846. For the Indian Wars the new honors are: New Mexico 1852; Kansas 1869; Montana 1877; Montana 1879 and Montana 1881. Silver bands have been awarded to troops as follows: Troop A, Aisne-Marne; Troop B, Oklahoma 1854, Wyoming 1872 and Wyoming 1874; Troop C (inactive), Aisne-Marne; Troop E, Wyoming 1867; and Troop I (inactive), Aisne-Marne, Champagne and Oise-Aisne.

The regiment has been busily engaged in training during the summer and fall. It participated as a part of the Provisional Cavalry Division in the Fort Riley phase of the Fourth Army Maneuvers last August; it has completed target practice with all arms, including the caliber

.50 machine gun and combat firing; it has as usual, put on many demonstrations for the Cavalry School; and platoons from the rifle troops have completed the leadership test for small units. The winning platoon was from Troop A and was commanded by Lt. D. W. Johnston, Jr.

The trophy for the highest percentage in rifle marksmanship was won by the Headquarters Troop, Captain John H. Riepe, commanding. Sgt. W. B. Thompson of Troop B. received a watch for the highest score with the caliber .30 rifle and Private G. C. Cheever of the Machine Gun Troop a medal for being the high man with the caliber .30 heavy machine gun. Cash prizes for the high scores for soldiers firing for the first time with the rifle were won by Pfc. C. C. Scott of Troop A and Private Jack L. Martin of Troop F; and cash prizes for the best scores in dismounted pistol firing were awarded to Private R. H. Johnson of the Headquarters Troop and Corporal R. H. Ulmer of Troop E.

At the request of the citizens of Herington, Kansas, the Regiment sent Troop A, under Captain John T. Ward, to assist in the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of that city, August 30, 1937.

On October 4th, one platoon from Troop F, under Lieutenant Snee was sent to Medicine Lodge, Kansas, for the annual celebration of the signing of the Indian Peace Treaty at that place.

A highly successful polo season under the capable direction of Captain Gordon B. Rogers has drawn to a close. The regiment had three teams in the field by allowing members of the regiment who became students at the Cavalry School to play through the fall tournament with regimental teams.

The Second Cavalry Yellows—Captains Westphalinger, Noble, Rogers and Frierson won the Cavalry School Fall Tournament defeating the Second Cavalry Blues—Lieutenant Wagstaff, Captain Ward and Majors Thompson and Barnhart, in the finals. The Purples, Captain Riepe and Lieutenants Johnston, Cairns, Hawkins and Bartlett won the Consolation to make it a clean sweep for the Second Dragoons.

It is hoped that the regiment will have four teams on the field in the spring. This will entail the making of a number of ponies during the winter as the regimental string is not strong and most of the mounts have seen their best playing days.

Football has been the major sport within the regiment during the autumn season. Each troop is represented by a team in a league in which the team from Troop A, 9th Engineer Squadron is included. The games are played at night under the lights in the stadium. The interesting series of games that has resulted on the well lighted, well prepared field has drawn large enthusiastic crowds. A school for officials prior to the beginning of the season has resulted in better coached teams, interesting play, and a smaller percentage of injuries to players than has been the experience in the past. The Engineer team now leads the league but has yet to meet three strong teams. An

interesting feature of the season is that four of the games so far have resulted in 0-0 scores.

In the Fall Hunter Trials held on Armistice Day, November 11, the regiment had several entries; in the Privately Owned Class, two of our entries were in the ribbons, owned respectively by Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Grimes and Captain Gordon B. Rogers.

The regiment has 5 riders and horses in training for the annual Fall Point to Point scheduled for November 21st. The point will be approximately 6 miles. It is believed that Point to Points afford excellent training for contestants; both horse and rider are on a regular training schedule. The Rider learns much, incident to conditioning and training his horse, it develops an eye to country and ability to rapidly cross varied terrain.

### 1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry— Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS H. REES, JR.,  
*Commanding*

September 20, 1937 to November 20, 1937

Following the return of the Squadron from the annual practice march, the remainder of the training period to October 31st was used in finishing machine gun firing, in squadron drill and tactical exercises for platoons and troops, and in squadron problems. A squadron mobilization test was conducted with very satisfactory results. In addition we participated in a Post mobilization test for the whole garrison.

On September 28th, the Horse Show Team went to Montreal as guests of the 17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars. The horses were sent by truck, a round trip of over 200 miles. They were stabled in the new armory of the Hussars on Cote des Neiges Road. This is a beautiful modern building containing an excellent riding hall (100 by 200 ft. ring), stables, athletic room, etc., a Sergeants' Mess and an Officers' Mess.

Many colorful events made the show outstanding. The musical ride by the Royal Mounted Police was particularly good. The military teams in the show were as follows:

Royal Canadian Dragoons  
17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars (2 teams)  
4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards  
1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry (2 teams)

Places won by the Squadron in the show were as follows:

*Officers' Chargers—High Time*, ridden by Lt. Col. T. H. Rees, Jr., 2d place.

*District Officer Commanding Challenge Trophy—Black Beauty*, ridden by Capt. C. C. Jadwin, 3d place.

*Jumping Stakes—High Time*, ridden by Lt. Col. T. H. Rees, Jr., 5th place.



*Bernice*, ridden by Lt. R. W. Fuller, III, 8th place.  
*N.C.O. and Trooper Mounts—Razor Back*, ridden by  
 Sgt. W. F. Northrup, Troop "B," 2d place.  
*Military Team Event*—1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry, 3d  
 place.

Considering the fact that our team had nothing but troop horses it is believed that a creditable showing was made against the Canadians as two of their horses were with the Canadian team at the National Horse Show, just held in Madison Square Garden.

The hospitality of Colonel S. A. Terroux and the officers of the 17th Hussars lived up to Hussar tradition and all of us came away feeling that the ties already existing between the 3d Cavalry and the 17th Hussars had been greatly strengthened.

On October 12th the Horse Show Team went to the Boston Horse Show given at the Commonwealth Armory under the auspices of the 110th Cavalry, Massachusetts National Guard.

The horses made the 500-mile round-trip by truck in excellent shape. Colonel Philip L. Brown and the officers of the 110th did everything possible to make our stay pleasant, and the show was a great success.

Military teams competing in the show were:

- 110th Cavalry (Mass. National Guard)
- 110th Cavalry (Conn. National Guard)
- 102d Cavalry (Essex Troop, N.J. N.G.)
- 1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry (2 teams)

Places won by the Squadron were as follows:

*Open Jumping (1st day)—High Time*, ridden by Lt. Col. T. H. Rees, Jr., 4th place.

*Bernice*, ridden by Capt. T. C. Wenzlaff, 5th place.

*Open Jumping (2d day)—Black Beauty*, ridden by Capt. C. C. Jadwin, 1st place.

*Bernice*, ridden by Capt. T. C. Wenzlaff, 5th place.

*Open Jumping (Championship)—Black Beauty*, ridden by Capt. C. C. Jadwin, 3d place.

*Scurry (over obstacles on time basis)—Bernice*, ridden by Capt. T. C. Wenzlaff, 2d place.

*Black Beauty*, ridden by Capt. C. C. Jadwin, 3d place.

*Officers' Charger—High Time*, ridden by Lt. Col. T. H. Rees, Jr., 1st place.

*The William H. Danforth Challenge Trophy—Officers' Jumping—Black Beauty*, ridden by Capt. C. C. Jadwin, 1st place.

*Blue Bell*, ridden by Capt. R. M. Barton, 2d place.

*High Time*, ridden by Lt. Col. T. H. Rees, Jr., 3d place.

*Enlisted Men's Jumping—Bernice*, ridden by Sgt. E. T. Towne, Troop "B," 3d place.

*Military Team Event—Jumping*—1st place, 3d Cav. 1st Team; 2d place, 3d Cav. 2d Team.

The winter training season opened on November 1st and schools of all kinds are in full swing. School for Thomason Act Reserve Officers is held every day. The five on duty with the 1st Squadron are:

- 2d Lt. A. C. Avery
- 2d Lt. L. F. Clark
- 2d Lt. R. E. Couhig
- 2d Lt. A. J. Nogelo
- 2d Lt. L. L. Willard

All are graduates of the R.O.T.C. unit at Massachusetts State College.

The school for regular officers meets for two and a half hours a week. This year an arrangement has been made for certain combined sessions with the officers of the 7th F.A. at which lectures are given on such subjects as Motor Procurement, Sino-Japanese War, Recent Trends in Tactical Development, Military History of the Champlain Valley, World War Battles, Mechanized Forces, and other subjects of current interest.

Due to the exceptionally good weather the Squadron has been able to work outside almost every day this fall. The Armistice Day Parade in Burlington, usually held in snow or rain, was made in good weather and the Squadron received many compliments on the appearance of men and horses. On November 12th a thirty-mile march was made to the Artillery Range and return, stopping for lunch at the place where we usually camp for summer training.

The first lot of twenty of the forty remounts received last summer all made this march in good shape. They were marched in a separate detachment and not required to keep up with the Squadron. All animals came through in excellent condition and following a test at the end of November by the Squadron Commander the remounts which pass will go for duty.

Training has commenced for a series of Gymkhanas which will be given in the riding hall during the winter. The results of the Gymkhanas last winter were most gratifying both in developing interest in mounted competition among the men of the squadron and thus improving their training, and also in helping establish cordial relations between the Post and the surrounding community.

As the period September 20th to November 20th draws to a close we are in the midst of an inspection by the Corps Area Inspector.

#### 4th Cavalry—Fort Meade, South Dakota

COLONEL STANLEY KOCH, *Commanding*

On November 8th the Regimental Commander announced, without a warning order, that all captains and lieutenants would meet at the riding hall at 6:45 P.M. prepared for a night ride. The course of approximately fifteen miles was laid out by Major Charles R. Chase. Radio reports from scout cars and pack radio sets kept the stay-at-homes in the riding hall posted on the progress of the riders. The contestants rode in pairs. Captain Martin A. Fennell and Lieutenant Robert J. Quinn, Jr., won the prize offered by Colonel Stanley Koch, covering the course in two hours and three minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Elwood L. Nye, Veterinary Corps, was present to inspect all horses as they finished; no horses were found to be

lame after their gruelling rides. After the last pair returned, all the officers and ladies went to the club for coffee and doughnuts—and listened to the alibis of the losers. The following morning, the Commanding Officer led all the regimental officers over the same course in one hour and forty-eight minutes; everyone agreed, upon return, that they had been taken for a ride.

On Wednesday afternoon preceding Armistice Day the officers of the 1st Squadron met and defeated the officers of the 2d Squadron in a hard-fought basketball game; score 23-22. Major Charles R. Chase and Captain Lester P. Veigel, throwing the principle of self-preservation to the winds, acted as referees. Major Leland E. Dashiell, Post Surgeon, was present with three consulting physicians and a detail of stretcher bearers, armed with First Aid equipment, to care for the sick, lame, lazy, and injured. The hostile line-ups:

1ST SQUADRON	2D SQUADRON
Captain D. W. Sawtelle (spare)	Major O. C. Newell
Lt. M. A. Hoherz	Captain M. A. Fennell
Lt. C. W. Hatschullat	Captain L. B. Rapp (spare)
Lt. L. F. Paul	Lt. R. J. Quinn, Jr.
Lt. N. A. Loeb	Lt. W. L. Halverson
Lt. C. E. Hermanek	Lt. P. E. Conant

The losers entertained the officers and ladies of the post with a buffet supper at the Club shortly after the game.

The 2d Squadron sponsored a highly successful Turkey Shoot on Saturday, November 21st. Skeet, trap, calibre .22, and calibre .45 were all provided in order that everyone might have a chance to get a bird.

The first of the series of Winter Horse Shows will be held in the riding hall on the afternoon of Friday, November 26th. Officers will be limited to one entry per class participated in, and each troop will be limited to three entries per class. Trophies or cash prizes will be presented to the winners of each class, and ribbons to the first four places. Each of the Winter Shows will be featured by an exhibition troop drill.

Major Arthur T. Lacey and family arrived on the post November 16th, 1937. Major Lacey was assigned to command the 1st Squadron. He reported after two months leave from Fort Bliss, Texas.

A children's riding class was organized on Wednesday, November 3d, under the tutelage of 2d Lieutenant Edward C. Dunn. The class has been growing steadily in popularity, attracting juvenile riders, not only from the post, but from many of the civilian families in the vicinity as well. The enrollment to date is twenty-eight. Lieutenant Dunn is assisted by Corporal Ralph Storm, Troop E. The class meets twice a week.

### 5th Cavalry—Fort Clark, Texas

COLONEL ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR., *Commanding*

No "muddling through" for the Fifth! Despite the fact that a large percentage of the command has been on de-

tached service at Camp Bullis throughout the Proposed Infantry Division Test, training has progressed very well indeed. Those returning from Camp Bullis will merely take their places in a vigorous training program of drill, schools, and field exercises already in progress.

The regiment has received one hundred and nine recruits, who, quartered in the R.O.T.C. Camp, are undergoing full recruit instruction. Also forty remounts have been trained, and an exceptionally good lot of forty more have just arrived.

As for sports, officers teams have played polo three times a week; much hunting has been done; and the Skeet Club and Post Athletic Association held a successful Turkey Shoot on Sunday, November 21st. A Post Soccer League of eight teams has been organized, with three games being played each week. The playing and coaching has now progressed to a point beyond that where the players either try to kick the ball or somebody's (the opponents???) shins. First Cavalry Brigade Headquarters Troop leads the league with two wins and one tie.

The new gate and bridge at the entrance to the Post have been completed, and the entrance road is being paved. Along with this and other construction, living quarters for stable crews are being completely rehabilitated.

Former residents of the Post would have difficulty in recognizing the interior of the Officers' Club—completely re-painted, re-decorated, and re-furnished, it is indeed a large asset to the Post. A Hallowe'en Hop and an Armistice Day Tea Dance were held in the beautifully furnished Club ball room.

### TROOP HORSE SHOW

On October 27, 1937, Headquarters Troop, First Cavalry Brigade, held a Troop Horse Show at the northeast corner of the Drill Field. Competition between the various sections of the Troop was encouraged and resulted in a rather good turnout, considering the small number of men in the organization and the type of horses with which the troop is mounted. The many and varied duties of a Brigade Headquarters Troop are such that a large amount of mounted work is not possible, and it was gratifying to note the interest shown by men who as a rule do not have the opportunity to ride very much. Post entries were allowed, which was taken advantage of by a good number of men.

It is believed that one of the most interesting features of this Troop Horse Show was the age of the horses participating. With the exception of two young horses transferred in from the 5th Cavalry, Headquarters Troop of the 1st Brigade has received no remounts since 1928. Quite naturally, most of the horses assigned to the Troop are becoming quite old and recently a good number of them have had to be condemned due to the infirmities of old age. With few exceptions, however, the horses, though a little aged, performed quite well and together with the great interest displayed by the men, made a very interesting show. Captain Hubert W. Ketchum, Jr., who

commands the Troop, officiated as Judge for all classes, and Mrs. O. I. Holman very graciously awarded the prizes.

In view of the success of this Horse Show the Troop Commander plans to have a Horse Show, mounted Field Day, or mounted work of a like nature bi-monthly during the current training season. Although the Troop is considerably below strength in the matter of horses, remounts will be allotted the Troop in the near future.

#### CLASSES

##### CLASS I. Best Turned Out Trooper.

- 1st *Reno Beauty*, ridden by Pvt. Park, Tr. Hq. Section.
- 2d *Peanut*, ridden by Pfc. Henyan, Radio Section.
- 3d *Alkali Ike*, ridden by Pfc. Nix, Tr. Hq. Section.

##### CLASS II. Bull Durham Race.

- 1st *Sammie*, ridden by Pvt. Garvin, Tr. Tq. Section.
- 2d *King*, ridden by Pfc. Cheltra, Message Center Sec.
- 3d *Peanut*, ridden by Pfc. Henyan, Radio Section.

##### CLASS III. Teams of Jumpers.

- 1st *Ramona*, ridden by Pvt. Isam, Radio Section.  
*Major*, ridden by Pvt. Cotharn, Radio Section.  
*King*, ridden by Pvt. Lovern, Radio Section.
- 2d *Goldbrick*, ridden by Pvt. Prestidge, Intell. Sec.  
*Blackbottom*, ridden by Pvt. Eickehorst, Intell. Sec.  
*Twilight*, ridden by Pvt. Walker, Intelligence Sec.
- 3d *Reno Beauty*, ridden by Pvt. Park, Tr. Hq. Section.  
*Peon*, ridden by Pvt. Nuckles, Tr. Hq. Section.  
*Monte*, ridden by Pvt. Geffert, Tr. Hq. Section.

##### CLASS IV. Troopers Mounts.

- 1st *Peanut*, ridden by Cpl. Martin, Radio Section.
- 2d *Major*, ridden by Pvt. Cotharn, Radio Section.
- 3d *Blackie*, ridden by Sgt. Keplinger, Radio Section.

##### CLASS V. Open Jumping.

- 1st *Goldbrick*, ridden by Pvt. Garvin, Tr. Hq. Section.
- 2d *Blackbottom*, ridden by Pvt. Prestidge, Intell. Sec.
- 3d *Diamond*, ridden by Cpl. Sikes, Message Cen. Sec.

Ages of some of the horses which were shown are as follows:

*Diamond*, 18 years; *Blackbottom*, 17 years; *Goldbrick*, 15 years; *Peanut*, 15 years; *Major*, 14 years; *Ramona*, 14 years; *Sammie*, 14 years; *Blackie*, 13 years; *Alkali Ike*, 13 years, and *King*, 13 years.

#### 6th Cavalry—Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia

COLONEL GEORGE DILLMAN, *Commanding*

A Military Tournament and Horse Show was held at Fort Oglethorpe from Sunday, October 24th to Sunday, October 31st, inclusive. There was an admission charge for certain events the proceeds to go to charitable organizations.

The following program was presented:

- October 24th—Drag Hunt. Polo Game.
- October 25th—Regimental Review.
- October 26th—Military Exhibit.
- October 27th—Drag Hunt. Polo Game.
- October 28th—Horse Show.

October 29th—Horse Show. Hunter Trials. Races, etc.

October 30th—Horse Show.

October 31st—Drag Hunt. Military Exhibit. Polo Game.

THE DRAG HUNTS called out large and enthusiastic fields. Courses were laid out so that spectators could witness the casts and view much of the running. This exhilarating sport is one of the major recreational activities at this station.

POLO: Three polo games were played as a part of the Tournament Week. On Sunday, October 24th, the Fort Oglethorpe Colts, composed of young players who have been in the regiment a year or two, played a civilian team from Cleveland, Tennessee, called the Bradley County Farmers. On Wednesday, the 27th, a junior Fort Oglethorpe team played a team from Fort McPherson. On Sunday, the 31st, the Fort Oglethorpe first team played a team from Fort Benning, Georgia. Fort Oglethorpe won all three games. Very large crowds attended the two Sunday games. Between halves of the first game the Bugle and Drum Corps of the Davis King Summers Post of the American Legion put on an exhibition drill. Between halves of the second game, and prior to the third game, Troop F, 6th Cavalry, staged a musical ride. Between halves of the third game, Troop E, 6th Cavalry, put on a formal mounted Guard Mounting.

The REGIMENTAL REVIEW was attended by a large crowd from Chattanooga. Honor guests occupied a special box erected for the occasion.

MILITARY EXHIBITS drew hundreds of people curious to see how soldiers live and what they do for a living. The exhibit consisted of a troop in shelter tent camp with cooks, saddlers, horseshoers, etc., functioning as if in the field; mounted pistol course; rifle targets; machine guns; message center, radios; scout cars; First Aid station; veterinary exhibit; and chemical warfare exhibit.

The HORSE SHOW and HUNTER TRIALS were interspersed with gymkhana events, Roman races, flat races, and hound races. There were twenty-nine classes including hunters, jumpers, gaited saddle horse, etc. A number of civilian entries showed and officers and ladies from Fort McPherson won a number of trophies and ribbons. Most of the trophies were donated by business men, organizations, and other civilian friends from Chattanooga.

On October 1st, the regiment began a period of individual and troop training, together with Officers', non-commissioned officers' and specialists' schools.

The following changes have occurred in regular Commissioned personnel.

Officers joining since July 1st:

Lt. Col. James M. Trout, Med. Corps, Maj. Hans E. Klopfer, Capt. Edwin M. Burnett, Capt. Thomas T. Thornburg, Capt. Hugh F. T. Hoffman.

Officers leaving since July 1st:

2d Lt. Paul M. Jones, 2d Lt. Andrew J. Lynch.



The regiment is pleased to have the following Thomason Act Officers who have joined for a year's training.

2d Lt. Edwin Thomas Knight, 2d Lt. John Hadley Todd, 2d Lt. James Owens Harley, 2d Lt. John White Yow, 2d Lt. Thomas Hearn Verdeal, 2d Lt. Servetus Perkins Crockett, 2d Lt. James Ashburn Seay, 2d Lt. George Long McElmurray, 2d Lt. William Andrew Wilkins, 2d Lt. Arthur Middleton Williams, 2d Lt. Randolph Eben Jones, 2d Lt. Joseph LeMasurier, Jr.

52 recruits who have joined during the summer months have been trained and are now on duty with the troops.

In addition to the new personnel, we received 60 excellent remounts which were given a very complete course of training.

A varied and successful program of sports has provided recreation and entertainment for local personnel. A hotly contested inter-troop baseball schedule saw B troop emerge with the championship. Informal horse shows designated to develop green horses and young riders were held bi-weekly.

### 7th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL JOHN K. HERR, *Commanding*

The officers and men who were absent at San Antonio on the Infantry Division Tests returned to Fort Bliss just after the middle of November. This absence of a large part of the command, since the first part of September, has prevented the holding of the regular inter-troop basketball league as in other years. However, troops have had some practice with team members, who remained at Fort Bliss, and a squadron basketball league was started the first of November. Now that the test troops are back, this will develop into a short inter-troop elimination tournament in preparation for the participation of the regimental team in the post league.

Training has been curtailed thus far this season, having been limited to individual training with equitation and animal management being stressed. Combat firing has been held at Castner Range each month as well as the progressive, monthly known distance firing. Recruit training has been carried forward without interruption and the recruits will be in excellent shape to join their troops when the combined training season is started the latter part of November.

The regiment furnished a troop for the composite squadron sent to parade in El Paso on Constitution Day. This mounted troop consisted entirely of recruits, of from two to four weeks training, up to and including squad leaders with the noncommissioned officer instructors acting as file closers and Thomason Act officers as platoon leader. The appearance and performance of this troop were highly complimented by the regimental commander. It is believed that the use of qualified recruits in public functions of this kind creates in them an early enthusiasm for their training and has a consequent beneficial result on their morale.

A regimental horse show was staged in Howze Stadium on October 16th in preparation for the informal Post Horse Show held on October 30th. In this latter show the Garry Owens made an extremely good showing by taking first and second in the Enlisted Men's Green Jumpers; first, second, third, and fourth in the Green Polo Ponies, first in the Officers' Charger Class; second and third in the Open Jumping and second in the teams of polo ponies.

The opening of the new bowling alleys at the Army Y.M.C.A., has developed an interest in this sport among officers and enlisted men alike. The officers team of the Seventh Cavalry after being beaten by the Brigade Commanders' team, revenged this defeat in their second meeting and also took over a team from Division Headquarters, and one from the 8th Cavalry. Troop teams are being organized and will soon be competing with other troop teams on the post as well as outside teams.

The Southwestern Open Championship Polo Tournament began on October 20th and continued to November 7th. Teams taking part this year were El Valle, University of Arizona, New Mexico Military Institute, Dallas, 8th Cavalry, Special Troops, Juarez and the Garry Owens. The Seventh defeated the Eighth in the second game by a score of 11 to 6, then in the semi-finals, downed El Valle, which had previously beaten Juarez, by the score of 18 to 6. The finals in the Southwestern Championship on November 7th between the Seventh Cavalry and the New Mexico Military Institute, which had previously defeated Arizona, and Special Troops, brought out a tremendous and colorful crowd in spite of a drizzling day. The Seventh had to give the Institute three goals by handicap and, after one of the most memorable polo battles ever staged in the Southwest, the Garry Owens took the Paul Revere bowl and the Southwestern Championship by a score of 14 to 9. The team lined up with Captain Yale at No. 1, Lt. Estes at No. 2, Lt. Wilson at No. 3 and Captain Howze at No. 4, with Lt. Miller as substitute. Lt. Miller, a Thomason Act officer, played in the first game against the Eighth Cavalry due to the absence of Captain Howze, and turned in an excellent game. Every man on the team played fine polo individually and the team work was outstanding. Lt. Harry Wilson, just joined from West Point, fitted in at No. 3 in great shape and was a tower of strength during the tournament.

### 8th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL INNIS P. SWIFT, *Commanding*

During the months of September and October, combat firing, using caliber .22 rifles and machine guns was conducted. Very satisfactory results were obtained on ranges not in excess of 300 yards. Due to money savings the use of caliber .22 instead of caliber .30 ammunition is excellent to instruct in combat fire at short ranges.

A regimental horse show and gymkhana was held on

September 24th and 25th, in which six (6) of the twenty-one (21) events were limited to enlisted men with not more than one and one-half years service, and one class in enlisted men's jumping was for men on their first enlistment.

The following are the results:

#### CLASS I—ENLISTED MEN'S SCHOOLING

- 1st Sgt. Sanders, Troop F, riding *Naughty Boy*;
- 2d Cpl. Gann, Troop A, riding *Yankee*;
- 3d Pvt. Toles, Troop E, riding *King*;
- 4th Sgt. Prueitt, Hq. Troop, riding *Mint Julep*.

#### CLASS II—JUMPING (ENL.) (All soldiers on first enlistment)

- 1st Pvt. Hood, Troop F, riding *Sky High*
- 2d Pvt. Cross, Troop A, riding *Rhubarb*
- 3d Pvt. Daniels, Hq. Troop, riding *Rabbitt*
- 4th Pvt. C. Cross, Troop E, riding *Spike*

#### CLASS III—MOUNTED WRESTLING

- 1st Pvt. Jacobs, Troop B
- 2d Pvt. Garland, Hq. Tr.

#### CLASS IV—BEST POLO MOUNT

- 1st Lt. Cherry, riding *Lady Gay*
- 2d Capt. Reardon, riding *Swingtime*
- 3d Capt. Neal, riding *Sun Pixie*
- 4th Lt. Janzan, riding *Barnaby*

#### CLASS V—BEST DRILLED SQUAD

- 1st Troop E
- 2d Troop F
- 3d Troop A

#### CLASS VI—JUMPING (Enlisted Men)

- 1st Sgt. Prueitt, Hq. Troop, riding *Hannibal*
- 2d Cpl. Black, MG Troop, riding *Sis*
- 3d Pvt. Willoughby, Troop F, riding *Naughty Boy*
- 4th Cpl. Gann, Troop A, riding *Air Mail*

#### CLASS VII—RESCUE RACE

- 1st Troop E
- 2d MG Troop

#### CLASS VIII—REMOUNT JUMPERS

- 1st Cpl. Black, MG Troop, riding *Colonel*
- 2d Cpl. Hague, Troop E, riding *School Boy*
- 3d Cpl. Robertson, MG Troop, riding *Tristan*
- 4th Sgt. Sanders, Troop F, riding *Stroll Along*

#### CLASS IX—MOUNTED EGG AND SPOON RACE

- 1st Pvt. Garland, Hq. Tr.
- 2d Pvt. Keeton, MG Tr.

#### CLASS X—OPEN JUMPING FOR OFFICERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND GUESTS

- 1st Mrs. Bradford, riding *Don*
- 2d Capt. Jones, riding *Bashful*
- 3d Lt. Cole, riding *Scarface*
- 4th Lt. Janzan, riding *Sotol*

#### CLASS XI—TROOPERS' MOUNTS

- 1st Sgt. Prueitt, Hq. Tr., riding *Boono*

- 2d Cpl. Senclair, Troop F, riding *School Boy*
- 3d Pvt. Smith, Troop E, riding *Preacher*
- 4th Pvt. Bowman, Troop A, riding *Coco*
- 5th Pvt. Taylor, MG Troop, riding *Killcrest*
- 6th Pvt. Brooks, Troop B, riding *Carmen*

#### CLASS XII—RESERVE OFFICERS' JUMPING

- 1st Lt. Shields, riding *Sultan*
- 2d Lt. David, riding *Bashful*
- 3d Lt. Forrest, riding *Kid*
- 4th Lt. Paul, riding *Baal*

#### CLASS XIII—LADIES' JUMPERS

- 1st Mrs. Cole, riding *Scarface*
- 2d Mrs. Bradford, riding *Stroll Along*
- 3d Miss Polk, riding *Reno*
- 4th Miss Richmond, riding *Cheka*

#### JUNIOR DIVISION

- 1st Miss Swift, riding *Naughty Boy*
- 2d Miss Forster, riding *Colonel*
- 3d Miss Oder, riding *Tristan*
- 4th Miss Cheves, riding *Mickey*

#### CLASS XIV—MOUNTED TUG OF WAR

- 1st 1st Squadron

#### CLASS XV—OFFICERS' SCHOOLING

- 1st Lt. Cole, riding *Yankee*
- 2d Major Pierce, riding *Tramper*
- 3d Lt. Wadkins, riding *Billy*
- 4th Lt. Alger, riding *Baal*

#### CLASS XVI—CHILDREN'S HORSEMANSHIP

- 1st Miss Piedy Aleshire
- 2d Master James Jones
- 3d Master John Jones
- 4th Miss Betty Forster

#### CLASS XVII—CHAMPION JUMPER

- 1st Sgt. Sanders, Troop F, riding *Kaiser*
- 2d Capt. Jones, riding *Bashful*
- 3d Mrs. Bradford, riding *Don*
- 4th Lt. Cole, riding *Scarface*

#### CLASS XVIII—SACK AND MULE RACE

- 1st Pvt. Smith, Troop E
- 2d Pvt. Byrom, MG Troop

#### CLASS XIX—LADIES' AND CHILDREN'S THREE-GAITED

##### CLASS

- 1st Mrs. Cole, riding *Rosita*
- 2d Miss Bradford, riding *Goldigger*
- 3d Mrs. Bradford, riding *Naughty Boy*
- 4th Miss Peggy Aleshire, riding *Susie*

#### CLASS XX—BEST HUNTER (Any Weight)

- 1st Mrs. Bradford, riding *Naughty Boy*
- 2d Lt. Janzan, riding *Tip*
- 3d Lt. Cole, riding *Baalbec*
- 4th Lt. Wadkins, riding *Stroll Along*

#### CLASS XXI—SLOW MULE RACE

- 1st Pvt. Black, Troop E.

2d Pvt. Ballard, Troop A

Another regimental horse show was held on October 22d and 23d which was open to more experienced riders and horses. Results as follows:

CLASS I—OFFICERS' CHARGERS (Compulsory for all Lieutenants)

- 1st Lt. Walker, riding *Hannibal*
- 2d Lt. Alger, riding *Tramper*
- 3d Lt. Shields, riding *Yankee*
- 4th Lt. Palmer, riding *Naughty Boy*

CLASS II—GREEN POLO PONIES

- 1st Lt. Cherry, riding *Goofy*
- 2d Lt. Palmer, riding *Croix de Guerre*
- 3d Capt. Reardon, riding *Lady Meise*
- 4th Capt. Neal, riding *Narcissa*

CLASS III—GREEN JUMPERS—ENLISTED MEN

- 1st Pvt. Smith, Troop F, riding *Big Boy*
- 2d Cpl. Barnes, Troop B, riding *Sulton*
- 3d Pvt. Dobbs, Troop B, riding *Jeff*
- 4th Pvt. Keeton, MG Troop, riding *Elmo*

CLASS IV—OPEN JUMPING

- 1st Sgt. Sanders, Troop F, riding *Kaiser*
- 2d Lt. Walker, riding *Bashful*
- 3d Lt. Cole, riding *Scarface*
- 4th Cpl. Robertson, riding *Baalbec*

CLASS V—LADIES' HACK

- 1st Miss Pery Aleshire, riding *Vin Rouge*
- 2d Miss Ann Bradford, riding *Goldigger*
- 3d Miss Diana Richmond, riding *Blue Bird*
- 4th Miss Tish Barnum, riding *Thusie*

SPECIAL JUMPING CLASS

Senior Division

- 1st Miss Diana Richmond, riding *Cheka*
- 2d Miss Tish Barnum, riding *Scarface*
- 3d Miss Sally Swift, riding *School Boy*
- 4th Miss Dorothy Cheves, riding *Jeff*

Junior Division

- 1st Miss Betty Forster, riding *Colonel*
- 2d Master Gilbert Cheves, riding *June Bug*
- 3d Miss Pam Swift, riding *Hickory*
- 4th Master Jim Jones, riding *Tangy*

A total of seven (7) officers and two hundred and one (201) enlisted men will soon return from participation in the Proposed Infantry Division Test which has been carried on at San Antonio, Texas, since September 15th. Upon their return, full training will be resumed.

All Troops are now preparing for the Cavalry Leadership Test, which will be held during the month of December. All Lieutenants and one platoon from every troop are entered in the individual phase, which is composed of tests in—Pistol Dismounted and Mounted—Rifle—Cross-Country Riding—Schooling Mounted—Handiness and Speed of Mount—Swimming—High

—Jump—Running—Rope Climbing—Throwing Hand Grenades—Running Broad Jump.

Platoons from Headquarters and Machine Gun Troops are entered in this phase, but only platoons of rifle troops are entered in the Leadership Phase, which is confidential.

It is necessary to obtain a satisfactory rating in nine (9) of the twelve (12) individual events to participate in the Leadership Phase.

9th Cavalry, Fort Riley, Kansas

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CUTHBERT P. STEARNS,

Commanding

The Supplemental Target Season ended October 30th with satisfactory results—Private Henry Turner, Troop E, who entered the service August 18th for the first time firing the service rifle led the range with 232 score for Course B.

Several officers of the regiment attended the Mechanized demonstration at Fort Knox, Kentucky. During their stay the Amateur Radio Station operated by the regiment and manned by members of the communication platoon handled a large volume of messages to their friends and families.

While on the subject of communications, it is well to mention that during the 4th Army Maneuvers the regiment played a very important part and demonstrated once more the versatility of cavalymen when it organized and operated the Signal Company for the Provisional Cavalry Division. The nucleus for the Signal Company was formed from the Communication Platoon of the regiment which acts during the School Year as the Demonstration and Operation Unit for all instruction in communication at the Cavalry School. This is a highly trained organization and many of its members are used as assistant instructors in the radio course given to Advance Equitation Class so the formation of a radio section for the maneuvers presented few difficulties. The formation of the rest of the Company, with its large Division Message Center and Wire Section, was a far more difficult problem however, for it necessitated taking into the platoon a large number of recruits who had never heard of Signal Communications. As only a month could be spared for the training of this group, due to the many duties which have to be performed by the regiment in connection with the school, and as much of the wire equipment had to be improvised, the men had to undergo a very intensive period of training during the heat of July and August. The excellent spirit shown by the men of the company was the subject of comment of all with whom they came in contact and the efficiency of the unit was testified to by the Commandant, the Division Commander, when he complimented them personally at the conclusion of the maneuvers. Throughout the maneuvers the communications functioned without a serious hitch even though more than two hundred messages were handled daily by the company. The successful handling of this difficult duty is one more accomplishment in a long series of fine



performances by the regiment and is a lasting tribute to the ability of Cavalrymen to make good at any job required of them.

The Buffalo (10th Cavalry) Gridders strayed to the upland grazing grounds (Ft. Riley) October 31st and were slaughtered by the Indians (9th Cavalry) by a score of 13 to 7.

The first snow of the season fell November 15th and found the Indians in Council after defeating the Black Razorbacks from Fayette, Arkansas, by a score of 28 to 0, Sunday, November 14th. This Council was not to celebrate or rejoice their victory but to prepare themselves for that yearly trek to the grazing grounds of the Buffalo (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas), for a feast on Buffalo meat, November 25th.

The Regimental Football team have had a very successful season and have shown marked improvement under the tutelage of Coach "Chief Tully." Their victories:

Joplin, Mo., Panthers .....	41-0
K. C. Chauffeurs Club .....	6-0
Santa Fe Shop Team .....	35-7
Western University .....	27-7
10th Cav., Buffaloes .....	13-7
Sedalia, Mo., Trojans .....	19-0
Black Razorbacks .....	28-0

## 10th Cavalry (Less 2nd Squadron and M. G. Troop) Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LIEUTENANT COLONEL N. B. BRISCOE, *Commanding*

Since the last issue of The JOURNAL the regiment has been principally engaged with its usual duties at the Command and General Staff School.

Captain Raymond D. Palmer and Captain Robert G. Lowe joined in September, Captain Palmer from the 1937 Cavalry Rifle Team, his latest station being the 12th Cavalry at Ft. Brown, and Captain Lowe from the 26th at Ft. Stotsenburg.

The regiment participated in the Armistice Day Parade in Leavenworth and received much favorable comment on its appearance and the performance of its mounted trumpet corps of twenty members.

Our football team is approaching the end of a very successful season, having won five games, tied one and lost one to the Ninth Cavalry at Ft. Riley on October 31st by a score of 7 to 13. Our Athletic Officer, Captain John P. Willey, has had the able coaching assistance of Captains Eddy Doyle and Bill Wood, who are students in the C&GSS and who have given very generously of their very limited spare time. We are looking forward to a return game with the Ninth Cavalry at Ft. Leavenworth on Thanksgiving Day and hoping to even the score. Win, lose, or draw there will be important festivities following the game.

Recently the regiment had a very interesting visitor in the person of Regimental Q.M. Sergeant Philip Letcher, Ret., who first enlisted in the Tenth Cavalry at Ft. Leav-

enworth in 1879 and served continuously with this regiment until he was retired at Ft. Robinson, Neb., December 25, 1906. His service included many of the Indian Campaigns in the southwest, service in Cuba during the Spanish-American War and again during the Cuban Pacification. After his retirement from the army, he again served the United States for nearly twenty years in the Postal Service. He now makes his home at 3415 N. 28th Street, Omaha, Nebraska.

## 11th Cavalry—Presidio of Monterey, California

COLONEL TROUP MILLER, *Commanding*

The following letter of commendation was received by the Regimental Commander, from Brigadier General Walter C. Sweeney, Commanding General of the 6th Brigade, Reinforced, after the return of the regiment to its home station upon completion of the Fourth Army Maneuvers at San Luis Obispo, California. (See CAV-ALRY JOURNAL, September-October, 1937.)

"It is with great personal satisfaction that I commend you and through you the officers and men of your 11th Cavalry for their services during the recent Fourth Army Maneuvers in the San Luis Obispo Area.

"The rapidity with which your command was able to shift from one flank to the other and to relieve threatened points in our line added immeasurably to the strength of our Blue Force and was an important factor in the successful operation of the Blue Force in the face of numerically superior forces.

"The cooperation of the cavalry with the other units of the Brigade and the close liaison it maintained with adjacent units and with 6th Brigade Headquarters are indicative of a highly trained regiment in which the morale and loyalty of the officers and men are most outstanding.

"During the four days of the maneuver many hardships were imposed on the troops chiefly by reason of their having to reoccupy their 'battle' position each day by 3:30 A.M. These hardships were accepted and undergone in a cheerful and uncomplaining spirit, that was highly commendable.

"Please convey to all the officers and men of your command my congratulations and thanks for their superior performance of duty."

The Regular Small Arms Target Season having been completed, the Regiment is again consolidated at its permanent station, the Presidio of Monterey. Post schools have been initiated and the Annual Training Program is under way.

Informal monthly horse shows are again being held. Classes are scheduled for both officers and enlisted men with emphasis placed on the progress of training of remounts. Remounts are classified according to date of arrival at this station from the depots with competition in certain classes restricted accordingly.

The post polo team has renewed practice and match play. Fifteen members of the garrison are competing for

places on the team. Major Charles H. Gerhardt, 11th Cavalry, has been designated as polo representative and team coach. Captain Lyman L. Judge, 11th Cavalry, and Captain Frank J. Thompson, 11th Cavalry, in addition to Major Gerhardt, have represented the regiment on the post team in competition to date. Matches are played weekly with local teams of the peninsula on the Del Monte Fields and less frequently with Stanford University at Palo Alto.

A training stable is operated on the post where prospective hunters and polo ponies are stabled and trained for participation in competition.

The fall and winter program of the recreation center is creating considerable entertainment and recreation. Monthly boxing bouts have aroused interest in the post as well as in the surrounding communities. The touch-football league, made up of organizations of the Presidio, has an enthusiastic following while the basketball league will soon be under way.

The Honorable John J. McGrath, Congressional Representative from the 8th California District was a guest of the Regimental Commander, Colonel Troup Miller, on October 29th. Congressman McGrath addressed the officers of the garrison, was entertained at lunch by the Regimental Commander and was the guest of honor at a mounted review of troops of the garrison as well as at the ceremony which followed. The opportunity afforded by the occasion of the visit of Congressman McGrath was utilized to present, with an appropriate ceremony, the trophies won by the 11th Cavalry Rifle Team and its individual members in the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio. The 11th Cavalry Team consisting of:

First Lieutenant Thomas D. Gillis, 11th Cavalry,  
Sergeant Victor Shantz, Troop "B," 11th Cavalry,  
Sergeant Paul Foster, Machine Gun Troop, 11th Cavalry,

Sergeant Gregory Tzitzicas, Troop "A," 11th Cavalry,

won the Regimental Team Trophy Match and was awarded the trophy symbolizing the event. Sergeant Victor Shantz, Troop "B," won the Cavalry School Trophy in the Individual Off-hand Match and the Cavalry-Engineer Trophy awarded to the high man of the Cavalry-Engineer Team. Sergeant Paul Foster, Machine Gun Troop, won the Holbrook Trophy awarded to the new man of the Cavalry Team securing the highest score in firing five times over the National Match course. Both Sergeant Shantz and Sergeant Foster were members of the Cavalry Team. Colonel Miller presented the trophies to the members of the team and addressed the assembled regiment commending the team on the gratifying showing made by the representatives of the regiment.

First Lieutenant Frederic W. Barnes, 11th Cavalry, USMA Class of 1934, and Second Lieutenant Robert G. Fergusson, 11th Cavalry, USMA Class of 1936, were married during the month of November. Lieutenant Barnes and Miss Rosa Miller, daughter of the Regi-

mental Commander, were married on November 4th, and Lieutenant Fergusson and Miss Charlotte Lawrence, daughter of Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Lawrence, Retired, of Carmel, California, were married on November 18th. The well wishes of the garrison were extended to the newlyweds in many social gatherings prior to the weddings.

Armistice Day was appropriately celebrated by the garrison in coöperation with the U.S.S. *Oklahoma*, commanded by Captain C. C. Hartigan, and patriotic organizations from the cities situated on the Monterey Peninsula. A colorful ceremony was held on Armistice Day at the new Monterey Municipal Airport constructed by the W.P.A. and turned over to the city for operation on November 11th. A detachment of sailors from the U.S.S. *Oklahoma*, "E" Troop, and the Band from the regiment represented the Army and Navy at the dedicatory exercises.

The *Oklahoma* arrived in Monterey Bay on November 9th and remained in the harbor until November 12th. During the visit of the battleship its officers were entertained by officers of the garrison at social functions at the Presidio and by individuals and organizations from the local communities at the Del Monte Hotel and other entertainment centers. Sailors from the ship played basketball with local teams in the post recreation center, rode through the Del Monte Forests on mounts provided by the 11th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 76th Field Artillery, were entertained with a dance at the recreation center, given by enlisted men of the garrison, and attended a wrestling exhibition staged by the Post Recreation Officer.

Major General W. G. Holmes, British Army, was the guest of honor of the garrison at a mounted review of troops on Wednesday, November 10th. General Holmes was escorted to the Reviewing Ground by Troop "A" of the Regiment, commanded by Captain Philip Shotwell. Captain Hartigan, commanding the U.S.S. *Oklahoma*, and officers of the ship also witnessed the ceremony from boxes in the reviewing stand.

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## 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, Fort Ringgold, Texas

LIEUTENANT COLONEL F. C. V. CROWLEY, *Commanding*

Fort Ringgold has, under the capable hand of Major Joe C. Rogers, been subject to many improvements. It is not believed that there exists a Post in the Corps Area where W.P.A. has been put to a better use. The irrigation system and installation of a powerful pump has transformed the Post from a more or less burnt area to a green spot amidst the surrounding cactus and mesquite.

The baseball diamond has been altered to provide for softball games and a league established which, to date, has been quite exciting to all. The league of six teams involves ninety men in athletics. A basketball league is contemplated in the near future involving the use of an outdoor lighted court.

The one time excellent Ringgold range is being restored for use by the Squadron, which hitherto has had to travel to Fort McIntosh or Fort Brown for rifle practice.

The officers and ladies of Fort Ringgold gave a dance during the latter part of October which was particularly successful in that it was attended by a number of officers and ladies from Fort Brown. Those attending were: Colonel Donald A. Robinson; Lt. Colonel and Mrs. H. M. Rayner; Major and Mrs. P. C. Clayton; Major and Mrs. T. Roemer; Major and Mrs. Dodd; Captain and Mrs. Stillinger, and Lieutenant and Mrs. Darrah.

### 26th Cavalry (PS)—Fort Stotsenburg, P. I.

COLONEL CLARENCE A. DOUGHERT, *Commanding*

The period of garrison training in the regiment ended on August 31, 1937. During this period schools were held covering the following subjects: (1) Sketching; (2) Clerical Work; (3) Defense against chemicals; (4) Horseshoeing; (5) Communications; (6) Ordnance; and (7) Motors.

On September 1, 1937, the regiment started its field training. During October troops and squadrons will have frequent field exercises and marches.

The two Regimental horseshows held in September and October were well attended. The outstanding performers in these two shows were U. S. Government remount *Johnny* ridden by Private Olivares, Headquarters Troop; U. S. Government *Bosni*, ridden by Private Benabese, Troop F; Major J. V. V. Shufelt's *Ten Broeck* ridden by Miss Jean Shufelt; Lieut. Colonel E. W. Taulbee's *Miss Supress* ridden by the owner and by Lieut. M. H. Acklen; and U. S. Government *Nick Tony*, ridden by Captain Z. W. Moores. The remount *Larry* and Captain Moores' *Noabit* winners in the last show have a great deal of promise.

Headquarters Troop won the Regimental Championship in Soccer, without the loss of a game.

From September 17-27, 1937, the regimental bowling teams, 1st Lt. Wayne J. Dunn, in charge, participated in the Department bowling tournament at Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I. The regimental teams placed 4th in ten pins and 5th in duck pins.

Polo practice games have just started. Games will be played regularly beginning in November.

War Department orders have assigned the following cavalry officers to duty in the Philippine Department:

Majors Pierce, John T., Halderman, W. T., and Hood, J. D.

Captains Kinnison, H. L., Jr., Bradley, Wm. J., and Burnside, Walter.

1st Lieuts. Lichirie, C. A., and Johnson, M. C.

Major Gordon J. F. Heron and 1st Lt. C. C. Allan are under orders for the states and will leave on the November Transport.

The 15th Anniversary of the organization of the regiment was celebrated on October 1, 1937. After a dis-

mounted review the regiment assembled and a brief address was made by Colonel Clarence A. Dougherty, Commanding the Regiment. A horseshow was held during the morning, the troop dinners and dances were held during the afternoon and a regimental dance that night.

### 112th Cavalry, Dallas, Texas

COLONEL WALTER B. PYRON, *Commanding*

The armory training in all units of this regiment is progressing most satisfactorily.

The individual refresher basic training period was completed by all units, as scheduled, on September 30th, and the second period squad training is now in progress.

During this period a squad competition is being conducted to determine the best squad in the regiment.

The competition is designed to encourage attendance at drill, to develop efficient squad teams, to demonstrate the qualities of prompt decisions, leadership, and aggressiveness in the squad leader, as evidenced by the general efficiency of his squad as a whole.

The test is divided into two phases: The Troop phase, from October 17th, to January 16th, and the Regimental phase from January 24th to the 31st. The weight for each phase is 50% of the total score for the complete squad test.

A board of Officers appointed by the regimental commander has prepared the test and will conduct it for each squad in the regiment.

Prizes will be awarded in each Troop to the winning squad in that Troop, and the best squad in the regiment, as determined by the board, will receive a cash prize donated by Colonel Pyron.

This competition has awakened the keenest interest throughout the regiment and bets are already being wagered as to the best squad.

Every Sunday one may observe in the hills, and on the dirt roads on the outskirts of Dallas, the squads engaging in their small Cavalry problems on advance guard, reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and hastily prepared actions, etc.

At almost every Officers call, since this armory training period started, Colonel Pyron has enunciated three cardinal principles to his squadron and troop commanders: "Teach your man to ride, to shoot, and take care of his horse." These principles are being stressed to the Nth degree by all troop commanders in this organization, and the results to date are most gratifying.



Trailer Field Kitchen, Headquarters Troop, 112th Cavalry



On November 11th, the Headquarters Troop represented the regiment in the Armistice Day, parade held in Dallas. Captain George A. Brewer, deserves great credit for the splendid appearance of his organization. He had his men and equipment looking like new pins and many complimentary remarks were heard from the spectators as this fine looking organization passed in review.

The troop field trailer-kitchen (see cut) was the hit of the parade. Captain Brewer had his cooks and mess attendants, in spanking white uniforms, preparing a meal while the parade was in progress. This was an eye opener to many of the spectators and one darkey spectator remarked, "It sure looks to me like them thar soldiers eat mighty well in war time."

This trailer kitchen is not a part of issue equipment, but was designed and built by Captain Brewer at his own expense. Its motive power is a twelve cylinder Packard engine and it is completely equipped with gas ranges, ice box, and serving tables to take care of all the mess needs of the troop and regimental headquarters personnel. The electric cooler was found most useful on the maneuvers, last summer, for icing the Colonel's beer.

Captain Campbell W. Newman and Lieut. James H. Neel, as members of the Dallas Polo team, participated in the polo tournament held at Fort Bliss the early part of November. The Dallas team, due to the long accurate hitting of Captain Newman, at No. 4, and the accurate goal shooting of Lieut. Neel, at No. 1, came through the tournament with colors flying, winning four out of the five games played. Both Captain Newman and Lieut. Neel, were loud in their praises of the courtesy and hospitality shown them while guests of the 1st Cavalry Division, Officers at Fort Bliss.

Colonel Pyron attended the annual meeting of the National Guard association at Montgomery Ala., at which he states a most important legislative program was mapped out with view of enacting laws in accordance with the program at the next session of Congress.

Major Sidney Johnson, commanding the second Squadron, who was the instructor, at the first session of the regimental non-coms school on October 4th, is being congratulated for the excellent conference and demonstration he gave. The subject The Proper Method of Instructing, a most difficult one, was put across by Major Johnson, in a most interesting and masterful manner, so that all the non-coms, as one stated, could hardly wait for the next drill to put in practice the valuable points, Major Johnson had taught them.

### 62d Cavalry Division

#### 305th Cavalry—Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

COLONEL VINCENT A. CARROLL, Cavalry-Reserve,  
*Commanding*

The active training period of the 305th got under way with the annual election of officers of the 305th Cavalry Association. Assembling in the historic armory of the

First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry, familiar to everyone in the cavalry service as the First City Troop, the officers cast their ballots for the administration best calculated to keep alive the activity and esprit de corps of the 305th during the coming season.

When all ballots had been counted the result showed that Major Leslie C. Bell had been elected first vice-president; Captain Ray Love, secretary; Lieutenant Shaler Stidham, Treasurer, and Captain Edward A. Towne to the Executive Committee.

The regiment participated in the annual Armistice Day parade in Philadelphia. This year the officers of the 305th acted as aides to the Marshal, Colonel Vincent A. Carroll, commander of the 305th.

An annual event on the program of the regiment is the church service, held on the Sunday nearest Armistice Day at the chapel at Ithaca, of which Regimental Chaplain Gurley is the Rector. This year's service will be doubly significant in that the regiment will honor the memory of their late Adjutant, Captain William J. Taylor, Jr. An irreplaceable loss to all of us.

On October 10, 1937 the 305th Cavalry lost one of its most beloved officers when Captain William J. Taylor, Jr., Regimental Adjutant died in the Pennsylvania Hospital after a very short illness.

Captain Taylor was born on July 3, 1896 in Cape May, N. J. He was a son of Mrs. Emily Newbold Taylor and the late Colonel William J. Taylor, noted surgeon of Philadelphia. He attended the Hoosick School, N. Y. of which he later became a Trustee. His military career began in 1915 and 1916 by attending the voluntary military camp conducted by the late General Leonard Wood, and known as the Plattsburg Training Camp. On May 12, 1917, he enrolled in the First Officers Training Camp at Fort Niagara, N. Y. In August, 1917 he was sent to Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, to complete his training. On November 17, 1917 he was commissioned a second lieutenant and assigned to the 335th Machine Gun Battalion, 87th Division at Camp Pike, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Just before the 87th Division sailed for France in August, 1918, he was married in Philadelphia to Miss Pauline Maynard of Knoxville, Tenn.

While in France he served as Intelligence Officer of the 335th Machine Gun Battalion. In March, 1919, he was demobilized and returned to his civilian occupation as a banker.

On October 14, 1924 he again entered the Army as a 2nd Lieut. Cavalry Reserve and was assigned to the 305th Cavalry. From that date until his death he served in this regiment, giving freely of his time and energy to raise the professional standing of the 305th Cavalry and participated actively in all regimental affairs.

He was commissioned a 1st Lieut., Cavalry Reserve on November 14, 1928, and in the Fall of 1932 was promoted to the rank of Captain, Cavalry Reserve. Upon becoming a Captain he was made Regimental Adjutant and filled that important staff position until his death. Captain Taylor had completed the required work for promotion to the

rank of Major, Cavalry Reserve, and would have been appointed to that rank in December of this year, 1937, had he lived.

He was an active member of the Sons of the Revolution, the Loyal Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He was well known throughout the 62nd Cavalry Division and had many friends in the Regular Army, National Guard and Officers' Reserve Corps.

Captain Taylor was an exceptional officer and was known, and will be remembered for his magnetic personality, tact, military knowledge and ability, and his keen sense of humor.

He is survived by a son, William J. Taylor, III, a daughter, Elizabeth, a brother C. Newbold Taylor, a sister Mrs. Charles Willing and a brother Francis Taylor.

### 306th Cavalry—Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington, D. C.

COLONEL J. B. P. CLAYTON HILL, Cavalry-Reserve,  
*Commanding*

The first regular conference of the "inactive" duty season was held on October 4, 1937 at the residence of Colonel Hill. The subject was "Orientation." The conference was conducted by Lieut. Colonel Wm. H. Skinner, who also reported briefly on the proposed plan of organizing a 306th Cavalry Club. The schedule for the coming year was discussed. The following officers were present: Colonel J. B. P. Clayton Hill, Lieut. Colonel Wm. H. Skinner, Major Wallace C. Warner, Captains Vernon J. Blondell, Thomas H. Mundy, Samuel Glazier and Ellis O. Keller, 1st Lieut. Graham Dukehart, all 306th Cavalry, and 1st Lieut. W. A. Parr, Med-Res., attached to the regiment. Major L. L. Bradford, Spec-Res., and 2d Lieut. D. F. Fisher, Jr., Med-Res., also attended.

The annual Regimental Dinner was held on Saturday evening, October 9th, 1937 at the Longfellow Hotel, Baltimore. Thirty-five officers were present, the Washington group being well represented as usual. Colonel Hill acted as the Toastmaster. Colonel Osmun Latrobe, Cav., Chief of Staff, 62nd Cavalry Division and Colonel Henry W. Baird, Cav., Senior Instructor, Baltimore (Md.) Reserve Units, were guests of the Regiment, as was a former officer, Lieut. Colonel Warren Dean, who served as the Executive and Supervisor of Training of the regiment during the early days of its organization in the spring of 1918. Others at the speakers table included Colonel Matthew F. James, 307th Cav., Colonel Stuart C. Hopper, QM-Res., President of the Maryland Department, Reserve Officers Association, Lieut. Colonel L. N. Glass, Cav., Unit Instructor, 307th Cavalry (Richmond, Va.), and Major John C. Mullenix, Cav., our 2d Squadron Unit Instructor.

Lieut. Colonel Skinner and Major Edward B. Harry described the progress being made in the organization of the 306th Cavalry Club, which it is proposed to locate in the country between Washington and Baltimore. All those present heartily approved the project, and a very

substantial sum was subscribed to underwrite the venture. Lieut. Colonel Warren Dean spoke on the training of the regiment during the World War days, and Lieut. Colonel Glass gave a most interesting extemporary address on the "Genealogy and Background of the Cold Spring Hounds, and their relationship to the 11th Foot" that was much enjoyed. The dinner arrangements were made by Captain Vernon J. Blondell and 1st Lieut. Graham Dukehart.

The conference of October 18th was held at Colonel Hill's residence. Captain Samuel Glazier acted as Instructor, the subject being the "Estimate of the Situation," which was illustrated by a cavalry problem. Lieut. Colonel Skinner reported further progress by the Cavalry Club Committee. It was announced that starting in November, all local reserve officers would meet twice monthly at the 104th Medical Regiment Armory, M.N.G. on the second and fourth Wednesdays, the first hour (7:30-8:30 PM) to be devoted to a general talk by an outstanding speaker, and the second hour to Unit meetings, for the usual working of problems, etc., in assigned rooms.

Members of the regiment have taken tables for the annual Armistice Night Banquet and Ball, which is sponsored by the Maryland Department, Reserve Officers Association of the United States.

### 2d Squadron, 306th Cavalry

MAJOR EDWARD B. HARRY, 306th Cavalry, *Commanding*

The Inactive Duty training period for the 2d Squadron and Machine Gun Troop, 306th Cavalry, Headquarters 462d Armored Car Squadron, and Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 153d Cavalry Brigade, got under way with the first meeting being held in the Reserve Officers Assembly Room, Munitions Building, October 7th. The speakers of the evening were:

"Defense against Chemical Warfare," by Captain T. J. Ford, Chemical Warfare Service.

"Mobilization of the 306th Cavalry," by Major Geary F. Eppley, 306th Cavalry.

The second conference was held on October 21st and included a training film (sound) on "Map Reading," and conferences on the "Preparation of Training Schedules," by Major H. H. Jacobs, 306th Cavalry, and "Reconnaissance Troop," by Captain E. A. Kane, 306th Cavalry. Both meetings were well attended with approximately 45 officers and candidates of cavalry present on each occasion.

The first Equitation Class of the season was held at Fort Myer, Va., on Sunday, October 31st, during which a small amount of "jumping" was done, followed by a most enjoyable cross-country ride.

### 307th Cavalry—Richmond, Virginia

COLONEL MATTHEW M. JAMES, Cavalry-Reserve,  
*Commanding*

Captain L. L. Montague recently brought out the 1936-37 addendum to the Regimental History—Copies on request to the Unit Instructor.

Competition for the Cavalry School detail has involved at least one of "ours"—Captain John W. Mann. We nominate him as good as most and better than the rest.

Through the courtesy of the Blues, the Richmond representation will have the opportunity for pistol practice this winter. The lads living near V.M.I. will have already shot away the four hundred rounds shipped up there.

Lieut. Colonel Glass has started his monthly school trips into the hinterland.

### 2d Squadron, 307th Cavalry, Norfolk, Virginia

The first unit school of the current inactive duty training period was held on October 19th, subject being "Reconnaissance and Counter-Reconnaissance," conducted by the Unit Instructor by means of a map problem with written solutions to the requirements by the students.

First Lieut. Southgate W. Taylor, after completing a prodigious amount of extension course work and attending the last two summer camps, has received his well-deserved captaincy.

We regret that our 2nd Lieut. William J. White, having moved to Pittsburgh, has been transferred to the 308th Cavalry, but congratulate them on getting an active and enthusiastic cavalryman.

First Lieut. Bill Trolan writes from Oklahoma City that he is as busy as a one-eyed bird dog in a field of quail, but has found time to get over to Fort Sill and meet Major Rinaldo Coe, the Cavalry Instructor there, and expects to get some riding and fox hunting during this winter. He also expresses great enthusiasm for the new *Cavalry Combat*, just published by the U. S. Cavalry Association, and we agree emphatically with him that no cavalryman can afford to be without it.

### 308th Cavalry—Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

COLONEL GEORGE H. CHERRINGTON, Cavalry-Reserve,  
*Commanding*

The school year is now upon us. As usual, submission of extension course lessons is starting slowly. It is to be hoped that it will pick up as usual—or even better than usual.

The first conference proved to be the best attended of any during the last two years. May this keep up!

Outdoor activities at the Training Center are satisfactory, considering the weather. In addition to the strictly military features, there have been two important parties. The first was a supper after the opening of the trapshooting season. More than seventy were served fried chicken and all the trimmings. Forty officers and guests participated in the shooting. The other party was held the Saturday night before Hallowe'en and was attended by about forty. There were several regulars missing from the mounted instruction on the following morning. A swell party!

Plans are being made for the third annual Turkey Shoot

on the Sunday before Thanksgiving. These shoots are becoming quite popular and we expect a large crowd.

A survey of the officers of the regiment is also being made to determine the advisability and desirability of staging a military ball in February, as we did last year. At the rate the replies are coming in, it is believed the ball will be held and that it will be as successful as the previous one.

### 862d Field Artillery (Horse) Baltimore, Maryland

COLONEL ROGER S. B. HARTZ, Field Artillery-Reserve,  
*Commanding*

The 862d Field Artillery (Horse) completed a very successful active duty training period at Fort Hoyle, Maryland, on September 3, 1937.

Nine officers formed part of a provisional regiment—the remainder of which was composed of officers from the 311th F.A. and 571st F.A.

During service practice (37 mm) much emphasis was placed upon lateral firing with a small angle "T."

### R.O.T.C. Unit (Cavalry Regiment) New Mexico Military Institute

Having lost three members of last year's championship team by graduation two of whom went to the University of Arizona, there only remained Cadet "Jack" Shirley around which to build another Polo Team.

Major "Andy" Norton entered his green team in the Southwestern Open Tournament at Fort Bliss, Texas and drew the University of Arizona in the first game which was won by the Institute in an extra period Score: 10-9.

Surprising even the most ardent enthusiasts and partisan supporters the team advanced to the finals by virtue of victory over the Special Troops.

The finals played Sunday, November 7, 1937 between the veteran Seventh Cavalry team and the youthful R.O.T.C. Cadets resulted in the defending champions of last year (New Mexico Military Institute) surrendering their crown to the Seventh Cavalry.

In this tournament the inexperienced Cadet team of this year showed almost unbelievable ability against veteran teams.

Former members of the Institute teams, Lt. Wilson of the Seventh Cavalry, and Cadets Thompson and Means of the University of Arizona, played on opposing teams.

Major General Herbert J. Brees, Commanding General, Eighth Corps Area, made an inspection of the unit on November 3, 1937. A Regimental Review, inspection of buildings, facilities, mounted drill, dismounted combat, machine gun drill, rifle marksmanship, shelter tent pitching, occupied the two hour period. General Brees complimented the Cadet Regiment on their excellent showing. Of the 557 cadets over one half were now cadets with less than 6 weeks R.O.T.C. Training.



# Roster of Regular Army Cavalry Officers

(As of November 15, 1937)

## Office, Chief of Cavalry, Washington, D. C.

**Major General**  
Leon B. Kromer

**Colonels**  
Alexander M. Miller, Jr. Guy Kent

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Karl S. Bradford Henry J. M. Smith

**Majors**  
Robert W. Grow Louis LeR. Martin  
Charles S. Kilburn Frank L. Whittaker

## The Cavalry Board, Fort Riley, Kansas

**Colonel**  
Dorsey R. Rodney

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Geo. S. Patton, Jr.

**Majors**  
Charles F. Houghton Richard E. Tallant

**Captain**  
Elmer V. Stansbury

## Commandant, Staff, and Faculty, The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas

**Brigadier General**  
Guy V. Henry

**Colonel**  
Clarence Lininger

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Cuthbert P. Stearns

**Majors**  
John J. Bohn Thomas W. Herren  
Frank A. Allen, Jr.

**Captains**  
Harrison H. D. Heiberg Winfield C. Scott  
William H. Hunter Carl D. Silverthorne  
Paul G. Kendall Willard G. Wyman  
George A. Rehm

## Staff and Faculty, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia

**Major**  
Kramer Thomas

## Staff and Faculty, The Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

**Major**  
Rinaldo L. Coe

## Staff and Faculty, The Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama

**Major**  
Richard L. Creed

## Staff and Faculty, The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

**Major**  
Alexander B. MacNabb

## Staff and Faculty, The Coast Artillery Corps School, Fort Monroe, Virginia

**Major**  
Otto B. Trigg

## Staff and Faculty, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**Colonel**  
Kinzie B. Edmunds

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Thoburn K. Brown Kenna G. Eastham  
John A. Considine Frederick Gilbreath  
Paul R. Davison Raymond E. McQuillin

**Majors**  
Wayland B. Augur Frederick R. Lafferty  
Harold deB. Bruck Harrold C. Mandell  
Cornelius M. Daly Albert C. Smith  
Oliver L. Haines Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.

**Captain**  
Henry M. Zeller

## Staff and Faculty, Army War College, Washington, D. C.

**Colonels**  
William W. Gordon George B. Hunter

**Major**  
James W. Barnett

## War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

**Colonel**  
Adna R. Chaffee

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
John B. Coulter Robert W. Strong  
Alexander D. Surles Pearl L. Thomas  
William Nalle

**Majors**  
Roderick R. Allen Earnest N. Harmon

**Captain**  
Paul McD. Robinett

## General Staff with Troops

**Colonels**  
Joseph A. Baer, Baltimore, Maryland  
William C. Christy, Fort Hayes, Ohio  
Frank Keller, Fort Bliss, Texas  
Llewellyn W. Oliver, Atlanta, Georgia  
Kerr T. Riggs, Panama, C. Z.  
William W. West, Fort Hayes, Ohio

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Sidney V. Bingham, Hawaii  
Harry D. Chamberlin, Fort Bliss, Texas  
Henry L. Flynn, Baltimore, Maryland  
Edward C. McGuire, San Francisco, Cal.  
Pearson Menoher, Boston, Massachusetts

**Majors**  
David H. Blakelock, Atlanta, Georgia  
James T. Duke, Fort Bliss, Texas  
McFarland Cockrill, Fort Bliss, Texas  
John W. McDonald, Hawaii  
James M. Shelton, Omaha, Nebraska

## Duty with General Staff

**Majors**  
Carl H. Strong, Governors Island, N. Y.  
William T. Hamilton, Fort Sam Houston, Texas  
Herbert A. Myers, Atlanta, Georgia  
Beverly H. Coiner, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

## Military Attaches

**Majors**  
Gustave B. Guenther, Riga, Latvia  
Norman E. Fiske, Rome, Italy  
Royden Williamson, Istanbul, Turkey

## Duty With Troops

### Headquarters, First Cavalry Division, Fort Bliss, Texas

**Brigadier General**  
Ben Lear

**Majors**  
Carl B. Byrd Roscoe S. Parker  
Percy S. Haydon

**Captains**  
Henry I. Hodes Hugh B. Waddell

### Headquarters, Special Troops, Fort Bliss, Texas

**Colonel**  
Stephen W. Winfree

**Majors**  
John C. Macdonald William R. Stickman

**Captains**  
Augustine D. Dugan Charles G. Meehan

**First Lieutenant**  
Harry E. Lardin

### First Armored Car Squadron, Fort Bliss, Texas

**Captain**  
Rogers A. Gardner

**First Lieutenant**  
William S. Van Nostrand

### First Cavalry Brigade, Fort Clark, Texas

**Brigadier General**  
Kenyon A. Joyce

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Charles L. Clifford

**Major**  
Halbert H. Neilson

Harry C. Mewshaw

**Captains**  
Hubert W. Ketchum, Jr.

### Second Cavalry Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas

**Brigadier General**  
Robert McC. Beck, Jr.

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
J. Frank Richmond

**Majors**  
Gilbert X. Cheves Charles A. Horger

**Captain**  
Verne D. Mudge

### Seventh Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), Fort Knox, Kentucky

**Brigadier General**  
Daniel Van Voorhis

### First Cavalry (Mechanized), Fort Knox, Kentucky

**Colonel**  
Bruce Palmer

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Willis D. Crittenberger John F. Davis Jack W. Heard

**Majors**  
Burton C. Andrus  
Raymond C. Blatt  
Erie F. Cress  
Gersum Cronander  
Wade C. Gatchell

**Captains**  
John L. Ballantyne  
William L. Barriger  
Wendell Blanchard  
Charles H. Bryan  
Daniel P. Buckland  
Douglas Cameron  
Harold Engerud  
Richard B. Evans  
Marcus E. Jones

**First Lieutenants**  
Phillip H. Bethune  
J. Paul Breden  
Charles G. Dodge  
Robert M. Lee

### Second Cavalry, Fort Riley, Kansas

**Colonel**  
Arthur W. Holderness

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Robert O. Annin William M. Grimes William E. Shipp

**Majors**  
Henry T. Allen  
Frank M. Barnhart  
John W. Carroll  
Ira A. Correll  
James A. Kilian

**Captains**  
William A. Bugher  
Andrew A. Frierson  
Charles H. Noble  
John H. Riepe  
Gordon B. Rogers

**First Lieutenants**  
Joseph A. Cleary  
Karl T. Gould  
David L. Hollingsworth  
Theodore F. Hurt, Jr.

**Second Lieutenants**  
Albert A. Matyas  
Eugene Nall

### Third Cavalry (Less First Squadron), Fort Myer, Virginia

**Colonel**  
Jonathan M. Wainwright

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
John Millikin

**Majors**  
Frank C. DeLangton  
Renn Lawrence  
Gyles Merrill

**Captains**  
Leslie D. Carter  
Thomas Q. Donaldson, Jr.  
John L. Hines, Jr.  
Henri A. Luebberrmann

**First Lieutenants**  
Charles M. Iseley  
Charles B. McClelland, Jr.

**Second Lieutenant**  
Richard M. Bauer

### First Squadron, Third Cavalry, Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Thomas H. Rees, Jr.

**Majors**  
Samuel V. Constant Herbert E. Watkins

**Captains**  
Raymond M. Barton  
Roland A. Browne

**First Lieutenant**  
Robert M. Fuller, III

**Second Lieutenants**  
Robert E. McCabe Edward W. Sawyer

### Fourth Cavalry, Fort Meade, South Dakota

**Colonel**  
Stanley Koch

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Edwin O'Connor

**Majors**  
Malcolm Byrne  
Charles R. Chase  
Geoffrey Galwey  
Wharton G. Ingram

**Captains**  
Martin A. Fennell  
Mitchell A. Giddens  
Henry C. Hine, Jr.

**First Lieutenants**  
Charles C. W. Allan  
William W. Culp

**Second Lieutenants**  
Kelso G. Clow  
Edward C. Dunn  
Norman A. Loeb

### Fifth Cavalry, Fort Clark, Texas

**Colonel**  
Robert C. Richardson, Jr.

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Lucien S. S. Berry John C. F. Tillson, Jr.

**Majors**  
Roy E. Blount  
Gordon J. F. Herron  
Oliver I. Holman

**Captains**  
Clovis E. Byers  
Murray B. Crandall  
Raymond W. Curtis  
Alan L. Fulton  
Benjamin H. Graban

**First Lieutenants**  
Angelo R. DelCampo, Jr.  
Branden M. Greeley

**Second Lieutenants**  
Kelton S. Davis  
Geo. H. Minor

### Sixth Cavalry, Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia

**Colonel**  
Geo. Dillman

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Howell M. Estes Henry L. Flynn

**Majors**  
Carlisle B. Cox  
Hans E. Kloefer  
Fred W. Koester  
Milton H. Patton

**Captains**  
Joseph K. Baker  
Logan C. Berry  
Edwin M. Burnett  
Walter Burnside  
Hugh F. T. Hoffman  
John O'D. Murtaugh

**First Lieutenants**  
John F. Franklin, Jr. Hamilton H. Howze

**Second Lieutenants**  
Stephen W. Holderness  
Charles J. Hoy  
Ned T. Norris

### Seventh Cavalry, Fort Bliss, Texas

**Colonel**  
John K. Herr

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Benjamin F. Hoge  
Harding Polk

**Majors**  
Edmund M. Barnum  
Donald R. Dunkle  
Edward F. Shaifer

**Captains**  
Christopher C. Strawn  
Raymond E. S. Williamson

**Captains**  
John L. De Pew  
Robert Edwards  
Robert L. Howze, Jr.

**Second Lieutenants**  
Creighton W. Abrahams, Jr.  
Andrew J. Boyle  
Howell M. Estes, Jr.  
Cæsar F. Fiore  
John S. Growdon  
Benjamin W. Heckemeyer

**Captains**  
Eugene C. Johnston  
Christian Knudsen  
Wesley W. Yale

**Second Lieutenants**  
Vernon P. Mock  
Francis J. Murdoch, Jr.  
Hilwert S. Streeter  
Albert B. Turner  
Edward W. Williams  
Arthur H. Wilson, Jr.

**Eighth Cavalry, Fort Bliss, Texas**

**Colonel**  
Innis P. Swift

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Joseph P. Aleshire

**Majors**  
William T. Bauskett, Jr.  
William B. Bradford  
Horace W. Forster

**Captains**  
George C. Clausen  
Morton McD. Jones  
Ralph M. Neal  
Francis L. Ready

**Second Lieutenants**  
James D. Alger  
Henry T. Cherry, Jr.  
Roy W. Cole, Jr.  
Ralph E. Haines, Jr.  
Russell V. D. Janzan  
William V. Martz

**Captains**  
Darrow Mencher  
Clinton A. Pierce

**Captains**  
William J. Reardon  
Thomas F. Sheehan  
Charles H. Valentine

**Second Lieutenants**  
Robert E. O'Brien, Jr.  
Bruce Palmer, Jr.  
John T. Shields  
Alexander D. Surles, Jr.  
Charles P. Walker

**Ninth Cavalry, Fort Riley, Kansas**

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Terry de la M. Allen  
George S. Andrews  
Charles B. Hazeltine

**Majors**  
William C. Chase  
George E. Huthsteiner  
Thomas F. Limbocker  
George I. Smith

**Captains**  
C. Stanton Babcock  
Royce A. Drake  
Oscar W. Koch  
Halley G. Maddox

**First Lieutenants**  
Edwin H. J. Carns  
Paul D. Harkins  
Frank D. Merrill  
Robert W. Porter, Jr.

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Joseph M. Tully  
John P. Wheeler

**Majors**  
Edwin M. Sumner  
Isaac G. Walker  
Russell C. Winchester

**Captains**  
Milo H. Matteson  
James H. Phillips  
Samuel P. Walker  
Isaac D. White

**First Lieutenants**  
Scott M. Sanford  
Franklin F. Wing, Jr.  
Wm. H. S. Wright

**Tenth Cavalry (Less Second Squadron and Machine Gun Troop), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
N. Butler Briscoe (Commanding)

**Majors**  
Murray H. Ellis

**Captains**  
Frederic de L. Comfort  
Robert G. Lowe

**Majors**  
William N. Todd, Jr.

**Captains**  
Raymond D. Palmer  
John P. Willey

**Second Squadron, Tenth Cavalry, West Point, New York**

**Major**  
Marion Carson

**Captains**  
Clarence K. Darling  
Eugene L. Harrison

**Captains**  
Harry W. Johnson

**Machine Gun Troop, Tenth Cavalry, Fort Myer, Virginia**

**Captain**  
Charles H. Reed

**First Lieutenant**  
James B. Quill

**Eleventh Cavalry, Presidio of Monterey, California**

**Colonel**  
Troup Miller

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
Edward J. Dwan

**Majors**  
Harry L. Branson  
Charles H. Gerhardt  
Norman N. Rogers

**Captains**  
Wm. S. Conrow  
Joseph M. Glasgow  
Lyman L. Judge  
Phillip B. Shotwell

**Majors**  
Wm. H. W. Youngs

**Captains**  
Alden H. Seabury  
James C. Ward

**Captains**  
Marcellus L. Stockton  
Egon E. Tausch  
Frank J. Thompson  
Frank G. Trew

**First Lieutenants**  
Frederick W. Barnes  
Perry B. Griffith  
Travis L. Petty

**Second Lieutenants**  
John H. Daly  
Meyer A. Edwards, Jr.  
Robert H. Fergusson

**First Lieutenants**  
Wm. H. Thompson  
Donald O. Vars

**Second Lieutenants**  
Thomas D. Gillis  
Cecil Himes  
Wilfred H. Tetley

**Twelfth Cavalry (Less Second Squadron), Fort Brown, Texas**

**Colonel**  
Donald A. Robinson

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Harold M. Rayner

**Majors**  
Wilson T. Bals  
Harry A. Buckley  
Philip C. Clayton

**Captains**  
Gordon S. Armes  
Charles H. Martin  
Otto R. Stillinger

**First Lieutenants**  
John W. Darrah  
Marvin C. Johnson

**Second Lieutenants**  
Ewing C. Johnson

**Majors**  
Heywood S. Dodd  
Theodore M. Roemer

**Captains**  
Benjamin A. Thomas  
John R. Thornton  
Joseph M. Williams

**First Lieutenants**  
Richard A. Smith

**Second Lieutenants**  
McPherson LeMoyné

**Second Squadron, Twelfth Cavalry, Fort Ringgold, Texas**

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Francis C. V. Crowley

**Major**  
Herbert L. Jackson

**Captains**  
Frederick W. Drury

**First Lieutenant**  
John J. LaPage

**Second Lieutenants**  
Edward D. Mohlere

**Captains**  
John L. Hitchings

**First Lieutenant**  
John J. LaPage

**Second Lieutenants**  
Edgar J. Treacy, Jr.

**Thirteenth Cavalry (Mechanized), Fort Knox, Kentucky**

**Colonel**  
Charles L. Scott

**Lieutenant Colonels**  
John D. Kelly

**Majors**  
Truman E. Boudinot  
Walton W. Cox  
Harold C. Fellows  
Hugh J. Fitzgerald

**Captains**  
Geo. P. Berilla, Jr.  
John M. Bethel  
Claude O. Burch  
John H. Claybrook, Jr.  
William A. Fuller  
James V. Gagne  
George B. Hudson

**First Lieutenants**  
Harry W. Candler  
Loren F. Cole  
Geo. W. Coolidge

**Majors**  
Goeffrey Keyes

**Captains**  
Nelson M. Imboden  
Bertrand Morrow  
Redding F. Perry  
Mordaunt V. Turner

**First Lieutenants**  
Malcolm D. Jones, Jr.  
Kevin O'Shea  
Frederick R. Pitts  
Geo. W. Read, Jr.  
John L. Ryan, Jr.  
Claude A. Thorpe  
Jesse B. Wells

**First Lieutenants**  
William B. Fraser  
David A. Watt

**Fourteenth Cavalry (Less First Squadron), Fort Des Moines, Iowa**

**Colonels**  
John C. Pegram (Commanding)

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Maak Garr

**Majors**  
John C. Daly  
Joseph W. Geer  
George A. King

**Captains**  
Charles P. Amazeen  
Howard A. Boone  
Harry D. Eckert

**First Lieutenants**  
James C. Blanning

**Second Lieutenants**  
Donald P. Christensen  
John J. Davis  
Ralph S. Harper

**Majors**  
Herman Kobbe

**Captains**  
George A. Moore  
John L. Rice

**First Lieutenants**  
Thomas J. Randolph  
Charles A. Sheldon  
Prentice E. Yeomans

**First Lieutenants**  
James B. Corbett

**Second Lieutenants**  
Eugene V. Reece  
Carl L. Rickenbaugh

**First Squadron, Fourteenth Cavalry, Fort Sheridan, Illinois**

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Wilfrid M. Blunt

**Majors**  
Paul H. Morris

**Majors**  
Brook Putnam



Clyde A. Burcham  
Edwin C. Greiner

**Captains**

Cary B. Hutchinson  
Henry S. Jernigan

**First Lieutenant**  
Wm. E. Chandler

**Second Lieutenants**

Carl Baehr, Jr. Walter C. Gleye

**Twenty-sixth Cavalry (P.S.), Fort Stotsenberg, P. I.**

**Colonel**  
Clarence A. Dougherty

**Lieutenant Colonels**

Edgar W. Taulbee Herbert E. Taylor

**Majors**

Jay K. Colwell Paul J. Matte  
Paul C. Febiger John T. Pierce  
Royce P. Gerfen Herman F. Rathjen  
William T. Haldeman James VanV. Shufelt  
John D. Hood

**Captains**

Eustaquio S. Bacig Zachary W. Moores  
Wallace H. Barnes Juan S. Moran  
William J. Bradley Granville V. Morse  
Geo. V. Ehrhardt Donald H. Nelson  
August W. Farwick Paul A. Ridge  
William O. Heacock Thos. Robinson  
Henry L. Kinnison John H. Stadler  
Rufus L. Land Mortimer F. Sullivan

**First Lieutenants**

Milton A. Acklen James L. Hathaway  
Brainerd S. Cook Cornelius A. Lichirie  
Gerald C. Cowan Samuel L. Myers  
Wayne J. Dunn Thomas F. Taylor

**United States Military Academy, West Point, New York****Captains**

Woodbury M. Burgess Alexander M. Miller, III  
Clarence C. Clendennen Lawrence E. Schick  
Thomas L. Harrold Ira P. Swift  
Willard A. Holbrook Ronald M. Shaw

**First Lieutenants**

Thomas J. Brennan, Jr. Theodore S. Riggs  
Frank H. Britton Chandler P. Robbins, Jr.  
Albert H. Harris Glenn F. Rogers  
John L. Inskeep Karl L. Scherer  
O'Neil K. Kane Thos. F. Van Natta, III  
Geo. R. Mather John K. Waters

**Students, The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas****Advanced Equitation Course****Captains**

John H. Collier Harold M. Forde  
Edwin P. Crandell Morris H. Marcus  
Paul A. Disney Basil L. Riggs

**First Lieutenants**

Bogardus S. Cairns Harry J. Fleeger  
Walter E. Finnegan Hugh W. Stevenson

**Regular Course**

**Captain**  
Harry W. Miller

**First Lieutenants**

David V. Adamson Matthew W. Kane  
Robert E. Arnette, Jr. Anthony F. Kleitz, Jr.  
William G. Bartlett Charles E. Leydecker  
Joseph E. Bastion, Jr. Norman K. Markle, Jr.  
Robert H. Bayne Whitside Miller  
F. Clay Bridgewater Joseph H. O'Malley  
Edwin M. Cahill James H. Polk  
William F. Damon, Jr. Jules V. Richardson  
Marshall W. Frame Robert W. Rayburn  
William H. Greear Harold L. Richey  
George R. Granert Graves C. Teller  
Joseph F. Haskell Jack W. Turner  
Jesse M. Hawkins, Jr. David Wagstaff, Jr.  
Frank S. Henry Sherburne Whipple, Jr.

**Students, The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas****Majors**

Stephen Boon, Jr. John O. Lawrence  
John T. Cole Ray T. Maddocks  
Harold E. Eastwood Eugene A. Regnier  
Thomas J. Heavey Charles H. Unger  
Kent C. Lambert

**Captains**

Edward J. Doyle Erle F. Thomson  
Donald H. Galloway James H. Walker  
Peter C. Hains, III John W. Wofford  
Paul M. Martin William H. Wood  
Gilman C. Mudgett

**Students, The Army War College, Washington, D. C.****Lieutenant Colonels**

Calvin DeWitt, Jr. John B. Thompson  
Duncan G. Richart

**Majors**

William K. Harrison, Jr. James C. Short  
Rufus S. Ramey Arthur P. Thayer

**Captain**  
Charles S. Miller

**Student, The Naval War College, Newport, R. I.**

**Lieutenant Colonel**  
Guy W. Chipman

**Students, The Army Industrial College, Washington, D. C.****Majors**

Joseph L. Philips Willard S. Wadleton

**Student, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia**

**Captain**  
Charles V. Bromley, Jr.

**Student, The Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama**

**Captain**  
Andrew E. Forsyth

**Language Students, Tokyo, Japan**

**Captain**  
Alexander George

**First Lieutenant**  
Eric H. F. Svensson, Jr.

**Student, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.**

**First Lieutenant**  
Joseph A. Michela

**Duty with the Organized Reserves****Colonels**

Henry W. Baird, Baltimore, Maryland  
Robert Blaine, Chattanooga, Tennessee  
Hugh H. Broadhurst, Kansas City, Missouri  
John K. Brown, New York, New York  
Richard E. Cummins, Boston, Massachusetts  
Oscar Foley, Tacoma, Washington  
Francis W. Glover, Charleston, South Carolina  
Frederick D. Griffith, Jr., Louisville, Kentucky  
John B. Johnson, Chicago, Illinois  
Osmun Latrobe, Towson, Maryland  
Isaac S. Martin, Chicago, Illinois  
Carl H. Muller, St. Louis, Missouri  
Ralph M. Parker, Detroit, Michigan  
Emil P. Pierson, New Orleans, Louisiana  
Jerome G. Pillow, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Robert C. Rodgers, Marion, Illinois  
George M. Russell, New York  
Howard R. Smalley, Rochester, New York  
Daniel D. Tompkins, Fort Bragg, North Carolina  
Arthur E. Wilburn, San Antonio, Texas  
Arthur H. Wilson, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

**Lieutenant Colonels**

James K. Cockrell, Huntington, West Virginia  
Richard W. Cooksey, New York, New York  
Arthur B. Conard, Detroit, Michigan  
Edward L. N. Glass, Richmond, Virginia  
John Kennard, Chicago, Illinois  
Welton M. Modisette, Newark, New Jersey  
Henry McE. Pendleton, Towson, Maryland  
Harold Thompson, Kansas City, Missouri  
Spencer A. Townsend, Los Angeles, California  
Frederic W. Whitney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

**Majors**

Harry H. Baird, Boston, Massachusetts  
Alfred L. Baylies, Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
Charles W. Burkett, St. Louis, Missouri  
Richard W. Carter, Detroit, Michigan  
Lathan H. Collins, Miami, Florida  
Roy E. Craig, Omaha, Nebraska  
Ernest F. Dukes, Buffalo, New York  
James R. Finley, Norfolk, Virginia  
Louis G. Gibney, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania  
Harold B. Gibson, Nashville, Tennessee  
Thomas G. Hanson, Jr., Los Angeles, California  
Harrison Herman, New Haven, Connecticut  
Alton W. Howard, Champaign, Illinois  
Fenton S. Jacobs, Denver, Colorado  
Catesby ap C. Jones, New York, New York  
Carter E. McLennan, Albany, New York  
John T. Minton, Tucson, Arizona  
John C. Mullenix, Washington, D. C.  
Cornelius F. O'Keefe, Towson, Maryland  
Holmes G. Paullin, Camden, New Jersey  
Otis Porter, Altoona, Pennsylvania  
Lewis A. Pulling, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma  
James S. Rodwell, New York, New York  
Frederick H. L. Ryder, Du Bois, Pennsylvania  
Henry M. Shoemaker, Austin, Texas  
William G. Simmons, Louisville, Kentucky  
Curtis L. Stafford, Des Moines, Iowa  
James B. Taylor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma  
Ernest A. Williams, Indianapolis, Indiana

**Captains**

George G. Elms, Atlanta, Georgia  
 Ralph T. Garver, Atlanta, Georgia  
 George R. McElroy, Chattanooga, Tennessee

**Duty with the National Guard****Colonels**

Robert M. Cheney, San Antonio, Texas  
 Archibald F. Commiskey, Baltimore, Maryland  
 Homer M. Groninger, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania  
 Joseph C. King, Des Moines, Iowa  
 Albert H. Mueller, Santa Fe, New Mexico  
 Richard D. Newman, Washington, D. C.  
 Thomas L. Sherburn, Chicago, Illinois

**Lieutenant Colonels**

Frederick W. Boye, Washington, D. C.  
 John T. McLane, Asheville, North Carolina  
 John M. Thompson, Dallas, Texas

**Majors**

Theodore B. Apgar, Brooklyn, New York  
 James N. Caperton, New York, New York  
 Julian W. Cunningham, Hartford, Connecticut  
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